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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis consists of three inter-related empirical papers. It examines the gender dimensions 
of rural land reform process and impacts by exploring the accessibility and benefits of land-
use certificates for female household heads vis-à-vis male household heads in the Amhara 
region of Ethiopia. The existing literature lacks a gender lens of the reform process and 
impacts. 
 
The first paper examines the factors that determine which lands are included in the 
household’s land-use certificate (status of certification), when during the reform process they 
become included (timing of certification), and whether there are gender differentials in each 
of these outcomes.  The findings show that there was gender bias in the rural land reform 
process of the Amhara region in terms of both outcomes.  
 
The second paper examines the impact of land-use certificates and socioeconomic 
factors on household perceived tenure security by gender. The findings suggest that what 
consistently matters more for enhancing perceived tenure security of both male, and 
particularly female household heads is possession of legal documented rights to land holdings 
i.e. land-use certificates. The impact of socioeconomic factors such as male presence in the 
household, mode of production or land use do not seem to be relevant for determining the 
perceived tenure security of male and female household heads. 
 
The third paper examines the impact of land-use certificates and socioeconomic 
factors on land related investments by gender. The findings suggest that land-use certificates 
are significant determinants for enhancing land investments among both male and female 
household heads, although a relatively lesser impact on the latter group is observed. While 
the findings show that land-use certificates are important for enhancing land related 
investments, the results also suggest that the impact of socioeconomic factors are relevant for 
the female household heads such as renting-out land, and male presence in the household. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction  
 
1.1 Gender and Rural Land Reform  
 
Women are key players in the global agriculture sector, making up 43 percent of the overall 
agricultural labor force—ranging from 20 percent in Latin America to 50 percent in East Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2016a). In fact, women in Sub-Saharan Africa account 
for 70 percent of Africa’s food production (World Bank, 2016b). The wave of male migration 
out of rural areas has increased women’s role in farming and contributed to the feminization 
of agriculture (Slavchevska et al., 2016).  
Despite the significant and increasing role of women in agriculture, globally less than 
20 percent of land holders are women (World Bank, 2016a). In particular, women in the 
developing world are less likely to feel secure in their land holdings. Although improving the 
security of land rights is important for both male and female landholders, it is especially 
necessary for the latter group, because women have traditionally been susceptible to greater 
economic and socioeconomic discrimination and are among the most vulnerable groups in 
rural societies (Joireman, 2008). 
2 
Improving women’s land-holding rights can have a substantial impact, too. Secured 
land rights enrich women’s well-being overall—that is, their advantages extend beyond their 
direct female beneficiaries to improvements in the situations of their families and 
communities. For example, using survey data from Peruvian urban households between 1995 
and 2003, Field (2007) finds that receipt of ownership title increased the willingness of 
former urban squatters, especially women, to participate in the formal labor market instead 
of staying at home to protect their land. This increased their income and reduced the 
incidence of child labor in their households. Other studies have shown that when women’s 
land rights improve, they are less likely to face long-term physical and psychological 
domestic violence (Panda, 2006; Gupta, 2006); their participation in household decision 
making is likely to increase (Allendorf, 2007); their families’ nutrition is likely to improve 
(Allendorf, 2007; Katz and Chamorro, 2002); their children’s educational achievements are 
likely to improve (Katz and Chamorro, 2002); and their fertility is likely to decrease (Field, 
2003). 
In recognition of the need for and impact of stronger land rights, many countries, 
especially in Africa, have introduced land-reform legislation and programs. One important 
and popular program that helped protect land rights, especially for marginalized groups such 
as women, was the rural land certification program introduced in Ethiopia in the late 1990s. 
This granted long-term usufruct rights, in the form of land-use certificates issued to land-
holding households, while maintaining the existing land-tenure system of total land 
ownership by the state. Each region was given responsibility for implementing the reform 
locally. The Amhara region in the Ethiopian highlands, which is the area of study in this 
thesis, was the second to undertake the reform. 
Amhara is the second-largest region of Ethiopia. Poverty is prevalent, livelihood is 
susceptible to famine and drought, and land degradation is a serious problem. It is a largely 
rural society, and agriculture is the main source of economic activity. Farming is dominated 
by small landholders mostly operating a mixed farming system.  
Eighteen percent of agricultural holders are female (Berhanu Adenew and Fayera 
Abdi, 2005). They are constrained by economic and social marginalization in their rural 
society, they face higher levels of insecurity over their land holdings than their male 
counterparts, and they invest less in their lands to tackle land degradation.  
3 
The Amhara region implemented the rural land reform in 2002 to reduce insecurity 
over land holdings, strengthen female land-holding rights, and improve livelihoods. The 
outcome was the issuance of land-use certificates to land-holding households. To ensure that 
female-headed households were not excluded, the committees overseeing the implementation 
of the reform were required to have at least one female member each. This was necessary to 
ensure that female landholders had equal opportunities to reap the benefits of formalized land 
rights. 
  
1.2 Gender, Reform Process, and Outcomes 
 
Despite the potential benefits rural land-reform programs can deliver to landholders, attempts 
to implement these reforms come with the risk that the process may not be systematic—that 
is, the potential for bias in who receives land-holding right documents and when. As such, 
the reform process must be designed carefully to ensure that all landholders receive 
formalized land rights, especially those who are at a socio-economic disadvantage in rural 
societies, such as female landholders. 
Several researchers have examined the accessibility of land-use certificates in terms 
of who receives them. Their findings (Do et al., 2008; Burnod et al., 2012; Deininger et al., 
2008a; and Holden et al., 2009) are mixed, ranging from finding the outcomes systematic to 
finding them unsystematic. In addition, the application of the gender context to determining 
the allocation of certificates to lands and households is limited. But despite these problems, 
the literature is useful for guiding the empirical analysis of the determinants of certification 
in the Amhara region and for showing the implications of the findings of the empirical 
analysis regarding the impact of land-titling. 
The first paper in this thesis employs probit estimations using cross-sectional data 
from the “Sustainable Land-Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” survey undertaken in the 
Amhara region in 2007 to examine the rural land-reform process there by gender. This paper 
investigates the determinants of parcel-certification status (whether a land parcel belonging 
to a household is certified) and timing (when the parcel is certified). Overall, the findings 
show that parcels held by female heads are less likely to be certified, but the sex of the head 
of household is irrelevant to when a parcel is certified. In addition, parcel characteristics and 
4 
certain socioeconomic factors affect the likelihood that a parcel is certified. This result holds 
in the aggregate sample of male- and female-headed households and in the male-headed-only 
sample when the estimations are re-run on data disaggregated by sex of the head of 
household. As for the parcel-certification timing, the impact of parcel characteristics is 
mixed, depending on both the parcel characteristic and the sample. The only relevant 
socioeconomic factor in the aggregate sample is schooling: more years of schooling increase 
the likelihood of early parcel certification. However, schooling is an irrelevant factor in the 
female-headed household sample. 
Although the literature for the Amhara region shows that socioeconomic factors could 
affect the certification process for female landholders, the empirical data reveal otherwise. 
However, the sex of the head of the landholding household does matter for the allocation of 
certificates, and this suggests the presence of gender bias in the reform process. Therefore, 
rural land reforms can fall short of achieving their gender objectives when vulnerable groups 
such as women are not sufficiently taken into account in their design and implementation. 
The literature points to three channels through which secure property rights can 
influence the ownership, use, investment, and transfer of land: First, well-defined land rights 
lower the chance of eviction, reduce the use of resources to protect one’s land holdings, and 
increase incentives for land-related investments (Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Besley, 1995). 
Second, land registration reduces the transaction costs of land sale and rental (Besley, 1995). 
Third, formalized land rights increase access to credit, as they allow land to be used as 
collateral (Besley, 1995; De Soto, 2000; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Deininger et al., 2011). 
Despite the general value of this literature, though, a gender lens has not been applied 
extensively in the analyses—for example, in explaining the potential gender differences in 
the channels through which secure property rights can influence land ownership.  
The second paper in this thesis applies gender analyses to studying the impact of land-
use certificates on households’ perceived tenure security using the Chamberlain random-
effects probit and linear probability model estimations. The paper also takes into account the 
endogeneity of certification, as determined in Chapter 4. The data are from the “Sustainable 
Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” survey undertaken in the Amhara region in 1999, 
2002, 2004, and 2007. The empirical results of this second paper reveal that certification did 
enhance households’ perceived tenure security, but as expected did not eliminate it, due to 
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the nature of Ethiopia’s land-tenure system. This system permits land expropriation by the 
state for public purposes even in the presence of certification, and this applies to both male 
and female land holders. However, the finding that certification has a greater impact on 
female-headed households indicates that certification may matter more to female 
landholders, as their social and economic position in the Amhara society makes them more 
vulnerable in protecting their assets. The results in the second paper also show that the impact 
of socioeconomic factors seems weaker than that of certification, and in some estimations 
insignificant altogether, for determining perceived tenure security. This applies to both male 
and female household heads. The findings suggest that what matters most in for both male 
and female household heads in this context is certification: legally documented rights to land 
holdings. Although socioeconomic factors can be important for enhancing land rights, they 
are less significant than formal documentation for securing land rights. This is due simply to 
the nature of Ethiopia’s land-tenure system. These results continue to hold, with the linear 
probability model and instrumental variable estimations being used as robustness checks. 
Using the predicted certification from the findings of Chapter 4 to take endogeneity into 
account reveals that overall, the sex of the household head remains a significant factor in 
perceived tenure security, and socio-economic characteristics remain largely insignificant. 
But the results pertaining to the impact of certification status are sensitive to the use of cross-
section data and predicted certification—that is, certification becomes an insignificant 
determinant of perceived tenure security. 
One critical outcome of strengthened land-holding rights is land-related investments 
that enhance agricultural productivity and livelihood. Place and Hazell (1993), Besley 
(1995), and Gavian et al. (1996) suggested that land investment decisions are affected by 
tenure security: there is a potential correlation between efficiency of agricultural resource 
allocation and formalization of land rights. Goldstein and Udry (2008) indicated that 
expectations of rights over the returns on that investment, and therefore the nature of property 
rights, influences investment incentives. Several works on property rights have presented this 
argument, including Desoto (2000), North (1981), Jones (1986), Mokyr (2002), and 
Engerman and Sokoloff (2003). 
 The third paper addresses the impact of land-use certificates on land-related 
investments. This paper contributes to the literature by applying the gender lens. The analyses 
6 
use probit estimations on cross-sectional data from the “Sustainable Land Use in the 
Ethiopian Highlands” survey undertaken in the Amhara region in 2007. This paper also takes 
into account the endogeneity of certification. The results reveal that certification has a 
significant impact and increases the likelihood that both new and additional soil and water 
conservation (SWC) investments and SWC maintenance are undertaken on parcels (using 
the data from both male- and female-headed households) and that parcels belonging to 
female-headed households are less likely to have both types on investment in them. However, 
with the female-household-only data sample, certification has an insignificant impact on the 
likelihood that either type of investment is undertaken. The results also show that, especially 
in the context of female heads, other factors significantly determine the likelihood of 
investments being undertaken on parcels. These include availability of male labor, and 
wealth. The estimations that take endogeneity of certification into account reveal the 
sensitivity of the impact-of-certification variable to changes in sample size. The predicted 
certification shows that certification has an insignificant impact on the likelihood of added 
SWC investments but a significant positive impact on SWC maintenance. This is similar to 
the result using IV estimations. Wealth and the presence of male labor remain significant 
factors in investment on parcels belonging to female heads, but not when the IV estimations 
are used. 
  The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides background 
information on rural land policy, reform, and gender in Ethiopia and the Amhara region. 
Chapter 3 discusses the data. Chapter 4 is the first empirical paper and covers the rural land 
reform process by gender. Chapter 5 is the second empirical paper and addresses the impact 
of land-use certificates on perceived tenure security by gender. Chapter 6 is the third 
empirical paper and examines the impact of land-use certificates on land-related investments 
by gender. Chapter 7 concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Background on Rural Land Policy, 
Reform, and Gender: Ethiopia and 
the Amhara Region 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Ethiopia1 is a diverse, large, and land-locked country situated in the Horn of Africa2. It has a 
land area of 1 million km2. It has an estimated total population of 97 million, nearly 81 
percent (of the total population) live rural areas (World Bank, WDI), and given the current 
annual population growth rate of 2.6 percent, Ethiopia’s population is projected to total 130 
million by 2025. Over the past decade, annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth ranged 
from 8.6 percent to 12.6 percent, and the range for GDP per capita growth rate was 5.9-9.6 
percent (World Bank, WDI). However, poverty continues to be prevalent i.e. in 2004/2005, 
the poverty rate estimated at national poverty lines was 38.9 percent, and in 2010, the poverty 
rate was 29.6 percent (World Bank, WDI).  
                                                          
1 See Figure A.1: Map of Ethiopia in Chapter 2 Appendix Figures. 
2 Ethiopia is a federal democratic decentralized government system comprising of nine autonomous regions and 
two city administrations.  
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Agriculture continues to be a dominant sector in the Ethiopian economy. In 2014 
agriculture, value added as a percent of GDP was 41.9. Majority of the population are 
employed in the agriculture sector i.e. in 2014 73 percent of the total employment was in 
agriculture; and in the same year 80 percent of males (as a percent of male employment) and 
65 percent of females (as a percent of female employment) were employed in the agriculture 
sector. The sector is a driver of the currently implemented Government’s Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP) which is a long-term agenda setting Ethiopia to become a middle-
income country by 2025 (World Bank, 2015).  
Given the prominence of the agriculture sector, addressing land issues become 
critical. Increasing population pressure, scarcity of land, soil erosion, land fragmentation, and 
insufficient land tenure security are the main land related concerns in Ethiopia. In addition, 
given the visible presence and role of women in the rural communities of Ethiopia, enhancing 
land holding rights of not only men but also women is key for sustainable rural livelihoods.   
One of the key regions in Ethiopia facing these concerns is the Amhara3 region. It is 
the second region in the country to have undertaken the rural land reform in Ethiopia to 
address the aforementioned constraints.  
Therefore, this chapter provides the background and motivation for understanding 
rural land policy, reform, and gender in Ethiopia and the Amhara region. The sections in this 
chapter are organized as follows: First, this chapter describes the evolution of Ethiopia’s land 
tenure system with an overview of the institutional actors, their role in the management of 
the land tenure system, and the implications for women’s access and rights to land. Second, 
since the context under analysis in this thesis is the Amhara region of Ethiopia, a description 
of the socioeconomic overview, land policy, and women’s access and rights to land in the 
region is provided. Following this, the chapter describes the rural land reform process in the 
Amhara region. The final section of this chapter is the conclusion. 
 
2.2 Ethiopia: Evolution of Land Policy 
 
Ethiopia’s land history is better understood through the context of three very different 
                                                          
3 See Figure A.2: Map of Amhara Region in Chapter 2 Appendix Figures. 
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political regimes, namely, the imperial regime which lasted until 1974, the Derg regime 
(1974-1991) and the current regime (1991 to present). The land tenure systems defining an 
individual’s relationship in legal terms to the land under the three political regimes of 
Ethiopia were quite varied with mixed implications for the agriculture sector.  
 
2.2.1 Land Policy under the Imperial Regime 
 
During the imperial regime there were various land tenure systems. In the northern regions 
the main type of land ownership was the rist. Under this system, land did not belong to an 
individual. Rather it belonged to the descent group and those in the group were entitled to a 
segment of the land through usufruct rights. This system was also hereditary. An individual 
was not allowed to sell his/her land outside of the family. The rist system did not allow the 
user to sell, bequeath, or mortgage his/her share of the piece of land outside the family. The 
other major form of land tenure was the gult (grant land) in which land grants were made by 
the provincial rulers or monarch. Under this system peasants with traditional land rights were 
required to make payments to landlords in the form of cash, kind, or labor (Crewett et al. 
2008). Other types of tenure in the North comprised of Samon, Gebbar Mengist, and 
Madeira4. Absentee landlordism in the north was infrequent, and landless tenants were 
limited. 
In the South, majority of the land was controlled by a few such as by the nobility, 
high ranking military personnel, and the church. Therefore, landless tenants and absentee 
landlordism were frequent. High tenure insecurity was common as tenant farmers faced land 
expropriation.  (Wikipedia, “Land Reform in Ethiopia”). 
Despite the variations in the land tenure systems between the northern and southern 
parts of Ethiopia, in both areas, peasant farmers lacked the mechanisms to enhance 
production because of land fragmentation, no access to credit, and the lack of modern 
                                                          
4 “Gebbar is land for which one paid tax on to the government and became the property of the taxpayer. Lands 
for which taxes were not paid to the government became government lands. Samon was land the government 
had granted to the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in perpetuity. Mengist was land registered as government 
property. Maderia was land granted mainly to government officials, war veterans, and other patriots in lieu of 
a pension or salary”.  
Source: Wikipedia. “Land Reform in Ethiopia”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_reform_in_Ethiopia 
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facilities. Over time, the feudal foundations of the land tenure system, deteriorating 
circumstances in the agriculture sector, deteriorating political, economic and social 
conditions led to the collapse of the imperial regime under a revolution led by Mengistu Haile 
Mariam in 1974 (Wikipedia, “Land Reform in Ethiopia”). 
 
2.2.2 Land Policy under the Derg Regime 
 
In 1975, the communist regime (Derg) of Haile Selassie announced the agrarian reform 
program called Proclamation No. 31/1975 “Proclamation to provide for the Public 
Ownership of Rural Lands” (Wikipedia, “Land Reform in Ethiopia”). This proclamation 
ensured that all rural land is owned by the state, and formed the legal foundation for the 
distribution of usufruct rights to a great number of rural families. 
During 1975-1976 the Derg regime implemented the “land to the tiller” approach 
which entailed land redistributions to farmers through Peasant Associations (PA)5. Sale, 
mortgage or lease of land by farmers was prohibited. Bequeathing was restricted to primary 
family members i.e. spouse and children upon death of the main land holder. Sharecropping, 
and use of hired labor were not permitted and the option of migration was ruled out as this 
meant abandonment of land bringing new claimants. The maximum plot size per family was 
10 hectares. Land redistributions occurred frequently to meet population pressure and to 
ensure that families were not excluded from land access. However, land access was 
determined also by the permanent presence in one location which discouraged farmers from 
migrating.  
Although the Derg land reform policies resulted in equitable access to land, the 
agricultural sector faced numerous challenges such as declining agricultural productivity, 
pervasiveness of poor farming techniques, land fragmentation, insecurity of tenure, and 
deficiencies of farm inputs and tools. The frequent land redistributions by the Peasants 
                                                          
5 “Articles 8 and 10 of the 1975 Land Reform Proclamation necessitated that peasants be organized into a 
hierarchy of associations to assist in implementing the rural development programs and policies”. 
Source: Wikipedia. “Land Reform in Ethiopia”, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Land_reform_in_Ethiopia 
 
.  
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Associations led to severe land fragmentation discouraging farmers from undertaking land 
related investments. 
In 1992, the Derg regime collapsed due to mounting political, economic, and social 
instability. Ethiopia became a federal democratic republic with a gradual shift towards a free 
market system. 
 
2.2.3 Land Policy under the Current Regime (Post-Derg) 
 
In the post-Derg regime era, substantial economic changes took place as a result of the 
gradual adoption of the free market system. However, land continued to be under state 
possession as explicitly stated in the 1995 Ethiopian constitution [Article 40]: 
 
“The right to ownership of rural land and urban land, as well as of all natural 
resource is exclusively vested in the state and the peoples of Ethiopia. Land is a 
common property of the Nations, Nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia, and shall 
not be subject to sale or other means of exchange.” (Berhanu Adenew and Fayera 
Abdi, 2005) 
 
Land transactions such as selling and mortgaging of land continued to be strictly prohibited. 
In the event land was needed for public purposes, evictions of land holders were permitted 
under the land policy and land holders were paid compensations. The 1995 constitution does 
mention the prohibition of land leasing, hiring of labor, and mandating a maximum size of 
10 hectares of land allocation to each family, and the length of usufruct rights for land 
holders. Restrictions on renting and sharecropping have become less stringent. Frequency of 
land redistributions was reduced. 
Although federal provisions continued to mandate state ownership of all lands, a law 
was legislated in 1997 which decentralized land administration/policy to the regions6 leading 
to significant variations across the regions of key legal land provisions/requirements. For 
example, the possibility of future land redistribution was an area of variations in regional 
land policies. For example, the Oromia region rules out future land redistributions, in the 
                                                          
6 Tigray region (1997, amended 2002), Amhara region (2000), Oromia Region (2002), and Southern Regional 
State (2003) (Crewett et al. 2008). 
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Amhara region and the Southern Regional State future land redistributions are considered, 
while the Tigray regional policy does indicate the possibility of future land redistributions. 
Moreover, in the Amhara and Tigray regions, the right to use land depends on the residence 
in the kebele. With the exception of the Amhara region, all other regions imposed limitations 
on the amount of land to be leased.  
 
2.3 Ethiopia: Land Rights, Farming, and Gender 
 
Prior to the land reform under the Derg regime, women were given the right to inherit land. 
The reform under the Derg regime which distributed the land according to family size 
registered the lands under the name of the male household head. Therefore, most women did 
not have rights to land possession. This changed during the post-Derg regime era i.e. the 1995 
Constitution mandated equal rights to land between men and women in terms of access, 
management, and transfer as well as equal inheritance rights. 
 Currently there are four mechanisms by which women can acquire access and rights 
to land: (i) land acquired through marriage which is considered a shared tenure; (ii) continued 
access and right to land due to changes in marital status such as death, divorce, and even 
through polygamy; (iii) inheritance; and (iv) access and rights to land through purchase 
(Endalamaw, 2014). Access and actual enforcement of land rights under each one of these 
mechanisms varies across regions as each has its own legal stipulations on land 
administration and use.  
Women in Ethiopia account nearly 48 percent of the agricultural labor force 
(Endalamaw, 2014). However, women are not culturally viewed as key farming agents. 
Perceptions on the role of women in farming are not supportive of their active involvement 
in agricultural activities. 
Unpaid and casual labor growing subsistence crops for household consumption, 
weeding, storing, processing, and harvesting manually certain cash crops are the main 
agriculture related activities women in Ethiopia engage in. Men tend to use relatively more 
technology in farming activities relative to women, due to lack of access, and cultural 
prohibitions on technology use, as well as the view that crops grown by women have lower 
priorities for agricultural research than those grown by their male counterparts.  
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Overall women’s activities in farming are also limited for several reasons: first, 
women have less access to key farming resources such as livestock (bulls/oxen) and farming 
equipment. Second, women’s limited role in farming is also due to the gender-based division 
of labor confining them to undertake more household responsibilities. Third, women with 
land can be limited by the availability of male labor in the household who can undertake 
farming activities in the field. Fourth, cultural norms imposed on women through the 
prohibition of their involvement such as in sowing, ploughing, and planting makes them 
dependent on male labor.  Female land holders respond to these constraints by rent-out their 
land to male members of the rural community with access to farming resources in exchange 
for share-cropped returns. 
 Female farmers have less access to extension services relative to men, mainly due to 
cultural restrictions which limit male-female interaction resulting in extension support being 
provided mostly to the male farmers. In addition, women in farming communities have no to 
less access to rural financial services compared to men due to several constraints: low 
literacy, cultural and social restrictions, and lack of collateral (Endalamaw, 2014). 
 
 
2.4 Amhara Region: Socio-Economic Context and Land-Tenure    
      Policy 
 
2.4.1 Socio-Economic Context   
 
The Amhara region is the second largest region in Ethiopia, following the Oromia region. It 
is located in the northern, north eastern and central areas of Ethiopia. Based on the 2007 
Census conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA), the Amhara Region 
has a population of 17,214,056 with an urban population comprising 12.27 percent of the 
population. The region covers about 11 percent of Ethiopia’s total area (Berhanu Adenew 
and Fayera Abdi, 2005). An overwhelming majority of the population in the region lives in 
rural areas. For example, a 2001/2002 estimate shows nearly 90 percent lives in rural areas 
(Berhanu Adenew and Fayera Abdi, 2005).   
Frequent drought and land degradation is a serious challenge in the Amhara region. 
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Infact, 71 percent of the land in the region is vulnerable to soil erosion (Berhanu Adenew and 
Fayera Abdi, 2005). Lack of tenure security is argued to have exacerbated land degradation 
as it discourages farmers from undertaking soil erosion preventative measures. 
The average landholding per household is 1.10 hectares and the average per capita 
holding is 0.24 hectares, which is much lower than the national average (Berhanu Adenew 
and Fayera Abdi, 2005). Among the agricultural holders, 18 percent are females, only 7.7 
percent of the male agricultural holders specialize in livestock production, while it is 18 
percent for female-headed agricultural holdings, and mixed farming is practiced by 48 
percent of the female holders and 80 percent of male holders (Berhanu Adenew and Fayera 
Abdi, 2005). 
In Amhara region, poverty is prevalent and livelihoods are susceptible to famine and 
drought. Specifically, the areas of south Gonder, north Shoa, and north Wollo suffer from 
recurrent drought and famine. On the other hand, eastern and western Gojam, the central and 
western zones, and northern Gonder are more productive agricultural areas (Berhanu, 
Adenew, and Fayera Abdi, 2005). Since agriculture is the main source of livelihood, access 
to land becomes very critical for survival and for sustained household welfare.  
 
2.4.2 Land-Tenure Policy 
 
As a result of the decentralization agenda of the 1997 federal law, the Amhara region enacted 
its own regional land policy in 2000. Among those was the 2004 Land Use and 
Administration Proclamation No. 46/96, 2000 which was updated in 2004 (see Table 2.1 for 
a synopsis of the 2004 Proclamation). The proclamation describes the right of possession, 
use, rent, and inheritance. The objectives of the Proclamation are to safeguard the user rights 
of the land holders, encourage agricultural productivity, protect land from erosion and 
degradation, and promote sustainable development. For example, as a result of the severity 
of soil erosion in the Amhara region, the regional land administration policy emphasized on 
land management and environmental protection. On this end, the Proclamation indicated that 
improper management of land will lead to the loss of user rights to land. In addition, the 
regional land law states that land holders have the right to be compensated in the event of 
land loss. Nevertheless, implementation of this guideline has been challenging. Regarding 
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leasing land, the regional land policy does not impose limits on the amount of land to be 
leased (Teklu, 2005). 
As for protecting women’s land rights in the region, the regional law states the 
following: (i) in the event of divorce, both the man and woman have equal share of the land 
held jointly; (ii) land transfer via inheritance is only legal when the testament is countersigned 
by the wife; (iii) and in terms of titling, both the names of the husband and wife are included 
on the registration form with their photographs attached to the certificate. Such certificates 
can only be given to the household when both the wife and husband acknowledge the receipt 
of the certificate with their signatures (Teklu, 2005). 
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Table 2.1: Synopsis of Amhara Region Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamations 
 
Use rights
Following the basic principle, land will not be transferred by sale or exchange by other property.
Any rural resident of the region, who is 18 years or older has the right to get access to land free of charge for agricultural 
purposes.
Land redistribution
Based on the general principle, redistribution will be undertaken only in irrigable land, i.e., re-allotment of land developed by 
irrigation to different users.  The beneficiaries will pay compensation for the land and the property developed by those who 
will lose land. Also, redistribution will be undertaken if members of the kebele decide to do so.  
Minimum holding (a) the maximum size of land possessed by one person cannot exceed 10 hectares , and (b) the minimum plot size should not 
be less than 0.2 hectares for rain-fed land and 0.06 for irrigated land.
Inheritance
The holder has the right to transfer land through inheritance to (a) to any rural resident involved in agricultural activities, (b) 
to persons living in towns engaging in low income generating activities to support their rural livelihood.
Note this does not affect the right of minors or family member or the interest of surviving spouse.
Gift
The holder can transfer land by way of gift to a child or grand-child or family member who is a resident of the region who 
does not have any land, or who uses leased land due to the smallness of the size of his possession.                                          
But spouse approval required in case of joint ownership.                                                                                                                         
It should be in a written form and should be registered at the woreda and kebele level.
The right to lease
Any holder has the right to lease out land to any person.
Duration of lease: the maximum period is 25 years, and can be renewed after it expires.
The agreement should be in a written form if the lease period is more than three years. The lease agreement should include 
the size, the duration, the kind and amount of payment. It should be registered by the Woreda EPLAU desk
The rental price will be determined by negotiation between the contracting parties.
Sub-lease is prohibited unless it is explicitly specified in the contract.
The right to mortgage 
and land related 
investments
The possessor has the right to mortgage the land use right or the property developed on the land or both.                             
Both mortgaged land can only be transferred in lease or by means of exchange with the approval of the mortgage.                                                  
It can only be concluded in writing and should be registered at the woreda level. The contract should specify the right of the 
creditor, and the duration of the rights in case of default. Note that mortgaging shall not have the effect of transferring the 
right of land possession to the creditor.
Obligation The holder should undertake appropriate soil and water conservations.
Land dispute and 
resolution
Mutual agreements and local elders can be used to resolve land related conflicts. The detail of the formal institutions is not 
provided in the draft proclamation.
Loss of user rights
Any holder can lose his/her use rights: (a) if permanently employed with the payment of a monthly salary, (b) if absent for 10 
consecutive years without leasing or assigning a person to administer it (and has no spouse or a minor child), and c) if fails 
to properly maintain the land. In all the above cases, the holder will get appropriate compensation for the permanent property 
developed on the land.
Land Expropriation If supported by the kebele people, land can be expropriated for public interest by payment of appropriate compensation. 
Certificates/book of 
holding/title deed
If jointly owned, it should be issued in the name of both spouses. Spouses may agree for joint ownership after marriage.
Source: Council of the Amhara National Regional Statae, 2006
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2.5 Amhara Region: Gender and Rural Land 
 
Equal rights to land for both men and women are spelled out in the 2000 Amhara regional land 
policy that was updated in 2004 (see Table 2.1). This section describes the gender differentials 
in the region in regards to land use and control, marital property rights, and inheritance rights.  
 
2.5.1 Land Use and Control 
 
The policy developed in 2000 provides for equal access to land for men and women. According 
to the Amhara Region Natural Resource and Land Administration Bureau, 38.6 percent of 
privately held land is registered under joint titling and equals 38.6 percent, 28.9 percent of land 
is registered under the name of female land holders, and 32.5 percent of the registered land is 
under men (Teklu, 2005). 
Although the regional land policy gives women equal access to land as men, there is a 
difference between male- and female-headed households in terms of land-use as a result of the 
limitations women face (Teklu, 2005). Division of labor between women and men define work 
by gender. Farming activities such as ploughing, threshing, and sowing seeds is regarded 
suitable only for men. Women participate in harvesting, weeding, land preparation, and 
transporting harvest together with men. Nevertheless, women are mostly engaged in milking 
and milk processing, managing animal barns, tending to backyard gardens, and poultry 
management (Gella et al., 2014). Women also face limitations in terms of their access to key 
farming resources such as bulls/oxen, and available male labor in the household to undertake 
farming activities. 
To help overcome the various aforementioned constraints, female-headed households 
engage in land rental activities through share-cropping agreements. According to Teklu (2005), 
the agreement on the share of the landlord and the tenant depends on how productive the land 
is and input provided by both. If the land is deemed productive and the sharecropper is 
responsible for the production costs, the harvest is shared equally. On the other hand, the owner 
gets one-third if the land is not fertile. For instance, if the woman delivers the seed, oxen, and 
land her compensation is two-thirds and the rest is allocated to the share-cropper. Even though 
women opt to hire labor to cultivate the land, it is challenging to find labor to hire which 
imposes limitations on the extent of land use (Teklu, 2005).  
According to the regional proclamation (Table 2.1), the extent to which a land holder 
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is involved in cultivating the land influences the security of land holdings. In other words, as 
long as a land holder is continuously utilizing his/her land, security of their land holding is 
guaranteed. Since women in the region face restrictions that prevent them from appropriately 
and continuously using their land, female land holders could be among the first ones in the 
community to lose their land holdings. 
Social status and family support women possess is one of the key factors the protection 
of their land rights. According to Teklu (2005), “if a woman has strong male family members 
it will be an embarrassment for them if they do not protect her rights”, as women are not 
culturally anticipated to handle such matters. Safeguarding land rights of individual family 
members is viewed as building family resources as a whole.  
 
2.5.2 Marital Property Rights 
 
Marital property rights in the region follow the national civil code. According to the customary 
law, upon divorce, except for the land and the house, a woman shares all the property she 
accumulated during the marriage (unless different terms are indicated in the marriage 
contract)age agreement. The land and house are excluded because these are expected to be the 
man’s contribution upon marriage. Recently this changed as a result of the law granting women 
equal access to land rights. Therefore, contributions at marriage now also include land held by 
women (Teklu, 2005). 
 
2.5.3 Inheritance Rights 
 
Those with legal rights to land are permitted to transfer land via inheritance as indicated in the 
Land Use Rights Proclamation. However, consent from the wife is required as regulated by the 
law. Land holders are also allowed to transfer their land to a caretaker. However, in practice, 
there is variation across the region in the manner of applying the inheritance regulations 
according to the Proclamation. 
Widows are not included in the land policy. However, the customary practice has been 
if a couple have children and the husband dies, the wife inherits all property acquired during 
the marriage, including land. However, if there were no children, the wife will receive half of 
the property and the remaining is the share of her in-law. On the other hand, if the wife passes 
away, the husband inherits all the marital property, regardless of whether the couple had 
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children or not (Teklu, 2005). 
 
 
2.6 Amhara Region: Rural Land Reform 
 
2.6.1 Motivation 
 
This section provides an overview of the rural land reform process in the Amhara region 
based on the qualitative literature of Adenew and Abdi (2005), and Hailu (2010). The 
motivation behind the rural land certification program in the Amhara is not unique to the region. 
The program was implemented nationwide in order to tackle various land related concerns such 
as enhancing tenure security, land degradation, protection of women’s land rights, and 
reductions in land related conflicts.  
 
2.6.2 Amhara Land Administration 
 
Figure 2.1 shows the organogram of the Amhara region land administration entities. The 
responsibility for the coordination of land registration in the Amhara region was delegated to 
the Environmental Protection Land Administration and Use Authority (EPLAUA) established 
in 2000. EPLAUA is answerable to the regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development. 
(Adenew and Abdi, 2005). There is an EPLAU representative at the zonal level. The Woreda 
level EPLAUA participated in the planning and implementation of the land administration, 
registration, and certification activities. Land administration at the kebele and sub-kebele levels 
is responsible for the implementation of the certification process (Adenew and Abdi, 2005). 
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Figure 2.1: Organogram of the land administration institutions in the Amhara region 
 
Regional Bureau of Agriculture and Rural Development 
            
Regional Environmental Protection Land Administration and Land Use Authority 
(EPLAUA) 
            
Zone Environmental Protection Land Administration and Land Use (EPLAUA) 
            
Woreda Environmental Protection Land Administration and Land Use (EPLAU) 
            
Kebele Land Administration Committee 
            
Sub-Kebele Land Administration Committee 
 
                Source: Adenew and Abdi (2005). 
 
2.6.3 Process 
 
Land registration and title certification pilot program started in 2002 (certification process 
began to roll-out in 2003), as part of the effort to build the Amhara region’s rural development 
program. A team of experts from the Woreda level supervised the certification program. On 
the other hand, a committee at the lowest level of local government (kebele or sub-kebele) 
undertook the data collection for the registration and land-use certificate issuance (Haile, 
2010). 
Registration of the land holdings was based on land allocated during the 1991-1996 
redistributions. Lack of man-power led to an adoption of gradual roll-out (Deininger et. al., 
2011) even though the implementation process started at the same time in all the Woredas. 
Field work took place during the dry season (January-July/August) when demand for 
agricultural labor was low, paper work and distribution of the land-use certificates occurred 
during the growing season. 
The registration and consequently certification occurred in seven different steps. First, 
there was “preparation and awareness raising” i.e. provision of information to the Woreda and 
kebele administration and awareness campaigns among the farmers. In this step, land 
Administration Committees (LACs) are then formed with its members being elected by the 
farmers and trained. One of the requirements of the LACs establishment is the inclusion of at 
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least one female member to ensure that the registration and certification process are accessible 
to the female land holders. 
 The second step was “application and identification”. This step encouraged all farmers 
to register their land by applying to the LAC by filling in relevant information such as: land 
names, number of parcels, and total area claimed. Not only this, but the application also 
contains a description of present land use and gives the names of the land holders neighboring 
to the east, south, west and north.  
 In the third step, a temporary certificate is issued to the land users in a kebele. This step 
provides proof of the farmer’s tenure rights at an early stage. This is called the “first stage” 
certificate document (see Figure A.3 in “Chapter 2 Appendix” for a sample of “first stage” 
certificate). At this stage, an exact map depicting the precise location of the land is not included 
yet. In the event that the head of the household is a male, the spouse’s picture is included in the 
certificate jointly and if the land holder is a female then her picture is included in the certificate 
(see Figure A.4 and A.5 in Chapter 2 Appendix). 
 In the fourth step, the results of the temporary certificate are displayed in public for one 
month. The public hearing process involved reading out-loud all applications and invited all 
the farmers so that conflicts can be resolved. Necessary edits in the field sheets are made with 
the approval of the LAC chairperson and the Woreda EPLAUA head. 
 The fifth step involves registering the information from the field sheets in the Land 
Registry Book held at the Woreda office. Instances of land related conflicts are recorded. 
However, the registration continues as the conflicts are decided. 
 In the sixth step, based on information documented in the Land Registry Book, a Book 
of Holding is issued by the Woreda administration office for every household that had 
registered its land. This Book includes the picture and name of the land holders, list of family 
members and address, as well as a summary of the basic rights and obligations according to 
the law. It also includes the official certificate of a household’s usufruct right to their land, the 
Primary Certificate (see Figure A.3 in Chapter 2 Appendix for a sample of “first stage land 
possession certificate”). 
 In the last step, a Secondary Certificate and Mapping is issued which contains maps of 
the land area which is then distributed to the land holders. This is issued after carrying out a 
survey to provide detailed description of the parcels such as the geographical coordinates using 
modern survey techniques and equipment (see Figure A.3 in Chapter 2 Appendix for a sample 
of “second stag land possession certificate”). 
 Two aspects are important to note about the certification process. First, certification 
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was based on farmers applying to the LAC for registration, so in essence certification was based 
on demand from farmers. Second, the certification program was implemented in a 
decentralized manner i.e. the process involved farmers’ participation. 
 Lack of sufficient capacity at the Woreda and kebele levels was cited as a major 
hindrance for program implementation. In addition, there seemed to be “competing interests, 
power and mandates between the political administration on the one hand and on the other, the 
land administration desks, and kebele land administration committees at Woreda and kebele 
levels” (Adenew and Abdi, 2005). Another primary concern regarding the land registration 
process was the lack of available budget and staff needed for implementing the registration and 
consequent certification of land holding. According to the Woreda EPLAUA desk officers 
there was less than half the human resources required (Adenew and Abdi, 2005). Financial 
constraints were also a challenge for the provision of training to farmers to encourage their 
participation in land registration, and for carrying out awareness-raising and communication 
with farmers. Woreda officials reported shortages in the availability of technical skills in 
various areas especially surveyors. Moreover, the delay in the delivery of the guidelines to the 
Woredas slowed implementation progress. The guideline was later provided in 2004. For these 
reasons, the registration has not progressed as it was envisioned, due to the financial, technical 
and administrative challenges faced, and contributed to the distinct variation in the progress of 
land registration across the zones in the region although the program started in all places at the 
same time.  
 In addition, it is also worth noting that there was a gap between the requirement to 
include females in the LACs during the registration process, and their actual participation, 
despite one of the land reform objectives of strengthening women’s land holding rights. 
According to Teklu (2005), the LAC’s were mostly composed of men.  The author states that 
women’s low participation in the land titling process and other socio-political activities is 
linked primarily to their low position in society. For example, a field visit research by Teklu 
(2005) found that women who never participated in the meetings to elect members of the LAC 
cited that they were not told of the details and logistics of the meetings. However, women in 
the region also believe that it is the role of men to attend such meetings and not a role for 
women to take part in. 
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2.6.4 Rights 
 
The right provided by the certificate is such that as long as the holder properly utilizes the land 
given to him/her, he/she has usufruct rights. In other words, unless the land is required for 
public use, the holder has undeniable use right on his/her holding. In the event the holder is 
disposed of his holdings for public use, s/he has the right to get a replacement whenever is 
appropriate and get a compensation for her/his asset on the holdings. Also, the holder can be 
disposed of his/her land for irrigation development, but has the right to get similar land that 
used the newly developed irrigation system. 
Overall, the certificates can be effective if enforced for protecting the land of rural land 
holders against “user right” claims by others such as neighbors. However, since land in 
Ethiopia belongs to the state, the certificates do not protect the landholders from evictions by 
the state nor from future land redistribution by the kebele (village) administrations. Therefore, 
the nature of tenure security the certificates bring in is limited due to the nature of the land 
tenure system. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provided the background and motivation for understanding rural land policy, 
reform, and gender in Ethiopia and the Amhara region. Political pressure, economic and social 
concerns motivated the evolution of the Ethiopian land tenure reform from a mix of private and 
public ownership of land to complete state control of all lands today.  
 Under the current land tenure system i.e. state ownership of all lands, economic 
concerns regarding rural livelihoods motivated a rural land reform initiative in the form of 
documenting the usufruct rights through issuance of land-use certificates to land holders. The 
program was implemented nationwide in order to tackle various land related concerns such as 
enhancing tenure security, tackle land degradation, protection of women’s land rights, and 
reductions in land related conflicts. This initiative was undertaken at the regional level.  
 One of the main objectives of the reform was to strengthen the land holding rights of 
the female land holders. Despite the limited resources and cultural restrictions women face in 
the rural communities of Ethiopia, enhancing access and land rights for women is significant 
for their sustained livelihood. Nevertheless, cultural barriers and limited access to farming 
resources puts into question the ability of female land holders to improve their livelihoods from 
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the rural land reform relative to the male land holders who do not face the same kinds of 
constraints. 
This thesis examines the Amhara region rural land reform, and attempts to assess its 
process and impacts on reducing tenure insecurity and land related investments, by gender. The 
Amhara region is the second Ethiopian region to have undertaken the reform. The land reform 
in the Amhara region was particularly important because of the need to address serious land 
degradation that could adversely impact rural livelihoods.  
 Since gender access to land rights was one of the main concerns of the Ethiopian rural 
land reform, this chapter provided a gender context of rural livelihoods in Ethiopia and the 
Amhara region, and its relation to land right and use. This provides an insightful background 
for the empirical analyses regarding the determinants of certification by gender, and impacts 
of the program on tenure security, and land related investments by gender.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Data 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter provides a description of the data that will be used for the descriptive and empirical 
analyses of this dissertation to understand the process and impacts of the Amhara region rural 
land reform by gender. The unit of analyses is the parcel (chapters 4 and 6) and household 
(chapter 5). This chapter is divided according to the following sections: section 3.2 describes 
the data source, section 3.3 describes the data, and section 3.4 summarizes the data limitations.  
 
 
3.2 Data Sources 
 
 
The household survey used for all the empirical analyses is the “Studies for Sustainable Land 
Use in the Ethiopian Highlands”. The survey was conducted by the Department of Economics 
of Addis Ababa University in collaboration with Gothenburg University, Ethiopian 
Development Research Institute, and the World Bank.  It is a panel survey of rural households 
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covering the years 1999, 2002, 2004, and 20077. The first wave of the surveys covered the 
period before the certification program was implemented. It is important to note that this survey 
was not originally designed to capture the Amhara certification program, and the potential 
impact on agriculture and rural livelihoods. The objective of the survey was to analyze the 
impact of a sustainable development program and comprehensive aspects of the certification 
program was added at a later stage of the survey, mainly in the fourth round of the wave i.e. in 
the 2007 survey year. 
  The Amhara regional survey is the most appropriate for the analyses of the thesis as it 
covers a comprehensive set of questions on the certification program as well as land-use, and 
has sufficient sample size for gender disaggregated analyses. The “Ethiopian Rural Household 
Survey (1989-2009)” does not capture the certification program. A Tigray region household 
panel survey8 (1997/1998, 2000/01, 2002/03 and 2005/06) which captures certification covers 
a small sample size (400 households) restricting a gender disaggregated analyses. A Southern 
Ethiopia regional rural survey (1997-98)9 was conducted but does not contain information on 
certification.  
 
 
3.3 Data Description 
 
 
3.3.1 Survey Sampling Procedure 
 
The surveys were conducted in 2 of the 11 zones of the Amhara region. They are the East 
Gojam and South Wollo zones. Each of the zones was purposefully selected to represent certain 
ecological characteristics in the areas of the region i.e. East Gojam is a surplus producing zone 
while South Wollo is a drought zone. The Woredas (districts) and the kebeles (villages) in each 
Woreda were also chosen based on similar criteria. However, the households in each kebele 
were selected randomly. This sampling procedure ensured that the selected kebeles were 
representative of the kebeles in the region (Deininger et al. 2011). The outcome of the sampling 
procedure for all the panel rounds are the following: In both the 1999 and 2002 rounds 6 
                                                          
7 1999 survey conducted during September-October, 2002 survey during July-August, 2004 survey during 
September-November, and 2007 round during July-August.  
8 This survey was used in the following research studies: Deininger et al. (2011); Holden et al. (2005); Holden et 
al. (2009). 
9 This survey was used in a study by Holden et al. (2002). 
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Woredas and 12 kebeles were selected, whilst in the 2002 and 2004 panel waves, 8 Woredas 
and 14 kebeles were selected, since one additional village in each zone was added. 
 
Figure 3.1: Sampling procedure 
 
 
3.3.2 Survey Questionnaire Description 
 
This panel survey data is comprehensive in that it provides information both at the individual, 
household, parcel, and plot levels. The following sections in the survey questionnaire are 
common in all rounds: household composition, health, off farm-income and social capital; land 
registration, certification, use and production, livestock/poultry ownership and income; 
household and enterprise assets; housing and personal hygiene; credits; water, energy, cooking 
and consumption habits, consumption expenditure, shocks, and risk and time experiments . 
Survey questionnaire sections not repeated across all the rounds are: A survey questionnaire 
section of “Willingness to Pay for Community Plantation” is only captured in the 1999 round. 
“Preference Revelation” is only in the 1999 and 2002 rounds. “Risk and Time Experiments” 
are in the 2004 and 2007 surveys, and the section on “Shocks” is only in the final round. 
 The first section of the questionnaire is “household composition, health, and social 
capital”. On household composition, questions asked were on characteristics of household 
members such as sex, age, marital status, main activity, literacy, education level, and training 
attended. Questions on health were asked to each household member, and included the 
following: presence of illness/injury/disease/disability and whether any medical consultations 
were undertaken. Questions on non-farm employment involved whether household members 
engaged in off-farm activities and type of such activities, and income from wage employment 
                ZONE
            East Gojam         South Wollo
WOREDA (DISTRICT) WOREDA (DISTRICT)
           Machakel              Gozmin             Enemay         Debre-Elias             Tehuldere                 Tenta           Harbu/Kalu Dessie-Zuria-Woreda 7
      Kebele (Village)        Kebele (Village)    Kebele (Village)     Kebele (Village)      Kebele(Village)
 
         Ammanuel              Yamed                Telma         Sekla Debir                   Kete            Godguadit           Addis Mender              Chorisa Indod Ber (Kebele 14)
    Kebele (Village)      Kebele (Village)       Kebele (Village)
                Kebi        Addis Gulit             Wolkite          Debre Elias            Chorisa       Amba Mariam               Yamed
Source: Surveys for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands
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and non-farm self-employment. Questions on social capital were asked to the household head 
and his/her spouse and included the following: participation in community organizations, 
actual and potential interaction of the household with people/other households in the kebele of 
residence, and questions on trust level in the community. 
 The second section of the survey questionnaire is on “land registration, certification, 
use, and production”. This section begins with questions on whether the household has any 
land with land holding rights, land size holdings, expectations about changes in the size of land 
holdings (increase, decrease, no change, don’t know), and whether the household undertakes 
any measures to maintain or increase their land holdings. This is followed by questions on the 
land certification program. 
The 2007 survey is the only survey round comprising of a sub-section on land 
registration and certification to help capture the process of the rural land reform. This captures 
information on perception about the land registration and certification program (asked to 
household head) such as whether the household is concerned about land related conflicts, 
whether household thinks that certification reduces number of conflicts related to inheritance 
to children, whether certificate will reduce non-inheritance related conflicts, whether 
certificates encourage soil and water conservation measures on land, whether certificates 
provide incentives to plant more trees on land, whether certificate will increase possibility of 
obtaining compensation in case land is taken, whether certificate will improve the position of 
women, whether certificate will encourage people to migrate, whether certificate will 
encourage soil conservation by the kebele on common property, and whether demarcation of 
public and community land will reduce problem of encroachment  on common property 
resource.  
Questions on involvement in the land certification program includes when the program 
started in the kebele; whether the household believes that it has been well informed about the 
program; whether a household member attended the awareness campaign meetings; whether it 
received any written material on the land registration, certification program, and land law; 
whether the household has a certificate to its holding; when the certificate was received; amount 
paid to receive the certificate; other certificate related costs (e.g. cost of picture); whether 
household would like to add a map on the certificate and willingness to pay for the map; 
willingness to have a certificate if one is not currently certified, and willingness to pay for the 
certificate if the government increased the fee.  
Both male- and female-headed households are then asked several questions on their 
knowledge about the land law. These questions include: what is the minimum number of years 
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for which households can rent out their user rights to others; what happens to the land if a 
household head with land holding rights migrates to the Zone capital for more than 5 years and 
engaged in non-farming activities; whether it is true that a holder who leaves his land fallow 
for 3 consecutive years without sufficient reasons will forfeit his user rights; whether a person 
can bequeath land through inheritance to individuals who are neither his/her direct nor adopted 
children as long as they would like to earn their livelihood in agriculture; whether a land holder 
can transfer his rights in donation to a person who is not a family member of care taker; whether 
it is legal for the household to mortgage the use rights of its land; whether use right of the 
family will be affected if the head of the household head has left the kebele for 10 years; 
whether a husband can transfer his and his spouse’s common land in donation without the 
consent of his wife; and whether the holder will receive proper compensation in advance if 
his/her land is taken for the purpose of public purpose. 
 Questions are also asked about the men’s and women’s position and land certification 
(respondent is male/female household head or adult male/female age 18 years and older in the 
absence of the head). Such questions include: how often the household participates at the kebele 
assembly; whether household raises issues at the assembly, whether the household is aware 
that minutes are prepared for those meetings, who in the household decides how earned money 
will be used, who decides on common household resources, and whether the household has 
any money or physical asset (e.g. livestock) of its own that it can alone decide on its usage? 
Female-headed households are asked additional questions such as if they are permitted to go 
to the market place without being accompanied, who in their household has the final say on 
whether they should work to earn money from non-farm business/employment, whether they 
have ever wanted to take out or been given a loan (in cash or in-kind) to start or expand a 
business. 
 In the later survey sections i.e. section on “land holding and 1998/99 E.C. production 
cycle”, questions on certification were again asked for each parcel owned and cultivated by the 
household and parcels rented-out/lent-out i.e. “do you have a legal document or certificate to 
this parcel?”, “when did you acquire the legal certificate”, and “whose name was the certificate 
issued to?”.  
The questionnaire includes information on three types of parcels: owned and cultivated 
by the household, owned and rented-out/lent-out, and leased-in. Information gathered on the 
self-cultivated and owned rented-out/lent-out gathered includes parcel size, when the parcel 
was acquired, whether household expects to lose the parcel in the coming 5 years due to land 
redistribution and reallocation, and primary use of the parcel. For parcel rented-out/lent-out 
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and rented-in questions are asked about the rental contract such as terms of the contract such 
as duration of rent, share-cropping/fixed rental arrangements, to whom the parcel rented out, 
etc. The survey also comprises of information on parcel characteristics, investments undertaken 
on parcels, type of crops grown, type, and amount of inputs used, labor, and non-labor inputs 
used.  
The remaining sections in the survey contain information on livestock/poultry 
ownership and income i.e. type and amount of livestock used, amount sold, and income earned 
from livestock activities; information on household and farm assets i.e. asset type and amount 
and value owned; information on credit such as borrowing source, amount borrowed, and 
source of the loan; information on energy, water, cooking and consumption habits i.e. energy 
type and consumption amount; and information on household consumption expenditures (food, 
beverages, and tobacco, non-durable goods, semi-durable and durable goods and services, 
education and non-consumption expenditure).  
 
3.3.3 Survey Data Description 
 
This section describes the data relevant for the analyses of the three empirical papers in this 
thesis. Two of these papers use data at the parcel level and one paper uses data at the household 
level. This is due to the fact that the unit of analyses to examine the research questions differs. 
 The first empirical paper in this thesis explores the determinants of parcel certification 
status and parcel certification timing, by gender. In other words, the analyses will assess the 
gender differentials in what determines whether a parcel is certified and when it is certified. 
The analyses takes into account in which kebele parcels are located in, parcel characteristics, 
and household characteristics to which parcels belong to. Therefore, the dependent variables 
are two: first, parcel certification status i.e. whether a parcel is included in the household land-
holding certificate; and second, parcel certification timing i.e. whether a parcel is certified 
“early” or “late during the certification process. Therefore, the unit of analyses in the first paper 
is the parcel. 
 The second empirical paper explores the impact of households’ certification status on 
household tenure security, by gender. In other words, the analyses will assess the gender 
differentials in the determinants of household tenure security taking into account their 
certification status, household characteristics, and livelihood strategies. Therefore, the 
dependent variable is a households’ perception of tenure security i.e. whether households feel 
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tenure secure (those who indicate they expect an increase or no change in the size of their land 
holdings) and tenure insecure (those who expect a decrease in the size of their land holdings). 
Hence the unit of analyses in the second paper is the household.  
 The third empirical paper explores the gender differential impact of parcel certification on 
the likelihood of investments are undertaken on parcels. The analyses take into account parcel 
characteristics and household characteristics in which parcels belong to. The paper looks at two 
dependent variables which represent investments on parcels: first, whether there are new Soil 
and Water Conservation (SWC) measures undertaken on the parcel; and second, whether SWC 
maintenance was undertaken on a parcel. Thus the unit of analyses in the third paper is the 
household.  
 
3.3.3.1 Household Level Data 
 
For the analyses of the second paper, the thesis uses unbalanced data since the larger sample 
size relative to the balanced panel provides an opportunity to undertake a gender disaggregated 
analyses. In addition, the data is panel because the dependent variable for the second paper is 
captured in all four survey waves relative to capturing the dependent variable at the parcel level 
which is only captured in the final survey round. For these reason, the analyses in this thesis 
(second empirical paper) at the household level will use the unbalanced and panel data from 
the four survey waves i.e. 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2007. 
  The attrition rates in the raw data are relatively low: household level attritions between 
the baseline survey in 1999 and first follow-up survey in 2002 is approximately 3 percent, and 
with the second follow-up is nearly 5 percent, and with the final follow-up in 2007 is 
approximately 6 percent. Nearly 94 percent of the households in the 1999 round are complete 
panel households implying that they were interviewed in all of the three follow-up panel waves 
(balanced panel). This amounts to 1,421 households in which 1,160 and 261 are male- and 
female-headed households, respectively. 
 A household level unbalanced panel dataset is constructed using each of the four survey 
waves10 (Table 3.1). This dataset consists of 6,541 observations (82 percent of the observations 
are from male-headed households), and 1,864 households across the survey years. The 1,864 
                                                          
10 This dataset is constructed after the data cleaning of the four survey rounds which led to the elimination of 
duplicate household identification numbers which resulted in the reduction of balanced panel households from 
1421 to 1413 households.  
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households across the panel reflect the fact that some households have entered and/or dropped 
out from the survey. In the unbalanced panel dataset, there are 1,414 and 242 households 
headed by males and females across all the survey years, respectively i.e. there was no change 
in the sex of the head in these households. However, there are 208 households with changes in 
the sex of the household head across the survey years. Therefore, these changes as well as 
households leaving and entering the sample across the years influenced the change in the 
number of male- and female-headed households across the years as show in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Survey sample size (unbalanced panel), by survey year 
 
   
  Table 3.2 depicts the distribution of the male- and female-headed households during 
1999-2007 in the household level balanced panel data. The balanced panel consists of 5,652 
observations from 1,413 households. In this balanced panel sample, overall 84 percent of the 
observations are obtained from male-headed households. Across the aggregate survey period 
the number of male-headed households increased until 2004 when a total of 16 households 
disappeared from the sample relative to the previous year. Conversely, the number of female-
headed households increased throughout the survey years.  
 
Table 3.2: Survey sample size (balanced panel), by survey year 
 
 
Variable 1999 2002 2004 2007
No. of households 1516 1518 1748 1759
No. of male headed households 1265 1290 1436 1420
No. of female headed households 251 228 312 339
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian 
Highlands” panel survey.
Variable 1999 2002 2004 2007
# of households 1413 1413 1413 1413
Male headed households 1189 1206 1174 1157
Female headed households 224 207 239 256
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel 
survey.
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The certification program was not introduced until 1995 E.C.11 (200212 in Gregorian 
Calendar). The 2007 survey first captures information on certification status at the household 
level and then at the parcel level. The survey asked each household the following: “Do you 
have a certificate to your holdings?” Nearly 78 percent of the households responded “Yes”. 
Nearly 23 percent of the households did not have information about the year in which they 
received land certificates (397 households out of 1,759). Therefore, out of the 1,362 households 
with information, 0.34 percent of the households received certificates in 1995 E.C., 0.51 
percent got certified in 1996, 12.68 percent and 46.76 percent of them received certificates in 
1997 and 1998 respectively, and 17.12 percent obtained land-use certificates in 1999.  
Conversion of the Ethiopian Calendar to Gregorian shows that a substantial proportion 
of both male- and female-headed households acquired certificates during 2005-2007 (2002 was 
the pilot year in Gregorian Calendar) due to the lengthy certification process and 
implementation delays as depicted in Table 3.3. In 2004, nearly only 1 percent of the male-
headed households received certificates, and in 2007, 77 percent of the male-headed 
households were certified. In the female-headed households, nearly 2 percent and 78 percent 
received certificates in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Moreover, the data shows that there 7 
observations in 2007 with missing information on household certification status. 
 
Table 3.3: Distribution of household certification status, by survey year 
 
 
In the total panel and pooled sample used for analyses at the household level, nearly 79 
percent of observations report no certificates and mainly include observations from the first 
                                                          
11 E.C. is Ethiopia Calendar. The Ethiopian Calendar has twelve months with 30 days each and a thirteenth month 
with 5 or 6 days depending on the year. The first day of the Ethiopian year for years between 1901 and 2099 
(inclusive), is usually September 11 (Gregorian), but falls on September 12 in years before the Gregorian leap 
year. The Gregorian Calendar is 7 years ahead of the Ethiopian Calendar. See Table B.1 in Chapter Three 
Appendix Tables for an example of date conversion from Ethiopian to Gregorian Calendar. 
12 In this and upcoming chapters, years of certification are denoted in the Ethiopian Calendar while survey years 
are referred to in the Gregorian Calendar. 
1999 2002 2004 2007 1999 2002 2004 2007
No 1265 1290 1422 316 251 228 305 73
Yes 0 0 14 1097 0 0 7 266
. 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0
No. of Male Headed Households No. of Female Headed Households
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” survey.
Certification Status
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three survey waves, i.e. 1999, 2002, and 2004. Out of the total 6541 observations, only 20 
percent with certificates come from female-headed households, while among observations with 
no certificates, a mere 17 percent are linked to households headed by women. However, these 
distributions are not surprising given that there are likely to be fewer female-headed households 
relative to male-headed households in the surveyed area in general, which is subsequently 
reflected in the gender distribution of land certification recipients. Nonetheless, there is 
sufficient variation in the survey data that allows carrying out the gender analysis in this thesis.  
 
3.3.3.2 Parcel Level Data 
 
For analyses at the parcel level (first and third empirical papers), this thesis uses cross-sectional 
data i.e. from the 2007 survey for two reasons: first, the parcels cannot be matched across time; 
second, variation in the dependent variables in the first empirical paper i.e. parcel certification 
status and timing are best captured in the 2007 survey. Therefore, the parcel level analyses will 
not capture changes across time i.e. pre and post certification program. Third, the analyses in 
the first paper is undertaken at the parcel level because it is the parcels that are certified i.e. 
documented in the land holding certificate awarded to the household. In the third empirical 
paper, household decisions to undertake investments are made at the parcel level. Therefore, 
determining the impact of certification on land investments requires parcel level analyses as 
well. 
In the 2007 survey questionnaire, the cross-sectional dataset consists of 7,988 parcels 
belonging to 1,759 households. Nearly 83 percent of 7,988 parcels belong to male-headed 
households. Majority of the households have more than one parcel justifying the parcel to be 
the unit of analyses in papers 1 and 3. There are 1619 households with 6,873 owned and self-
cultivated parcels, and 443 households with 1,109 owned and rented-out parcels. Table 3.4 
shows the parcel summary statistics, including by type of parcel land-use i.e. whether the parcel 
is self-cultivated or rented-out. 
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Table 3.4: Parcel summary statistics (no. of households) 
 
 
The table shows that majority of the male and female households have all self-cultivated 
parcels implying that most are small-scale farmers followed by households with only rented-
out parcels, and a few number of households with a mix of both self-cultivated and rented-out 
parcels. It is also evident that female-headed households have varied use of their land relative 
to the male-headed households i.e. more female heads have a mix of self-cultivated and rented-
out land. The mix of land-use implies to some extent diversity in sources of crop production 
which is varied across the sex of the household head. Therefore, it is plausible that issuance of 
land rights i.e. certificates could impact male- and female-headed households differently. 
  There are 6 parcels from 6 households in the 2007 dataset with no information on 
whether they are self-cultivated, rented-out or leased-in which explains the shortfall in the total 
number of households under “type of parcel land-use” by 6 observations i.e. 1,753 parcels. 
Even though these 6 observations are negligible and will not impact the results of the analyses, 
they do contain information on certification i.e. they are non-certified parcels. 
Only parcels owned and cultivated by the household and parcels owned and rented-out 
are considered for the analyses in the thesis. This is because the 555 households with 1,175 
leased-in parcels either through sharecropping or fixed-rental arrangement do not belong to the 
households captured in the survey, and so the survey does not capture information on 
certification for such parcels. 
Information on parcel certification are obtained from the parcel level section of the 
survey. Households were asked “Do you have a legal document or certificate to this parcel?” 
83 percent of the observations (parcels) are from male-headed households. Out of the 7,988 
parcels, 79 percent are certified. Out of the 79 percent certified parcels, 83 percent belong to 
male-headed households. 
Male headed 
households
Female headed 
households Total
Households with 1 parcel 60 22 82
Households with more than one parcel 1360 317 1,677
Type of parcel land-use
Households with all self-cultivated parcels 1,161 149 1,310
Households with all rented-out parcels 197 112 309
Households with self-cultivated and rented-out parcels 58 76 134
Households with missing information on type of parcel-land use 4 2 6
Note: Total # of households=1,759, Total # of parcels = 7,988
Source: Own estimation from the "Survey of Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands", 2007
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The 2007 survey also captured for each self-cultivated and rented-out parcel when it 
became certified in the following way: “When did you acquire the legal certificate, year?” The 
households’ response indicates that 0.54 percent of the parcel were certified in 1996 E.C., 15 
percent of the parcels were certified in 1997 E.C. , 49 percent were certified in 1998 E.C., and 
15 percent were certified in 1999 E.C. (nearly 21 percent of the parcels have missing years of 
certification recorded). The fact that majority of the parcels were certified in later years of the 
certification program implies that the certification process could have experience 
implementation delays. Overall, there are 1,658 parcel observations (21 percent of the total 
parcels in the sample) with information on whether they are certified parcels but with no 
information on their certification year. Out of these 1,658 observations, 98 percent are not 
certified (therefore, the certification year is not applicable) and 2 percent i.e. 27 parcels have 
missing information on year of certification. 
  Table 3.5 provides parcel summary statistics with certification. As the objective of the 
program was to certify all parcels in the kebeles, this did not seem to have occured. Among the 
non-certified parcels, the majority is from households that have none of their parcels certified 
and a fewer parcels from households in which some were not certified. The non-certification 
of these parcels could be due to unresolved land disputes at the time of the certification process.  
 
Table 3.5: Parcel summary statistics with certification (no. of households) 
 
 
 
 
 
Male headed 
households
Female headed 
households Total
Households with no parcels certified 317 84 401
Households with all parcels certified 1,038 242 1,280
Households with some parcels certified 65 13 78
Households with missing information on parcel certification 
for all parcels in the household 0 0 0
Note: Total # of households=1,759, Total # of parcels = 7,988
Source: Own estimation from the "Survey of Sustainable Land Use in the 
Ethiopian Highlands", 2007
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3.4 Characteristics of the Sample 
 
3.4.1 Individual and Household Profiles 
 
All the kebeles in the sample are located in the Ethiopian Highlands with mean elevation of 
2,563m. The sampled kebeles are quite distant to the nearest road and town. Distance to the 
nearest road and town is on average 32 km and 72 km, respectively. Majority of the kebele 
households (73 percent) reside in small dwellings (2 rooms) with corrugated roofs. 
  An average kebele has approximately 126 households (821 individuals) with on average 
7 members in each household. The distribution of male to female residents is nearly equal i.e. 
51 percent are male residents. On average the kebeles have young residents (mean age of 25 
years). Majority of the residents are identified as children/too young to be married (38 percent), 
therefore, only 34 percent of the residents are married, 20 percent are single, 4 percent are 
divorced, and 3 percent are widowed. This distribution holds by gender as well. As for the main 
activity of the kebele residents, given the young population, majority are students (32 percent), 
15percent are identified as children (too young to work), 23 percent are farmers/family farmer, 
and 17 percent are domestic workers. When disaggregated by gender, majority of the female 
residents are domestic residents (35 percent) and only 9 percent are engaged in farming, while 
the male residents are farmers/family workers (37 percent), and 34 percent are students. 
  As for the characteristics of the household heads, nearly 83 percent of the households 
are male headed. The average age is 49 years (48 years and 51 years for male and female 
residents, respectively).  Majority of the heads are married (81 percent), 11 percent are 
widowed, 4 percent are divorced, and 2 percent are single (54 percent of the female heads are 
widowed, and 95 percent of the male heads are married). Household heads are primarily 
illiterate (55 percent), and a higher percentage of female heads are illiterate (88 percent) relative 
to the female heads (48 percent).  
 
3.4.2 Rural Livelihoods 
 
Agriculture is the main economic activity of the kebele heads. Nearly 83 percent of the heads 
are farmers/family farm workers, 9 percent are engaged in domestic work, and 3 percent are 
out of the labor force (the remaining 5 percent of the sample is engaged in various activities 
such as health worker, teacher, trader, traditional physician, etc.). While agriculture is the main 
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activity for the male heads, it is not for the female heads. Majority of the female heads are 
engaged in domestic work (48 percent) but a visible proportion is engaged in farming (34 
percent), and 8 percent are not in the labor force. Majority of the households do not grow 
perennial crops i.e. cash crops (85 percent). Farming is primarily for subsistence. 
The status of engagement in off-farm employment activities (working off the 
household’s land either on someone else’s land or in other employment against payments in 
cash or in-kind) by household heads in the kebeles is small (23 percent and 20 percent of the 
male and female heads, respectively). In fact, majority of household heads who responded they 
would not like to work (more) for wages or salary cited “needed on farm” as the reason i.e. 52 
percent and 43 percent of male- and female-headed households, respectively. The location of 
the off-farm employment activities in exchange for wage is the kebele of residence for majority 
of both male heads (76 percent) and female heads (73 percent). The income from wage 
employment was primarily used for general purchases for the household both male- and 
female-headed households. 
Engaging in labor sharing arrangements is common among male-headed households 
(55 percent) relative to their female counterparts (26 percent). Participation in non-farm self-
employment activities is not common in both male- and female-headed households (15 percent 
and 13 percent of male- and female-headed households participated, respectively).  
Majority of female-headed households engaged in non-farm self-employment activities 
are involved in grain trade (31 percent), and also in selling beverages (33 percent). As for male 
counterparts, the highest proportion is involved in handicraft including pottery (23 percent), 13 
percent are engaged in trade in grain, and 3 percent of male HHHs are selling beverages.  As 
for livestock trading, 9 percent of male-headed households are engaged in such activity but 
there is no female head participation. In both male- and female-headed households, income 
from non-farm self-employment activities was allocated to general household purchases. 
There is a notable difference in the share of male and female HHHs who are involved 
in food-for-work activities. In this regard, more female-headed households are engaged in work 
activities in exchange for food (nearly 26 percent) whereas it is only 10 percent for male-headed 
households. 
Male-headed households (76 percent) are endowed with key livestock for farming such 
as bulls/oxen relative to female-headed households (37 percent). Average number of bulls/oxen 
ownership in male-headed households is 2 compared to 1 in female-headed households. 
Bulls/oxen are also a sign of wealth in farming communities due to their high value relative to 
other types of livestock. 
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3.4.3 Land Holdings 
 
Almost all male- and female-headed households have land with holding rights and over 50 
percent  feel that the farm belongs to self although more female heads have such feelings about 
their farm (nearly 59percent) whilst its 52percent for the males. 
The kebeles in the Amhara region seem to be characterized by small farm holders. The 
average land size holdings in the kebele are 0.055 hectares with slightly larger land size in 
female than male-headed households (0.053 hectares in male-headed households and 0.066 in 
female-headed households). More male-headed households are actively engaged in 
maintaining their land holdings (62 percent) compared to the female heads (54 percent). 
Among those who are actively involved in maintaining their land holdings, 61 percent of both 
male and female heads use soil conservation, and the next most employed measure is planting 
trees. Among those who are not actively maintaining their land holdings, 68 percent and 51 
percent of male and female heads, respectively, cite “land belonging to the state” as the reason 
for not taking any measures, claiming the reason that the “land belongs to the kebele”.   
 
3.4.4 Perceptions on Certification 
 
Overall household perceptions about the usefulness of the land-use certificates are positive. For 
example, an overwhelming majority of both male- and female-headed households (77 percent 
and 83 percent, respectively) say they are concerned about land related conflicts than male 
HHHs (77 percent). Majority of the male (92 percent) and female (85 percent) headed 
households believe that land being surveyed and then obtaining a land use certificate will 
reduce the status of land related conflicts. Also more male (93 percent) than female (81 percent) 
heads think that a certificate encourages them undertake more soil and water conservations 
measures on their own land. The same pattern also holds for whether certificate provides 
households with the incentive to plant more trees on their land. Majority of both male (91 
percent) and female heads (82 percent) think that a certificate will increase the possibility of 
obtaining compensation in case the land is taken. Also the majority of male (89 percent) and 
female heads (84 percent) think that certificates enhance the position of women. However, it 
interesting to note that slightly less percentage of female heads compared to the male heads 
thinks so. As for migration, both male- and female-headed households (73 percent) believe that 
possessing a land-use certificate encourages people to migrate. 
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3.4.5 Social Capital 
 
The 2007 survey asks household heads whether there is a household is member of the ten listed 
organizations (kebele council, kebele administration, kebele social court, land-use and 
administrative committee, service cooperatives, political party, religious assembly committee, 
iddir (burial association), iqqub, and microfinance institutions) in the kebele. Majority of both 
male and female households have participated in one or more of these organizations with 
involvement in the iddir (burial association) being a common form of social capital and only a 
few are members of the land use and administrative committee. A second measure of “social 
capital” is whether household heads have blood relations or close acquaintance with the leader 
or leaders of the listed organizations/associations. Once again majority of both the male and 
female household heads responded as having connections/networks with those in the iddir 
(burial associations) followed by the “religious assembly” group. Despite the relevance of 
being a member of the “land use and administrative committee” under an environment of rural 
land reform, participation in such organizations do not seem to be extensive for both the male 
and female household heads.  
 
3.4.6 Involvement in the Land-Certification Program Process 
 
Most of the households in the kebeles indicated that they were well informed about the land 
registration and certification program i.e. nearly 79 percent of the households. However, the 
extent of being well informed visibly differs by gender, i.e. 81 percent and 70 percent of the 
male- and female-headed households said they were well informed, respectively. The survey 
data suggests that the relatively low awareness of the female-headed households could indicate 
that they may not have taken the initiative to attend and learn from the campaigns as much as 
the male-headed households (93 percent and 81 percent of the male- and female-headed 
households said they attended the public information meetings, respectively), even though the 
majority in both groups indicated that public information meetings about the registration and 
certification process were held (93 percent of male-headed households and 89 percent of 
female-headed households). From this it can be deduced that the Land Administrative 
Committee could have equally targeted both male- and female-headed households but female-
headed households may not have actively participated in the process relative to the male-
headed households (on average, male-headed households attended the public information 
meetings three times while female-headed households attended such meetings two times). Not 
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surprising, majority of both households did not receive written materials on the land 
registration and certification program, and land laws. Perhaps this was due to the fact that the 
Kebele residents are primarily illiterate, and information about the certification process and 
laws could have been orally transmitted during the awareness campaign meetings. 
 
3.4.7 Households’ Knowledge of Land-Related Laws 
 
Overall, there is low level of awareness by both male and female household heads about the 
land related laws, and the lack of awareness is in some instances higher among female than 
male heads. For example, most of the male (38 percent) and female (35 percent) headed 
households do not think that leaving the land fallow for three consecutive years without 
sufficient reasons will forfeit his/her user rights, and more female household heads (17 percent) 
do not know about this specific regulation than the male heads (10 percent). As shown in Table 
2.1 (Amhara Region Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamation) of Chapter 2, failing 
to properly maintain the land can lead to loss of user rights. In addition, both male- and female-
headed households think that the maximum number of years that land holders can rent-out land 
is 4 years but the Proclamation stipulates it is 25 years. Also both male and female heads (76 
percent and 75 percent, respectively) do not think that if the household head left the kebele 
where the land is located for 10 years it will affect the use rights of the family. The regional 
Proclamation stipulates that any holder can lose his/her user rights if absent for 10 consecutive 
years without leasing or assigning someone to administer it (and has no spouse or minor 
children). In this regard, 15 percent of female heads do not know the regulations compared to 
8 percent of the male heads. 
 
 
3.5 Data Limitations 
 
Although the survey data is comprehensive in capturing details about sustainable land use in 
the Ethiopian Highlands and certification, this chapter identified several limitations influencing 
the level of the analyses i.e. parcel or household levels, and whether the analyses can be 
undertaken using panel or cross-sectional data. Key identified data constraints are: first, the 
parcels cannot be matched across the survey years confining parcel level studies to cross-
sectional analyses; second, questions on certification were included only in the final survey 
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round imposing limitations on understanding the adoption of certification as it was being 
rolled-out from the start of program implementation; and third, questions on tenure security 
across time could be only captured at the household level and not parcel level. This chapter 
presented that although the sample size for the female-headed households is substantially 
smaller than the sample for male-headed households, it is still plausible to undertake gender 
disaggregated analyses. Limited female sample size is not unique to the Amhara rural data as 
in many Sub-Saharan Africa farming communities, it is common that household heads are often 
males.  
 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
 
The Amhara regional survey is comprehensive in its coverage of rural land-use and to some 
extent certification as well as having somewhat a reasonable sample size to allow for a gender 
disaggregated analyses on the determinants of certification and impacts on outcomes such as 
tenure security and land related investments. There are several data limitations that will 
influence the type of analyses to be undertaken in the empirical chapters of the thesis. Despite 
the limitations, it is important to assess the determinants and impacts of the Amhara rural land 
reform by gender. The gender context is largely understudied and this thesis tries to fill the gap 
in the literature by examining three research questions: First, what are the determinants of 
parcel certification status and timing by gender? Second, what is the impact of certification on 
household tenure security? Third, what is the impact of certification on land related 
investments?  This is the objective of the upcoming chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Gender, Rural Land Certification, 
and the Reform Process 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Implementing rural land reforms in an attempt to strengthen land-holding rights often requires 
meeting several challenges. There is the risk that the process may not be systematic—bias may 
determine who the beneficiaries are and when they benefited from the reform. Such bias might 
include gender or wealth. According to Deininger et al. (2008a), efforts at land titling must 
meet two conditions: first, documents need to be awarded systematically and all at once, with 
the award process being participatory and involving strong community participation; second, 
information campaigns must be held before titling documents are issued to ensure that all 
participants are aware of the rules and are on a level playing field. Other concerns include 
financial and technical capacity constraints. Cost constraints can prevent reforms (Deininger et 
al., 2008b) or limit them to fewer beneficiaries, and technical limitations, such as lack of 
manpower and administrative failures (Holden et al., 2009), can have similar results.  Deininger 
et al. (2008a) pointed out that the feasibility of reforms in the institutional, political, and 
economic domains is linked to success in implementation. 
This study builds on the aforementioned literature by examining the determinants of 
parcel-certification status and timing in the context of the Amhara region of Ethiopia. Parcel-
certification status is measured by whether parcels belonging to male and female household 
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heads are included in the household’s land-use certificate. Parcel-certification timing is 
measured by whether a parcel is included in the household’s land-use certificate in the earlier 
or later rounds of the certification process. All the analyses will be assessed by gender, 
specifically for parcels belonging to male and female heads of household. 
The research questions addressed in this chapter are important for several reasons. First, 
from a policy perspective, and on a sectoral level, rural land reforms are undertaken to enhance 
the development of the agricultural sector and especially to lift up vulnerable and marginalized 
members of rural communities, such as women. Therefore, the reform process should be 
understood thoroughly and designed carefully to meet sectoral objectives and ensure that the 
reform reaches everyone, especially the disadvantaged segments of the rural population. 
Second, from a financial perspective, rural land reform is a costly initiative, especially 
for developing countries. These budget constraints mean that understanding the 
implementation process is critical for maximizing the anticipated gains from the reform. The 
micro-level benefits of strengthening land-property rights extend beyond the agriculture sector 
and have been cited by many authors, including De Soto (2000), Goldstein et al. (2008), Duflo 
(2003), World Bank (2006), and Deininger et al. (2008a). 
Third, from a research perspective, understanding the process is important because it 
permits assessment of the causal relationship, if any, between land titling and expected 
outcomes. Kassa (2014) pointed out that empirical studies have had difficulty measuring the 
impact of, for example, titles on land-related investments, because the allocation of property 
rights to households may not be random. The lack of randomness in many land-rights initiatives 
has been pointed out by Do et al. (2008); who reported that it is hard to find a “natural 
experiment” that allocates land rights in a strictly random manner, with the exception being in 
Galiani et al. (2006). In other words, the issuing land titles can be determined by various 
characteristics at the household, parcel, and village levels. Moreover, if a land reform is aimed 
at benefiting a specific group, then understanding the implementation process is key to ensuring 
that the group is targeted effectively. 
Fourth, gaining insights into the land-titling process is crucial because lessons learned 
from past titling reforms can be used to improve the implementation processes of future 
initiatives for strengthening property rights, especially initiatives targeting specific groups. 
The current empirical literature disagrees on whether there was bias in the reform 
process of the Amhara region. The program’s objective was to cover all the villages in the area, 
so the rural land-registration process required for the issuance of certificates was considered 
“systematic and methodological” (SIDA-Amhara Rural Development Program [SARDP] and 
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BoEPLAU, 2010). On this basis, the process was indicated to involve no gender or wealth bias 
(Deininger et al., 2011), and the variable capturing the households’ certification status was 
assumed by Deininger et al. (2008a) to be exogenous. However, other writers have judged the 
certification process to be endogenous on the basis of the premise that “all farmers are 
encouraged to apply to the LAC13 for registration” (SARDP, 2010). The land-registration 
procedure necessary for certificate issuance depended on farmers applying for registration by 
filling in applications. Hence there is potential bias in who applies for and eventually obtains 
certificates. In a similar rural land-reform agenda in Madagascar, the Ethiopian certification 
process was treated as based on “demand” and “non-systematic”: Burnod et al. (2012)14  
regarded the process as endogenous because “legalization of property rights is not systematic 
but engaged on landowners’ demand.” Despite this conflict, however, no studies have 
undertaken a detailed quantitative assessment of the certification process of the Amhara region. 
Holden et al. (2009) empirically assessed whether bias existed in the rural land 
certification program of the Tigray region. This kind of assessment has not been undertaken 
for the Amhara region, but several empirical papers assessing the impact of the program treated 
the process as exogenous in their empirical estimations. These included Deininger et al. (2011), 
Bezabih et al. (2010), Bekele et al. (2010), Deininger et al. (2008b), and Melesse et al. (2015). 
Although one objective of Ethiopia’s nationwide rural land reform was to strengthen 
the land-holding rights of female landholders, Holden et al. (2009), Deininger et al. (2011), and 
Burnod et al. (2012) did not undertake detailed gender assessments of the certification process. 
But given this objective, it is important to shed light on whether the certification process in 
Amhara and other regions was being systematic or not from the gender perspective: (1) Were 
parcels belonging to female household heads preferentially included in the household land-use 
certificate? And (2) were parcels belonging to female household heads targeted in earlier 
rounds of the certification process than parcels belonging to male household heads? 
This chapter contributes to the literature by examining gender differentials in parcel- 
and socioeconomic characteristics of the heads of household who hold the land. By doing so, 
it helps resolve the conflict in the literature over whether the certification process in the region 
was biased. In addition to parcel certification status, this chapter also examines timing. 
Because strengthening the land-holding rights of female landholders was one of the 
main objectives of Ethiopia’s rural land reform, I hypothesize that parcel-certification status 
                                                          
13 LAC is Land Administration Committee. 
14 Madagascar implemented a recent land certification program attempting to model Ethiopia’s successful   
    experience with the certification process. 
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and timing were pro-female: parcels belonging to female heads of household were more likely 
to be certified, and certified in earlier rounds of the certification process, than parcels belonging 
to male household heads. To test this, I employ probit estimations using cross-sectional parcel-
level data to examine the determinants of certification status and timing by gender. 
The empirical results reveal the following: (1) Parcels belonging to female heads of 
household were less likely to be certified than those belonging to males. (2) The sex of the 
household head was an insignificant factor in parcel-certification timing. (3) Male presence in 
the household was an insignificant factor in both certification status and timing, regardless of 
the sex of the head of household. (4) Greater wealth and proximity to the nearest road were 
significant factors, but only for parcels held by males. They decreased and increased the 
likelihood of parcel certification, respectively, but both were irrelevant to when a parcel was 
certified. The impact of schooling was significant and contributed to early certification in the 
overall and male-headed household samples. (5) Good parcel characteristics, especially being 
“fertile” and having SWC maintenance, made parcels more likely to be certified but were 
insignificant determinants for certification in the female-headed sample. (6) Years of schooling 
was the only significant socio-economic factor in certification timing, and this only for parcels 
held by male heads. (7) The impact of parcel characteristics on the timing of certification was 
mixed, depending on the parcel characteristics and the sample. 
Although these results conflict with accounts of women in rural Amhara and the 
importance of socioeconomic factors for strengthening female land-holding rights, the 
evidence from the empirical analyses does suggest the presence of gender bias, as evidenced 
by the lower likelihood of certification for parcels belonging to female heads of household. 
This means that rural land reforms can fall short of their gender objectives when vulnerable 
groups are not adequately targeted and supported during the implementation. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 covers the literature 
on rural land certification programs in Ethiopia and elsewhere. Section 4.3 discusses the data 
and empirical methodology. Section 4.4 presents the estimation results. Section 4.5 concludes, 
discusses policy implications, and outlines areas for future research. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
Empirical studies of land-use certification have undertaken detailed analyses of the socio-
economic impact of certification. However, this research is thin on the determinants of 
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certification—that is, who receives certificates for land holdings and when. Empirical analysis 
involving a gender context is especially limited. This section summarizes the literature on the 
subject by looking at the cases of Vietnam, Madagascar, and Ethiopia. I refer to Vietnam and 
Madagascar because these they have undertaken rural land reforms similar to Ethiopia’s in the 
issuance of household land-use certificates. This sections also summarizes the literature on 
problems of endogeneity resulting from rural land reforms, and suggested solutions to them. 
Do et al. (2008) used nationwide province-level analyses to measure the percentage of 
households registered and the speed of registration for land-use certificate issuance in Vietnam. 
This is interesting because the analyses were done at the provincial level with nationwide 
coverage, making it important to determine why the implementation of the program varied 
between provinces. To estimate the status and speed of registration, the authors used several 
types of data: data from the two rounds of the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS), 1992–
93 and 1997–98, and provincial data on the progress of certificate issuance and the number of 
land-department officials in each province. They also used data on provincial populations, 
agricultural yields, and urbanization, and data from the 1994 Agricultural and Rural Census to 
capture variables representing infrastructure facilities in rural areas. 
Do et al. (2008) noted that land officials cited two main sources of delay in land titling: 
lack of manpower and time spent resolving disputes. All time-invariant household and 
provincial characteristics were controlled for in the regression, with the dependent variable 
being a measure of the land-use certificate issuance—specifically, the proportion of households 
with certificates in 1998—speed of registration—computing as 200115 minus the year in which 
certificates reached 50 percent of households—and explanatory variables representing 
provincial characteristics. The results show that land registration was not strongly correlated 
with land-department manpower or any other provincial characteristics, such as population 
density, urbanization, proportion of communes having a market, mean level of education, or 
per-capita household expenditure. The results also showed no significant difference in the 
implementation of the reform in the North and the South. Overall, the empirical analyses 
highlighted a lack of systematic relation to any observed provincial characteristics. 
In Madagascar, where land-use certificates were part of the Malagasy land reform 
program, Burnod et al. (2012) indicated that certification was on-demand and “non-
systematic.” The authors undertook household-level analyses using cross-sectional data from 
                                                          
15 2001 is the target year in which land certificate issuance was expected to reach more than 11 million rural 
households.  
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a specially designed survey conducted in 2011 on a sample of 1,862 rural households in four 
regions and nine communes of Madagascar. They investigated the predictive factors of 
certification using descriptive evidence and empirical analyses through a linear probability 
model with household-fixed effects, controlling for parcel and household characteristics. They 
found the following: Level of education was not a determinant of certification, foreign-born 
people were not excluded from the certification process, and women resort to certification more 
than men. They also found that certification access was strongly determined by household 
wealth: the wealthier the household, the higher the probability of its holding a land document. 
Deininger et al. (2008a) compared the certification process in different regions of 
Ethiopia, including Tigray, Oromia, and the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s 
Region (SNNPR), to assess qualitatively whether there was any bias at the village, household, 
or parcel level. The village-level evidence showed that although the process went largely as 
planned, several shortcomings contributing to incomplete certification: (1) Women’s 
representation was limited, as only 20 percent of LACs included a female member. (2) Access 
to written information on the law, process, and purpose of certification was limited. At the 
household and parcel levels, they found little evidence of wealth bias in access to the program 
or information on it, and female participation in the early registration stages was limited. In 
assessing whether the outcomes were biased against women,16 they found that women’s 
awareness of the certification process was high, the majority of women knew where the 
certificate of their household was stored, and most knew whose name was on the certificate. 
Holden et al. (2009) cited administrative factors as plausible sources of bias in a reform 
process. For example, some households might not have received certificates in the Tigray land-
certification program for the following plausible reasons: “(a) administrative failures 
contributing to unfinished registration and certification in some communities, (b) absence of 
some households at the time of registration, (c) failure of the administration to obtain additional 
certificates once they were finished, (d) some households perceiving the certificates as not 
significant at that time leading to lack of certificate collection, and (e) loss of certificates by 
some households or, if there was a change in the household head, the new head did not  take 
over the old certificate or acquire a new one.” Holden et al. (2009) suggested that administrative 
failures appear to have affected households and communities in a random way and were not 
likely to have introduced any endogeneity bias. However, reasons (b), (d), and (e) above could 
have introduced bias. 
                                                          
16 Questions asked to a female respondent which in most cases was the spouse of the household head. 
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Holden et al. (2009) carried out an empirical exercise to identify the determinants of 
the issuance of household land-use certificates in the Tigray region, using a unique balanced 
household and plot-level panel data set covering the five main zones of the region. The baseline 
survey—before the land registration and certification program was introduced—was in 1998, 
and follow-up survey rounds were in 2001 and 2006. The authors estimated three model for 
the determinants of land certificates. In the first, village-fixed effects were tested as instruments 
for predicting administrative failures through the use of a “years since certification” variable 
to represent loss of certificates or changes in household heads, with new heads failing to obtain 
a certificate. The second estimated the determinants of possessing a land certificate using 
observable household and plot characteristics. The third estimated these determinants using a 
linear probability model with household-fixed effects and observable plot characteristics.  
The results of the first model showed that only 7.1 percent of households without 
certificates were predicted correctly. Holden et al. (2009) noted that the weak predictive power 
could indicate either that the instruments were weak or that the certification process was 
random. The inclusion of observable household characteristics, as in the second model, showed 
that livestock holdings and farm size were significant determinants of certification: households 
with fewer animals and larger farms had a higher likelihood of being certified. Livestock was 
explained as being a sign of wealth and influence, which could have a positive correlation with 
tenure security, and households with larger land holdings were likely to be more tenure-
insecure due to their increased chance of losing land in the next redistribution. 
The second model also revealed that only 1.2 percent of households without certificates 
were predicted correctly, meaning that this model was even weaker. The authors found that 
livestock holding and farm size were significant determinants of certification: households with 
fewer animals and larger farms were more likely to obtain certificates. 
In the third model, the results showed a high predictive power for households without 
a certificate: nearly 88.1 percent. Nevertheless, Holden et al. (2009) pointed out that the result 
left an unexplained error that was uncorrelated with unobserved household heterogeneity. 
Kassa (2014) empirically assessed the impact of land titling on investment in Tanzania 
using the 2010/2011 Tanzania Living Standard Measurement Survey. This was a household 
survey with national coverage. While this work does not qualitatively describe or empirically 
estimate the determinants of land titling in Tanzania, it is important for its emphasis on the 
endogeneity of land titling and its conclusion that a closer examination of the land-titling 
process is needed. Kassa (2014) noted that the allocation of property rights to households could 
be determined by household- and village-level characteristics, legal instruments, and household 
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unobservables. The author pointed out that the literature on the impact of land titling varied in 
its methodology for accounting for the endogeneity of land titling; for example, Smith (2004) 
used no instruments, and Besley (1995) suggested multiple instruments, such as the presence 
of a transfer deed, whether the household had ever contested the right to its holding, how the 
land was obtained, and the number of years of land ownership. 
Overall, the literature shows that the results of land titling through land-use certificates 
are mixed, and certification outcomes range from systematic to non-systematic. Do et al. (2008) 
showed provincial characteristics not to be a determinant of certification. Among household 
characteristics, wealth is a significant determinant, but the direction of impact varies between 
the studies: in Holden et al. (2009), less wealth is positively associated with certification; in 
Burnod et al. (2012), wealthy households are more likely to receive certificates. On the other 
hand, Deininger et al. (2008b) found no wealth bias. 
Regarding gender bias, the findings are also not consistent. Burnod et al. (2012) found 
that women were more likely to resort to certification than men, but Deininger et al. (2008b) 
found little evidence of gender bias. These works are useful for guiding analyses of the 
determinants of certification in the Amhara region, and for showing the implications of 
empirical analyses of the impact of land titling. 
This paper contributes to the aforementioned literature in the following ways. First, it 
paper provides analyses at the parcel level, whereas Burnod et al. (2012), Holden et al. (2009), 
and Do et al. (2009) conducted their analyses at the household, plot, and province levels, 
respectively. Second, it provides an empirical assessment of gender differentials in the 
determination of parcel-certification status and timing. A detailed gender lens was used in the 
analyses of Burnod et al. (2012), Do et al. (2008), or Holden et al. (2009). 
 
 
4.3 Data and Description 
 
4.3.1 Data Source 
 
The analyses in this chapter were undertaken at the parcel level using parcel cross-section data 
from the 2007 survey. This chapter uses parcel-level analyses because during the certification 
process, the LACs make a decision for each parcel belonging to the household whether to 
include it in the land-use certificate to be issued to the household: the certificate issued to the 
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household will include only the certified parcels. Seventy-eight of 1,759 households had some 
parcels certified. If all of its parcels are certified, a household is also issued a certificate, and 
the data show that 1,280 households were in this situation. No certificate is issued to the 
household if none of the parcels belonging it are certified. There are 401 such households in 
the data. Parcels may be denied certification because of unresolved land disputes or a 
household’s failure to maintain the parcel properly. 
Although the overall analysis uses data from the 2007 survey to capture the dependent 
variables and certain parcel characteristics, it uses lagged data from the 2004 survey to capture 
characteristics of the head of household, household wealth, and household accessibility. This 
is because most of the parcels were certified in 2005 and 2006, when there were no surveys of 
relevant household characteristics. Therefore, the analysis assumes there were no significant 
changes in the one or two years after the 2004 survey. SWC maintenance is the only parcel 
characteristic also captured in 2004, because it can be expected to vary in a short time span, 
unlike parcel size, soil quality, depth, or slope. 
 
4.3.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
There are two dependent variables in this chapter: parcel-certification status and parcel-
certification timing. Both are binary variables, taking a value of 0 or 1. 
For each parcel a household owned and cultivated or rented-out, if it responded that it 
was certified, the “parcel-certification status” variable for that parcel is assigned the value 1. If 
the household responded that the parcel was not certified, that variable is 0. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3 (section 3.3.3.2), 83 percent of the parcels belonged to male heads of household. Of 
the 7,988 parcels, 79 percent were certified. Most of the certified parcels also belonged to males 
(83 percent). Tale 4.1 shows that most parcels belonging to either male or female heads of 
household were certified, and the proportion between the two groups is similar. (Details of the 
certification status at the household level are provided in section 3.3.3.1.) 
 The “parcel certification timing” variable captures when a parcels was first included in 
a household’s land-holding certificate, expressed in Ethiopian Calendar (E.C.) years. Rather 
than treat each year of certification as a category in the dependent variable, the results are 
grouped into two categories: early and late. If a parcel was certified in 1996 or 1997 E.C., it is 
treated as certified early and is assigned a value of 0. If a parcel was certified in 1998 or 1999 
E.C., it was certified late, and is assigned a value of 1. This categorization das deemed 
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appropriate for the analyses in this chapter as a way to allow sufficient sample sizes for gender 
analyses, and because only 0.54 percent of the parcels were certified in the first year, 1996, it 
is reasonable to assume that “early certification” mainly captures parcels certified in 1997 E.C.  
Section 3.3.3.2 shows that most of the parcels (64 percent) were certified in 1998 and 
1999 E.C., so in the later rounds of the process, and that most of these (85 percent) belonged 
to male household heads. Table 4.1 shows that parcels belonging to female household heads 
were targeted for certification earlier in the process than those belonging to males.17 
 
Table 4.1: Parcel certification status and timing, by gender (%) 
 Male-Headed 
Households  
Female-Headed 
Households 
          Total  
 Uncertified 
Parcels 
Certified 
Parcels 
Uncertified 
Parcels 
Certified 
Parcels 
Uncertified 
Parcels 
Certified 
Parcels 
Parcel-Certification 
Status 
21 79 21 79 21 79 
       
 Male-Headed 
Households  
Female-Headed 
Household 
          Total  
 Early Late Early  Late Early Late  
Parcel-Certification 
Timing 
14 65 22 57 15 64 
  
Source: My estimation from the “Sustainable Land-Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” Survey, 2007 
 
Note: The statistics capturing parcel-certification timing do not add up to 100 percent because 21 percent of the 
observations were of parcels that have not been certified.  
 
Because certification was undertaken at the kebele level (see Section 2.6.3 for an 
overview of the process), I will describe parcel-certification status and timing across the 
kebeles. Because the unit of analysis is the individual parcel, I will also assess correlations 
between status and timing and parcel characteristics. Finally, because parcels were under the 
control of households, I describe characteristics of households the parcels belong to, 
                                                          
17 In terms of capturing parcel certification timing at the household level, the 2007 survey data shows the 
following: out of the 1759 households, there are 401 households with no information on parcel certification timing; 
in male household heads 171, 928 households received certification for their parcels in the “early” and “late” 
rounds of the certification process, respectively (3 male-headed households have a mix of parcels with both “early” 
and “late” certification timing); in female household heads 65, 189 households received certification for their 
parcels in the “early” and “late” rounds of the certification process, respectively (2 female-headed households 
have a mix of parcels with both “early” and “late” certification timing).  
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disaggregated by certification status and timing.  
 
4.3.2.1 Parcel Certification Status and Timing, by Kebele 
 
Table 4.2 shows parcel-certification status by kebele and sex of the household head. Overall, 
79 percent of parcels in male- and female-headed households were certified. The pattern of 
certification status within kebeles is similar for parcels in male- and female-headed households: 
the proportions of parcels certified in each kebele belonging to male- and female- headed 
households are nearly equal. Exceptions appear in Kebi and Telma. In Kebi, 98 percent of the 
parcels in female-headed households were certified, but only 75 percent in male-headed 
households were included in the households’ land-use certificates. In Telma, the reverse holds: 
all parcels from male-headed households were certified but only 75 percent of those in female-
headed households were. Looking at the status across the kebeles, we find that majority of the 
parcels certified in both the male- and female-headed households were in the East Gojjam zone. 
Perhaps there was more incentive to ensure that parcels from surplus-producing areas were 
titled so that production in those areas would not be jeopardized. 
Table 4.3 shows that more parcels in female-headed households were certified early 
than in male-headed households, almost 22 percent versus 14 percent. Moreover, in some 
kebeles, such as Telma, Kete, Amba Mariam, and Addis Mender, more parcels from female-
headed households were certified early than from male-headed households. Because one 
objectives of the Ethiopian rural land reform program was to strengthen the rights of female 
landholders, the reform process might have targeted female landholders in its earlier years. 
The data show no evident correlation between parcel location and certification status. 
It also seems, on average, that there was no gender bias in the certification of parcels within or 
between kebeles. This might mean the certification process was systematic in parcel 
certification by location and by gender. This would not be surprising, as the objective of the 
reform was to ensure that all parcels were certified. As for timing, most parcels in most kebeles 
were certified late, suggesting that there were problems in the implementation process. On the 
other hand, the description also revealed the presence of noticeable variations within kebeles 
in favor of early certification for parcels in female-headed households. This suggests that the 
process targeted female-held parcels in its earlier rounds. In other words, gender bias could be 
present in the parcel-certification timing. 
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Table 4.2: Parcel-certification status, by kebele and gender (%) 
 
Kebeles No Yes Total No Yes Total 
Ammanuel 11 591 602 2 84 86
1.83 98.17 100 2.33 97.67 100
0.8 11.22 9.07 0.7 7.86 6.36
Debre Elias 8 551 559 1 69 70
1.43 98.57 100 1.43 98.57 100
0.58 10.46 8.43 0.35 6.45 5.17
Kebi 78 234 312 1 40 41
25 75 100 2.44 97.56 100
5.7 4.44 4.7 0.35 3.74 3.03
Wolkite 474 4 478 53 0 53
99.16 0.84 100 100 0 100
34.62 0.08 7.2 18.66 0 3.92
Telma 0 420 420 8 46 54
0 100 100 14.81 85.19 100
0 7.98 6.33 2.82 4.3 3.99
Sekla Debir 393 0 393 85 0 85
100 0 100 100 0 100
28.71 0 5.92 29.93 0 6.28
Kete 170 761 931 40 120 160
18.26 81.74 100 25 75 100
12.42 14.45 14.03 14.08 11.23 11.83
Godguadit 32 350 382 14 80 94
8.38 91.62 100 14.89 85.11 100
2.34 6.65 5.76 4.93 7.48 6.95
Amba Mariam 50 552 602 22 164 186
8.31 91.69 100 11.83 88.17 100
3.65 10.48 9.07 7.75 15.34 13.75
Yamed 23 464 487 0 141 141
4.72 95.28 100 0 100 100
1.68 8.81 7.34 0 13.19 10.42
Addis Mender 64 176 240 15 44 59
26.67 73.33 100 25.42 74.58 100
4.67 3.34 3.62 5.28 4.12 4.36
Chorisa 19 322 341 6 73 79
5.57 94.43 100 7.59 92.41 100
1.39 6.11 5.14 2.11 6.83 5.84
Indod Ber 29 522 551 16 127 143
5.26 94.74 100 11.19 88.81 100
2.12 9.91 8.3 5.63 11.88 10.57
Addis Gulit 18 319 337 21 81 102
5.34 94.66 100 20.59 79.41 100
1.31 6.06 5.08 7.39 7.58 7.54
Total 1,369 5,266 6,635 284 1,069 1,353
20.63 79.37 100 20.99 79.01 100
100 100 100 100 100 100
Parcel Certification Status
Parcels from Female Headed Households 
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" Survey, 2007
Parcels from Male Headed Households 
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Table 4.3: Parcel-certification timing, by kebele and gender (%) 
 
Kebeles Early Late
Missing 
Observations Total Early Late
Missing 
Observations Total 
Ammanuel 14 576 12 602 0 84 2 86
2.33 95.68 1.99 100 0 97.67 2.33 100
1.5 13.32 0.87 9.07 0 10.88 0.7 6.36
Debre Elias 16 534 9 559 0 69 1 70
2.86 95.53 1.61 100 0 98.57 1.43 100
1.71 12.35 0.66 8.43 0 8.94 0.35 5.17
Kebi 0 234 78 312 0 40 1 41
0 75 25 100 0 97.56 2.44 100
0 5.41 5.68 4.7 0 5.18 0.35 3.03
Wolkite 4 0 474 478 0 0 53 53
0.84 0 99.16 100 0 0 100 100
0.43 0 34.5 7.2 0 0 18.66 3.92
Telma 4 410 6 420 5 41 8 54
0.95 97.62 1.43 100 9.26 75.93 14.81 100
0.43 9.48 0.44 6.33 1.68 5.31 2.82 3.99
Sekla Debir 0 0 393 393 0 0 85 85
0 0 100 100 0 0 100 100
0 0 28.6 5.92 0 0 29.93 6.28
Kete 9 760 162 931 15 105 40 160
0.97 81.63 17.4 100 9.38 65.63 25 100
0.96 17.57 11.79 14.03 5.05 13.6 14.08 11.83
Godguadit 2 348 32 382 0 80 14 94
0.52 91.1 8.38 100 0 85.11 14.89 100
0.21 8.05 2.33 5.76 0 10.36 4.93 6.95
Amba Mariam 401 150 51 602 147 15 24 186
66.61 24.92 8.47 100 79.03 8.06 12.9 100
42.84 3.47 3.71 9.07 49.49 1.94 8.45 13.75
Yamed 303 161 23 487 86 55 0 141
62.22 33.06 4.72 100 60.99 39.01 0 100
32.37 3.72 1.67 7.34 28.96 7.12 0 10.42
Addis Mender 0 174 66 240 5 41 13 59
0 72.5 27.5 100 8.47 69.49 22.03 100
0 4.02 4.8 3.62 1.68 5.31 4.58 4.36
Chorisa 0 320 21 341 0 73 6 79
0 93.84 6.16 100 0 92.41 7.59 100
0 7.4 1.53 5.14 0 9.46 2.11 5.84
Indod Ber 42 483 26 551 7 120 16 143
7.62 87.66 4.72 100 4.9 83.92 11.19 100
4.49 11.17 1.89 8.3 2.36 15.54 5.63 10.57
Addis Gulit 141 175 21 337 32 49 21 102
41.84 51.93 6.23 100 31.37 48.04 20.59 100
15.06 4.05 1.53 5.08 10.77 6.35 7.39 7.54
Total 936 4,325 1,374 6,635 297 772 284 1,353
14.11 65.18 20.71 100 21.95 57.06 20.99 100
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" Survey, 2007
Parcels from Male Headed Households Parcels from Female Headed Households 
Parcel Certification Timing
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4.3.2.2 Variable Descriptions and Basic Summary Statistics 
 
Tables C.1–C.3 in the appendix provide the variable descriptions and summary statistics for 
the parcel-level data used in the estimations. These tables show that nearly 79 percent of the 
parcels were certified, and nearly 81 percent of the certified parcels were certified late in the 
process. Approximately 17 percent of the parcels were owned by female-headed households. 
Parcel characteristics include quality, slope, depth, and type. “Fertile” parcel quality is 
the best for its productive capacity; “flat” slope is most preferred because it is less vulnerable 
to soil erosion; “deep” parcels are also preferred for farming; and “black” parcel type is 
considered the best for farming. 
As the tables in the appendix show, there is no distinct variation in parcel characteristics 
between male- and female-headed households. Both have a nearly equal distribution of the best 
parcel traits across the various characteristics. Most of the parcels are “red” in type, and slightly 
more parcels in female-headed households have the best, “black” type (40 percent to 34 
percent). Most parcels are of “medium” depth, and “deep” parcels are distributed equally 
between male- and female-headed households at 34 percent. Most parcels are “flat,” and 76 
percent and 72 percent respectively of female- and male-owned parcels are flat. And most 
parcels, 54 percent are “fertile”; 62 percent and 53 percent of parcels in female- and male-
headed households are “fertile.” Parcels in female-headed households are larger on average 
than those in male-headed households. Because this is the average parcel size, the parcel area 
in female-headed households is distributed on a smaller sample than in male-headed 
households. In addition, male-headed households have more parcels with land-related 
investments, in terms of SWC maintenance, than parcels in female-headed households.  
 As for differences in household characteristics, parcels belonging to male-headed 
households also belong to households whose heads who are more literate and wealthier than 
female-headed households. The average number of prime-age males in both groups is almost 
the same. And parcels of households closest to roads belong to female-headed households.   
Because a primary objective of Ethiopia’s rural land reform was to strengthen the rights 
of the female landholders, I hypothesize that parcels belonging to female-headed households 
were certified earlier in the reform. I also expect that parcel quality and investments such as 
SWC maintenance increase the likelihood and earliness of parcels being certified and for both 
male- and female-headed households. Two variables are reflected in the household land-use 
certificate: the certificate stipulates that the landholder “properly maintain” the land, and 
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quality is the only parcel characteristic captured in the certificate (see Figure A.3 in the 
Appendix). As for household characteristics, the prevalence of parcel certification, in terms of 
status and timing, increases in poorer households, especially female-headed households. 
Livelihoods in rural Amhara are vulnerable, especially for female landholders. Lastly, the 
further a household is from the nearest road, the more likely a parcel is to be certified. This is 
expected to apply equally to parcels in both male- and female-headed households. Distance to 
the nearest road could reflect the logistical difficulties encountered by the LACs during the 
reform implementation. 
 
4.3.2.3 Parcel Characteristics, by Certification Status and Timing 
 
This sub-section describes the correlations between parcel-certification status and timing, and 
various parcel characteristics. Three of these characteristics (slope, depth, and type) were also 
cited by Holden et al. (2009) for the study of the determinants of certification. Parcel quality 
was added because it is included in the first two stages of the land-holding certificate. Although 
Holden et al. (2009) focused on the Tigray region, this paper assumes that parcel characteristics 
other than quality are also relevant to certification status and timing. 
Parcels with the “best” characteristics are expected to be certified, and certified earlier, 
given that the Amhara Land Administration and Use Proclamation mandates that landholders 
undertake appropriate measures to enhance the productivity of their parcels (see Table 2.1 for 
details). This implies that parcels with soil and water conservation measures are also likely to 
be certified, and earlier. Parcels that have not been properly maintained in accordance with the 
proclamation could be considered abandoned by the kebele officials and not certified. I expect 
no difference in certification status and timing by parcel size. Larger parcels could be at a 
greater risk of loss, so there is an added incentive to include them in the certificate, but 
households with smaller parcels are considered small farmers with vulnerable rural livelihoods, 
so the LACs could have ensured that small parcels were certified, and in earlier rounds. 
Table 4.4 describes parcel-certification status and timing alongside various parcel 
characteristics. Certified parcels and parcels certified in earlier rounds tend to be fertile, flat, 
and medium depth. Red soil is the dominant characteristic of certified parcels, but these parcels 
are not certified in the earlier rounds. There is no visible difference in certification status or 
timing in terms of parcel size. Certified parcels and those certified earlier tend to have SWC 
maintenance invested in them. 
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These data are further disaggregated by sex of the head of household to which the 
parcels belong, in Table 4.5. Female-headed households have a greater proportion of certified 
and non-certified parcels with the “best” quality, slope, depth, and type characteristics. A 
similar pattern appears in certification timing, except in the cases of quality and depth, where 
the reverse holds. In addition, certified and early-certified parcels belonging to female-headed 
households are larger than those belonging to male-headed households. In terms of investments 
in land, certified and early-certified parcels tend to be those with SWC maintenance in both 
male- and female-headed households, but the number is higher in the former group. 
 
Table 4.4: Parcel characteristics, by outcome variable (male and female household heads) 
 
 
Parcel Characteristics No Certificate Certificate Early Certification Late Certification
Parcel quality (% )
Fertile 41.32 57.52 70.07 54.44
Medium-fertile 35.33 30.37 24.01 31.96
Infertile 22.99 12 5.68 13.52
Parcel slope (% )
Flat 68.54 73.12 80.05 71.51
Medium 25.41 21.58 17.76 22.5
Steep 5.69 5.15 1.95 5.93
Parcel depth (% )
Deep 35.45 33.69 30.98 34.51
Medium 38.42 51.48 56.04 50.21
Shallow 25.77 14.65 12.73 15.11
Parcel type (% )
Black 32.06 36.15 41.52 34.73
Red 49.67 47.07 39.58 48.99
Grey 9.5 6.17 2.68 7.02
Other 8.41 10.53 15.9 9.24
Parcel size, hectares (mean) 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04
With SWC maintenane (% ) 18.81 31.9 47.69 28.33
Source: Survey of Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands (2007)
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Table 4.5: Parcel characteristics, by outcome variables and gender 
 
 
4.3.2.4 Household Characteristics, by Certification Status and Timing 
 
This sub-section discusses average household characteristics by parcel-certification status and 
timing. 
Years of schooling is included because I assume that household heads with more 
schooling are likely to be more informed and involved in the certification process, increasing 
the chance of their land holdings being certified early. This variable is also captured by Holden 
et al. (2009). Number of prime-age (15–45) males in the household, wealth, and distance to the 
nearest road are also included. Given the Amhara region context (see Chapter 2), male presence 
in the household or family can be crucial for protecting land rights, especially those of female 
landholders. Male household members can play an active role on behalf of female landholders 
during the registration and certification process, increasing the likelihood of their parcels being 
certified, and in early rounds. This variable thus allows for a gender analysis by showing 
differences in certification outcomes between male- and female-headed households. Holden et 
Parcel Characteristics
Male Headed 
Households
Female Headed 
Households
Male Headed 
Households
Female Headed 
Households
Male Headed 
Households
Female Headed 
Households
Male Headed 
Households
Female Headed 
Households
Parcel quality (%)
Fertile 38.57 54.58 56.29 63.61 70.51 68.69 53.23 61.27
Medium-fertile 36.45 29.93 30.76 28.44 23.08 26.94 32.42 29.4
Infertile 24.69 14.79 12.82 7.95 6.09 4.38 14.27 9.33
Parcel slope (%)
Flat 67.57 73.24 72.58 76.15 79.06 83.16 71.24 73.06
Medium 26.22 21.48 22.16 18.71 18.8 14.48 22.84 20.6
Steep 5.92 4.58 5.15 5.14 1.82 2.36 5.85 6.35
Parcel depth (%)
Deep 34.55 39.79 33.95 32.37 31.84 28.28 34.64 33.81
Medium 38.13 39.79 51.25 52.57 55.24 58.59 50.22 50.13
Shallow 27.03 19.72 14.57 15.06 12.61 13.13 14.94 16.06
Parcel type (%)
Black 30.31 40.49 35.47 39.48 40.17 45.79 34.36 36.79
Red 50.91 43.66 48.42 40.41 42.52 30.3 49.83 44.3
Grey 10.01 7.04 5.89 7.58 2.35 3.7 6.66 9.07
Other 8.47 8.1 10.14 12.44 14.64 19.87 9.13 9.84
Parcel size, hectares (mean) 0.05 0.12 0.03 0.1 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.1
With SWC maintenance (%) 19.5 15.49 32.78 29.59 50.16 41.86 29.2 25.35
Source: Survey of Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands (2007)
No Certificate Certificate Early Certification Late Certification
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al. (2009) did not capture the role of male presence on certification, so this paper makes a 
contribution to the literature. 
As for wealth, this paper expects that in the Amhara region, poorer households are more 
likely to be certified and in earlier rounds. Land titling can be seen as a measure for 
strengthening the land-holding rights of poorer households to give them incentive to improve 
the productivity of their land and thus improve their livelihoods. The distance to the nearest 
road is important because it is plausible that households may not receive certificates or may 
get them later if it is difficult to reach them. It is equally plausible that the households farthest 
from roads could have found it difficult to attend awareness campaign meetings or to register 
for certification with LAC members. Either way, this paper expects the households farthest 
from roads to have been issued fewer land-holding certificates or to have received them in later 
rounds of the process. 
Table 4.6 shows details of certification status and timing with respect to various 
household characteristics. Male-headed households are more likely to have their parcels 
certified, but female-headed households are more likely to have their parcels certified in earlier 
rounds. In addition, both households headed by either males or females with more schooling 
are more likely to have their parcels certified, and in earlier rounds. Both male- and female-
headed households seem more likely to have their parcels certified, but in later rounds, with 
greater presence of male support in the household. The same is true for household wealth. 
Lastly, female-headed households tend to have their parcels certified, and earlier, if they are 
close to the nearest road. 
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Table 4.6: Household characteristics by outcome variable 
 
 
 
4.4 Estimation Strategy and Results 
 
4.4.1 Estimation Strategy 
 
The estimation strategy in this paper takes account of the fact that the rural land reform process 
in the Amhara region was not implemented simultaneously in all the kebeles. It was rolled out 
gradually for several reasons (highlighted in Chapter 2): lack of manpower, financial 
constraints, delays in the provision of guidelines, and administrative and technical difficulties. 
This paper uses cross-section data from 2007, as discussed Section 3.3.3.2. 
Household Characteristics No Certificate Certificate Early Certification Late Certification
Sex of household head (%)
Male 82.82 83.35 77.62 84.72
Female 17.18 15.47 20.92 14.17
Age of household head (mean) 50.59 51.22 49.27 51.64
Male 50.70 50.90 48.72 51.34
Female 50.04 52.93 51.34 53.38
Years of schooling (mean) 0.75 1.21 1.94 1.03
Male 0.79 1.36 2.21 1.16
Female 0.59 0.41 0.93 0.23
Number of prime age males in the 
household (mean) 1.05 1.19 0.85 1.27
Male 1.08 1.18 0.77 1.26
Female 0.89 1.25 1.14 1.28
Wealth Characteristics  (mean # of 
bulls/oxen owned) 1.57 1.65 1.02 1.79
Male 1.75 1.78 1.1 1.92
Female 0.70 0.93 0.66 1.03
Distance to nearest road (metres) 58.45 24.69 22.2 25.29
Male 61.28 25.28 23.38 25.67
Female 44.79 22.02 17.94 23.63
Source: Survey of Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands (2007)
Note: Information is at parcel level
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This paper departs from Holden et al.’s (2009) strategy by examining the systematic 
differences in certification at the parcel level rather than the household level, and in using cross-
sectional data rather than panel data. It also adds the gender dimension to the determinants of 
parcel-certification status by identifying mechanisms by which status could differ by gender. 
This paper also uses data from the Amhara region, whereas Holden et al. (2009) used data from 
the Tigray region. This provides an opportunity to explore differences in outcomes between 
different regions in Ethiopia that experienced the same type of land reform. 
 
4.4.1.1 Parcel-Certification Status 
 
Lack of parcel certification could result from observable and unobservable kebele 
characteristics and from observable and unobservable parcel and household characteristics. The 
determinants of parcel certification status are thus estimated using Equation 1, which follows 
the empirical strategy adopted by Holden et al. (2009). In Equation (1), the determinants of 
parcel certification status in a household, CSih, are modeled to depend on observable parcel and 
household characteristics and kebele dummies to control for observed differences among 
parcels, households, and kebeles. This is the estimation model used by Holden et al. (2009): 
 
 CSih = α30 + α31Pih + α32Hih + α33Dk + e3ih (1) 
 
CSih is equal to 1 if parcel i in household h has a certificate, and 0 otherwise; Pih is a vector of 
parcel characteristics; Hih is a vector of household characteristics; Dk is a vector of kebele 
dummies; and e1ih, e2ih, e3ih are the error terms related to each of the specified models. 
Observable household characteristics include sex, age, and years of schooling of the head of 
household, number of prime-age males in the household, mean number of bulls or oxen in the 
household, and distance of the household to the nearest road. Proxies for parcel characteristics 
include parcel type, depth, slope, quality, size, and whether it has SWC maintenance.  
Equation 1 is estimated using probit estimation. Following Holden et al. (2009), kebele 
dummies are included to capture unobserved kebele heterogeneities. The regression results will 
report the marginal effects from the probit estimations, namely the likelihood that a parcel is 
certified given certain parcel and household characteristics. 
The equation is estimated using an aggregate sample of parcels belonging to male- and 
female-headed households, and on separate samples: one sample of parcels belonging to male-
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headed households, and one of parcels belonging to female-headed households. Re-estimating 
the equations using disaggregated data sample allows us to determine whether the impact of 
each control variable is similar for parcels in male- and female-headed households. Given that 
female farmers in the Amhara region have different socio-economic status from males, it is 
plausible that the impacts on the likelihood of certification could differ.  
 
4.4.1.2 Parcel Certification Timing 
 
In regards to certification timing, this paper follows the same estimation strategy as for 
certification status. This is because in the Amhara region, the same constraints faced during the 
registration and certification process could very well affect certification timing. For example, 
lack of manpower could mean that some parcels were not certified, and that those certified 
were added to land-holding certificates in later rounds. 
Do et al. (2008) measured the speed of land-reform implementation across the 
provinces of Vietnam. This paper departs from their strategy in several ways, due to the nature 
of the research question and to data limitations: First, the analyses in Vietnam was done at the 
provincial level due to the availability of data on province-level populations, agricultural 
yields, urbanization, and rural infrastructure facilities. Do et al. (2008) also used data on land-
department manpower at the province level to capture delays in land reform implementation. 
These data are not available for the Amhara region. In addition, Do et al. used panel data for 
Vietnam, whereas the Amhara data in this chapter use cross-sectional analyses.  
Therefore, the estimation model of Equation 2 is similar to Equation 1, the only 
difference being the specification of the dependent variable: CSih is replaced with CTih:  
 
 CTih = α30 + α31Pih + α32Hih + α33Dk + e3ih (2) 
 
CTih is equal to 1 if parcel i in household h is certified late (in 1998 or 1999 E.C.), and to 0 
otherwise. The independent variables are the same as in Equation 1.  
The estimation strategy for Equation 2 is the same as Equations 1, and the results will 
be estimated using the aggregate sample data and the samples disaggregated by the sex of the 
head of the household to which parcels belong. Note that the fewer observations will be used 
for estimating the determinants of parcel-certification timing than for status because timing is 
estimated on the subset of parcels that have been certified—it excludes non-certified parcels.  
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4.4.1.3 Bivariate Probit Estimation of Parcel-Certification Status and Timing 
 
This chapter also undertakes a bivariate probit estimation to determine whether the two probit 
equations for determining parcel-certification status and timing should be estimated separately 
or simultaneously. This is important to know, given that a decision is first made on whether a 
parcel is included in the household’s land-use certificate, and then another is made on whether 
it is certified in the early or late rounds. To assess this, the bivariate probit will report a 
correlation coefficient (ρ) between the residuals of each of the two probits. Through a Wald 
significance test, if (ρ) is significantly different from 0, then the two probits should be estimated 
simultaneously. Otherwise, they should be estimated separately.  
If the Wald test shows that the probits should be estimated simultaneously, this result 
will be compared to the results of the two separate probits for determining parcel certification 
status and timing. This will determine whether the results of the separate estimations are robust 
to the joint estimation. 
 
4.4.2 Estimation Results 
 
4.4.2.1 Parcel Certification Status 
The marginal effects from the probit estimations for the determinants of parcel-certification 
status are presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8. On the impact of observable household 
characteristics, the results indicate that the Amhara rural land reform was not “pro-female”: 
parcels belonging to female-headed households were less likely to be certified than those 
belonging to male-headed households. This result can be explained by a fact noted in Chapter 
2: the LAC’s were mostly composed of men, which could have affected female landholders’ 
awareness of the certification program during the publicity campaign. I also pointed in Chapter 
2 that women’s low participation in the land-titling process and other socio-political activities 
was linked to their low position in society, as Teklu (2005) pointed out: women who never 
participated in meetings to elect members of the LAC also indicated that they were not 
informed of the dates and locations of the meetings and believed that they were a task for men, 
and that women did not go to meetings. This finding suggests that a level playing field is 
necessary to ensure that the initial conditions for disadvantaged community members. In this 
case, unless the land reform process actively targets participation by female landholders, those 
landholders are likely to continue suffering from weak land-holding rights despite the reform. 
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 Wealth is the only socioeconomic factor that is significant in explaining the likelihood 
of parcel certification. Distance to the nearest road is also significant. However, these variables 
are still relevant only to parcels belonging to male household heads. Wealth decreases the 
likelihood of parcel certification, meaning the certification process may have targeted poorer 
households. This result could have also been driven by the correlation of wealth with 
unobservables within kebeles, especially as some kebeles are located in the surplus-producing 
East Gojjam area but others are in the drought-prone South Wollo. The data show that the 
average number of bulls or oxen owned in South Wollo kebeles is higher (2.21) than in East 
Gojjam kebeles (1.43). In Amhara, livestock is an important food-insecurity mitigating 
mechanism because, apart from its direct use, it acts as a source of wealth storage. Because 
South Wollo is also poorer than East Gojjam , it is plausible that the negative impact of wealth 
on the likelihood of certification is driven by kebeles in South Wollo who own more bulls and 
oxen. In fact, the data show that nearly 64 percent and 39 percent of the non-certified and 
certified parcels, respectively, are in South Wollo. As for proximity to roads, parcels closer to 
roads are more likely to be certified. These parcels were perhaps relatively easier to reach 
during the reform process. 
 Surprisingly, the number of males in the household is not a significant determinant of 
parcel certification. This stands in contrast to the literature on women in rural Amhara. A 
plausible explanation is that males, especially in female-headed households, might be more 
important for their role as laborers in farming activities than for their influence on the 
certification process. 
 For the most part, parcel characteristics are significant factors only in the overall and 
male-headed household samples. In other words, they play no important role on the likelihood 
that parcels belonging to female heads are certified. In the two samples, the results show that 
overall, “good” parcel characteristics and SWC maintenance are significant  drivers of parcel-
certification status. Parcels that are black, deep, flat, and fertile are more likely to be certified. 
Parcels that are being invested in with SWC maintenance are also more likely to be certified. 
SWC maintenance shows that land is being used appropriately, so land holders with such 
investments might have been certified to give them incentive to continue these activities. Lack 
of appropriate maintenance, as stipulated in the land-holding certificate, could act as a signal 
that the land is abandoned, and officials might not certify it. 
Adding a variable to capture the interaction term between the “number of prime age 
males” and “sex” variables, as shown in specification (e),  produces similar results to the other 
specifications in  Table 4.7 . However, the impact of the interaction term itself is insignificant. 
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This suggests that having male members in the household has no relevance to whether a parcel 
is certified. 
 
Table 4.7: Determinants of parcel-certification status (male and female household heads) 
 
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Parcel type_Red^ -0.0651*** -0.0658*** -0.0661*** -0.0611*** -0.0610***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Parcel type_Grey^ -0.0653*** -0.0657*** -0.0663*** -0.0572*** -0.0584***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Parcel type_Other^ -0.0347** -0.0343** -0.0353** -0.0333** -0.0329**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Parcel depth_Medium^^ 0.0443*** 0.0452*** 0.0453*** 0.0460*** 0.0456***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Parcel depth_Shallow^^ 0.0603*** 0.0617*** 0.0620*** 0.0573*** 0.0566***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Parcel slope_Medium^^^ 0.0216* 0.0195 0.0194 0.0159 0.0162
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Parcel slope_Steep^^^ 0.026 0.0265 0.0269 0.0223 0.0224
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Parcel quality_Medium^^^^ -0.0263** -0.0273** -0.0273** -0.0296*** -0.0303***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Parcel quality_Infertile^^^^ -0.0425*** -0.0444*** -0.0457*** -0.0383** -0.0382**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Parcel size -0.0138* -0.012 -0.0121 -0.0150** -0.0143*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
SWC Maintenance 0.0633*** 0.0634*** 0.0632*** 0.0597*** 0.0594***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Sex -0.0432*** -0.0432*** -0.0573*** -0.0771***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.024)
Age 0.0006 0.0006 0.0003 0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of schooling 0.0008 0.0014 0.0013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Number of prime-age males in 
household
0.0081 0.005
(0.006) (0.006)
Number of bulls/oxen -0.0172*** -0.0172***
(0.006) (0.006)
Distance to nearest road 0.0011*** 0.0011***
(0.000) (0.000)
Number of prime-age males*sex 0.0162
(0.014)
Kebele fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6699 6647 6615 6488 6488
pseudo R-sq 0.4418 0.4431 0.44 0.4549 0.4557
Standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
^denotes "black" parcel type as reference group; ^^denotes "deep" parcel depth as a reference group; ^^^denotes 
"flat" parcel slope as a reference group; ^^^  ^denotes "fertile" parcel quality as a reference group
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Table 4.8: Determinants of parcel-certification status (disaggregated sample) 
 
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
Parcel type_Red^ -0.0752*** -0.0701*** -0.0619 -0.0472
(0.012) (0.012) (0.036) (0.036)
Parcel type_Grey^ -0.0774*** -0.0670*** -0.0436 -0.0548
(0.018) (0.018) (0.052) (0.049)
Parcel type_Other^ -0.0488*** -0.0466*** 0.0171 0.0371
(0.016) (0.016) (0.061) (0.059)
Parcel depth_Medium^^ 0.0499*** 0.0496*** 0.0519 0.0459
(0.013) (0.013) (0.042) (0.039)
Parcel depth_Shallow^^ 0.0641*** 0.0596*** 0.043 0.0438
(0.020) (0.020) (0.061) (0.058)
Parcel slope_Medium^^^ 0.0229* 0.0189 0.0371 0.0271
(0.014) (0.013) (0.046) (0.044)
Parcel slope_Steep^^^ 0.0361* 0.0303 0.0129 0.0022
(0.021) (0.021) (0.059) (0.058)
Parcel quality_Medium^^^^ -0.0297** -0.0314*** -0.0486 -0.0556
(0.012) (0.012) (0.045) (0.044)
Parcel quality_Infertile^^^^ -0.0514*** -0.0431** -0.0032 0.0019
(0.016) (0.017) (0.056) (0.052)
Parcel size -0.015 -0.0177* -0.006 -0.0103
(0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
SWC Maintenance 0.0703*** 0.0669*** 0.0427 0.0498
(0.015) (0.014) (0.044) (0.042)
Sex --- --- --- ---
Age 0.0003 0.0013
(0.001) (0.002)
Years of schooling 0.0026 -0.0176
(0.003) (0.012)
Number of prime-age males in 
household 0.0074 0.0291
(0.006) (0.023)
Number of bulls/oxen -0.0178*** -0.0326
(0.007) (0.021)
Distance to nearest road 0.0011*** 0.0015
(0.000) (0.001)
Kebele fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5244 5079 830 804
pseudo R-sq 0.4671 0.4789 0.1257 0.1532
Standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
^denotes "black" parcel type as reference group; ^^denotes "deep" parcel depth as a reference group; ^^^denotes 
"flat" parcel slope as a reference group; ^^^  ^denotes "fertile" parcel quality as a reference group
Male Headed Households Female Headed Households
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4.4.2.2 Results for Parcel-Certification Timing 
 
The marginal effects from the probit estimations for the determinants of parcel certification 
timing are presented in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. Sex of the head of household is not a significant 
determinant of when parcels are certified. It was a significant variable for certification status, 
so this finding suggests that speed of certification is influenced more by administrative factors 
(the ability of LACs to reach households) than by household characteristics. In fact, years of 
schooling is the only socioeconomic characteristic that is significant, and only so in the 
aggregate and male-household-head samples. More years of schooling contributes to earlier 
certification for male heads but is irrelevant for female heads. Household heads with more 
schooling are more likely to be aware of the certification program and participate to ensure that 
their parcels are certified early. 
  The results for the impact of parcel characteristics are mixed, depending on the 
characteristic and the sample. Only parcel type and slope are significant, as shown in the results 
for the aggregate sample. I expect that parcels with “other” status are more likely to be certified 
early than black parcels, and that medium-sloped parcels are more likely to be certified late 
than flat parcels. Parcel depth, quality, size, and SWC maintenance are not significant 
determinants of the outcome. When the sample is disaggregated, parcel quality does become a 
significant determinant for male heads: medium-quality parcels are more likely to be certified 
late than fertile parcels. And some characteristics become significant in the female sample, 
such as parcel type and size: “other”-type and large parcels are more likely to be certified early 
than black or small parcels.  
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Table 4.9: Determinants of parcel-certification timing (male and female household heads) 
 
 
Variables (a) (b) (c) (d)
Parcel type_Red^ -0.0084 -0.0097 -0.011 -0.0108
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Parcel type_Grey^ 0.0188 0.0184 0.019 0.0126
(0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Parcel type_Other^ -0.0607** -0.0596** -0.0586** -0.0464*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)
Parcel depth_Medium^^ -0.017 -0.0149 -0.0137 -0.0159
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Parcel depth_Shallow^^ -0.0153 -0.0122 -0.0133 -0.0059
(0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Parcel slope_Medium^^^ 0.0314** 0.0327** 0.0321** 0.0309**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Parcel slope_Steep^^^ 0.0405 0.0397 0.0393 0.0484*
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
Parcel quality_Medium^^^^ 0.023 0.0229 0.0229 0.0222
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Parcel quality_Infertile^^^^ 0.0286 0.0254 0.0255 0.0204
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Parcel size -0.0021 -0.0012 0.0007 -0.0018
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
SWC Maintenance 0.0108 0.0104 0.0105 0.0091
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Sex -0.0157 -0.0226 -0.0252
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026)
Age 0.0008 0.0003 0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of schooling -0.0069** -0.0073**
(0.003) (0.003)
Number of prime-age males in 
household 0.0082
(0.010)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.003
(0.009)
Distance to nearest road -0.0004
(0.001)
Kebele fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4930 4896 4894 4810
pseudo R-sq 0.4956 0.5012 0.5051 0.5099
Standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
^denotes "black" parcel type as reference group; ^^denotes "deep" parcel depth as a reference group; ^^^denotes 
"flat" parcel slope as a reference group; ^^^  ^denotes "fertile" parcel quality as a reference group
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Table 4.10: Determinants of parcel-certification timing (disaggregated sample) 
 
 
Variables (a) (b) (d) (e)
Parcel type_Red^ -0.0129 -0.0177 0.0284 0.0413
(0.015) (0.018) (0.046) (0.044)
Parcel type_Grey^ 0.0477 0.0507 -0.0398 -0.0101
(0.034) (0.039) (0.096) (0.087)
Parcel type_Other^ -0.0572** -0.0418 -0.1337* -0.1411*
(0.028) (0.034) (0.070) (0.074)
Parcel depth_Medium^^ -0.014 -0.0169 -0.0561 -0.0556
(0.019) (0.023) (0.053) (0.051)
Parcel depth_Shallow^^ -0.0081 0.0061 -0.0883 -0.1205*
(0.023) (0.026) (0.073) (0.074)
Parcel slope_Medium^^^ 0.0332** 0.0389** 0.0063 0.0157
(0.015) (0.017) (0.056) (0.060)
Parcel slope_Steep^^^ 0.0345 0.0599 0.0745 0.0697
(0.030) (0.040) (0.085) (0.084)
Parcel quality_Medium^^^^ 0.0314* 0.0385* 0.0204 0.0051
(0.017) (0.020) (0.056) (0.052)
Parcel quality_Infertile^^^^ 0.0312 0.0223 0.0472 0.0674
(0.024) (0.026) (0.089) (0.082)
Parcel size -0.0071 0.0016 -0.0194 -0.0315**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016)
SWC Maintenance 0.0023 -0.0038 0.0758 0.0972
(0.021) (0.025) (0.070) (0.079)
Sex 
--- --- --- ---
Age -0.0001 -0.0025
(0.001) (0.002)
Years of schooling -0.0093** -0.0248
(0.004) (0.020)
Number of prime-age males in 
household 0.0207 -0.0574
(0.013) (0.037)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.0149 -0.0289
(0.012) (0.038)
Distance to nearest road -0.0007 -0.0004
(0.001) (0.002)
Kebele fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4043 3286 484 480
pseudo R-sq 0.5102 0.4973 0.3958 0.4322
Standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
^denotes "black" parcel type as reference group; ^^denotes "deep" parcel depth as a reference group; ^^^denotes 
"flat" parcel slope as a reference group; ^^^  ^denotes "fertile" parcel quality as a reference group
Male Headed Households Female Headed Households
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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4.4.2.3 Results for Bivariate Probit Estimation of Parcel-Certification Status and 
Timing 
 
Table 4.11 reports the results of the Wald significance test derived from the bivariate probit 
estimation in Table 4.12, determining whether rho is significantly different from 0. As the p-
value in the table indicates, the null hypothesis, rho = 0, is not rejected. Therefore, the two 
probits for determining parcel certification status and timing are to be estimated separately, as 
in the earlier analyses of this chapter. This finding suggests that in the Amhara region, the 
decisions whether and when to certify were undertaken separately. This could be explained by 
the possibility that households had some control over when they received certification, as it 
depended on when they submitted their applications to register, but no control over whether 
they received the certification.  
 
Table 4.11: Wald significance test 
 
 
 The marginal effects from the bi-variate post-probit estimation are reported in Table 
4.12. Column c shows the post-estimation marginal effects for the likelihood that parcel 
certification = 1 (certified) and parcel certification timing = 1 (certified late). Characteristics 
such as parcel quality and SWC maintenance have significant impacts on both outcomes. In 
addition, fertile parcels and SWC-maintained parcels are more likely to be certified and 
certified early than parcels of lesser quality and without SWC maintenance. As for household 
characteristics, the two important variables of “sex” and “number of prime-age males” appear 
to be insignificant. This contrasts with the results of the separate probit estimations.  
 
Correlation Coefficient Standard Error
Estimated rho -0.0481189 0.1521183
Wald test of rho=0
chi2(1)=0.319567 Prob > chi2 = 0.7521
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Table 4.12: Bivariate probit estimation of parcel-certification status and timing 
 
 
(a) (b) (c)
Certification Status Certification Timing
Post-estimation Marginal 
Effects
Parcel type_Red^ -0.266* -0.000 -0.002
(0.139) (0.086) (0.012)
Parcel type_Grey^ -0.101 0.483*** 0.1095***
(0.345) (0.166) (0.027)
Parcel type_Other^ -0.250 -0.171 -0.0408**
(0.293) (0.127) (0.016)
Parcel depth_Medium^^ 0.858** -0.241*** -0.0487***
(0.388) (0.093) (0.011)
Parcel depth_Shallow^^ 0.634* -0.331*** -0.0708***
(0.357) (0.113) (0.018)
Parcel slope_Medium^^^ 0.147 0.218** 0.0508***
(0.260) (0.086) (0.013)
Parcel slope_Steep^^^ -0.133 0.666*** 0.1510***
(0.268) (0.172) (0.030)
Parcel quality_Medium^^^^ -1.043* 0.317*** 0.0646***
(0.551) (0.091) (0.012)
Parcel quality_Infertile^^^^ -0.843 0.411*** 0.0875***
(0.695) (0.135) (0.020)
Parcel size 0.058 0.052 0.0123
(0.045) (0.048) (0.011)
SWC Maintenance -0.721** -0.492*** -0.1177***
(0.337) (0.099) (0.010)
Sex 0.014 -0.057 -0.013
(0.339) (0.138) (0.014)
Age 0.023** 0.001 0.0004
(0.011) (0.004) (0.000)
Years of schooling 3.658*** -0.060*** 0.0133***
(0.315) (0.019) (0.006)
Number of prime-age males 0.092 0.102** 0.0240***
(0.117) (0.047) (0.005)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.133 0.311*** 0.0720***
(0.153) (0.051) (0.005)
Distance to nearest road 0.015* -0.001 -0.0001
(0.008) (0.002) (0.000)
_cons 1.638*** 0.587*** ---
(0.494) (0.227)
Kebele Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5386 5386 5386
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
^denotes "black" parcel type as reference group; ^^denotes "deep" parcel depth as a reference group; ^^^denotes "flat" parcel slope 
as a reference group; ^^^^ denotes "fertile" parcel quality as a reference group
Standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
Land administration projects such as rural land reforms can suffer from bias influencing both 
the beneficiaries of the reform and when the reform reaches them. Land titling needs to be 
carried out in a systematic process guided by sufficient information campaigns. 
Understanding the process of allocating land rights is critical for policy makers on many 
levels. First, it informs officials about the optimal ways of undertaking rural land reforms under 
technical, logistical, and financial constraints. Second, in contexts where females play active 
roles in farming but are vulnerable segments of rural communities, policy makers can ensure 
that the process does not exclude them, which could translate into adverse impacts on the 
productivity and overall welfare of rural communities. Third, gaining insight into the process 
allows quantitative research to better estimate the impact of land titling on rural livelihoods. 
This paper explored the determinants of parcel-certification status and timing, taking 
into account the gender differentials in these outcomes. The analysis employed cross-sectional 
parcel-level data to empirically assess the outcomes. The estimations controlled for parcel and 
household characteristics and for unobserved kebele heterogeneities. The findings show that 
parcels held by female heads are less likely to be certified, but that sex of the head of household 
is irrelevant to when a parcel is certified. Parcel characteristics and socioeconomic 
characteristics are irrelevant to likelihood of certification. Regarding parcel-certification 
timing, the impact of parcel characteristics is mixed, depending on the characteristic and the 
sample. Socioeconomic characteristics are insignificant to the timing of certification for parcels 
held by female heads. 
The bivariate probit estimation showed that the determinants of parcel certification 
status and timing must be estimated separately. While the decisions whether and when to certify 
a parcel can be made jointly, in the context of the Amhara region, they may not have been. 
The empirical findings of this chapter suggest that treating all groups in communities 
as being similar does not ensure equal access to reforms and their benefits. While this reform 
process envisaged certain methods for ensuring that lands belonging to female heads would 
have access to the reforms, the empirical assessment suggests that the actual implementation 
fell short, as parcels owned by female heads were less likely to be certified. 
Because the findings also suggest that the certification program in the Amhara region 
was not systematic, future research should consider the endogeneity of certification in the 
estimation of the impact of land-use certificates. Literature that has investigated the impact of 
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certification while assuming exogeneity of certification could be used to compare research 
findings and test the robustness of results, perhaps using predicted certificate variables and 
their impacts. 
This is precisely the methodology used in the next two chapters. The results of this 
chapter imply that when estimating the impact of certification on outcomes, such as household 
tenure security in Chapter 5 and land-related investments in Chapter 6, the use of an actual 
certification variable may not be the best estimation strategy to control for the lack of 
randomness in the certification process. Using the predicted-certification variable could be the 
best strategy, given the lack of an appropriate instrument variable from the survey data. This is 
discussed in detail in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Gender, Rural Land Certification, 
and Tenure Security 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Secured land holdings are crucial for men and women in poor rural communities: land is a 
fundamental input for agricultural production, can be used as collateral to access capital, can 
generate income directly if rented or sold, and is a form of economic security, especially in old 
age. While the benefits of secured land holdings extend to both male and female landholders, 
improving female land rights is particularly important because women have traditionally been 
susceptible to greater economic and socioeconomic discrimination and are often among the 
most vulnerable groups in rural societies (Joireman, 2008).  
Burnod et al. (2012) and Deininger et al. (2011) empirically assessed the impact of 
land-use certificates on tenure security in Madagascar, Vietnam, and Ethiopia. However, they 
did not provide formal evidence on the gender-specific impact of these reforms. This chapter 
fills in this gap in the literatures by examining the impact of land-use certificates on perceived 
tenure security of male and female heads of household in the Amhara region of Ethiopia. Given 
the socioeconomic constraints faced by female landholders in Amhara and the nature of 
Ethiopia’s land-tenure system, I hypothesize that (1) land-use certificates enhance the 
perceived tenure security of both male and female household heads, (2) certification enhances 
the perceived tenure security of female more than male household heads, and (3) 
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socioeconomic factors play a more significant role in enhancing the perceived tenure security 
of female than male household heads. I try to uncover whether the land-policy environment of 
Ethiopia, certification, and socioeconomics play important roles in strengthening the land-
holding rights of female heads of household in rural Amhara. 
These are the key contributions of this paper: First, it incorporates a gender lens into its 
analysis to identify the channels by which land-use certificates may have different impacts on 
the perceived tenure security of male- and female-headed households. Second, it takes into 
account the findings in Chapter 4 regarding the endogeneity of the certification process, and 
compares the results of the impact of land-use certificates on the perceived tenure security of 
the male and female household heads using the actual and predicted certification-status 
variables, with the latter applied as determined in Chapter 4. It also uses instrumental variable 
estimation. Third, this paper takes into account socioeconomic factors that could contribute to 
gender differentials in perceived tenure security. 
The research questions addressed in this paper are important for the following reasons: 
first, women account for 70 percent of Africa’s food production but often lack access to secure 
land (World Bank, 2016b). Therefore, from a policy perspective, agriculture-sector strategies 
need to ensure that this group is not marginalized, as they are significant contributors to 
agriculture and rural development. Second, given the scale of Ethiopia’s rural land reform 
program and the costs of its implementation, it is essential to assess the extent to which usufruct 
rights enhance tenure security via-a-vis other factors for improving the secure land holdings of 
females. By looking at this, we can determine whether enough of the objectives have been met 
to justify the resources allocated to the program. Third, for contexts with similar land-tenure 
systems to Ethiopia’s, this research can provide lessons on usufruct rights and gender in 
agriculture. 
This paper uses both panel and cross-sectional data to examine the impact of land-use 
certificates and socioeconomic factors on the perceived tenure security of the male and female 
heads of household. The Chamberlain random effects probit estimations are used as baselines 
estimations. Linear probability model and IV estimations are used to test the robustness of the 
results. This is followed by probit estimations using the 2007 cross-section data, and the results 
are compared between perceived tenure security with the actual and predicted certification-
status variables using predictions from the estimates in Chapter 4. All the panel and cross-
sectional estimations are undertaken using an aggregate data sample of male and female 
household heads and a disaggregated data sample of both groups. Of course, the sample of 
female household heads is rather small and puts analytical limitations on any extensive gender 
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analyses. But despite this, the paper makes a first step into understanding the gender dimension 
of strengthening land-holding rights through land-use certification. 
The empirical results using the panel data reveal that land-use certificates (actual) in 
the Amhara region increased the likelihood of perceived tenure security in both the aggregate 
and disaggregated data samples. Furthermore, the impact of the certificates was greater for 
female heads of household, who also have a higher perception of tenure security than males. 
The IV estimation shows similar results. The findings from the cross-sectional data show that 
certificates have an insignificant impact overall, but female household heads retain a significant 
positive perception of tenure security. Socio-economic factors are largely insignificant 
determinants of perceived tenure security in all estimations and data samples. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides the 
background to the tenure-security and gender context in the Amhara region. Section 5.3 covers 
the literature on rural land certification and tenure security. Section 5.4 discusses the data and 
descriptions. Section 5.5 discusses the estimation strategy and results. Section 5.6 concludes, 
discusses policy implications, and outlines areas for future research. 
 
5.2 Background 
 
This section provides an overview of the tenure security situation of female landholders in the 
Amhara region. It briefly describes their socioeconomic constraints and mechanisms vis-à-vis 
male landholders for influencing the security of land holdings. 
Female-headed households in rural Amhara tend to be poorer than households headed 
by men and more disadvantaged in access to economic resources that are vital for farming and 
sustaining a livelihood. Class and economic status influence the land rights of both women and 
men because they determine the position and influence of individuals and their households in 
the community. Essentially, the land-use certification program was expected to provide 
equitable rights to land by protecting women from socioeconomic vulnerabilities, land 
disputes, discrimination, and expropriation. However, efforts to improve land rights through 
state intervention alone may not be sufficient for giving women equal control of land. Tenure 
security is also strongly influenced by access to male labor and by ownership of key farming 
resources, such as oxen, which female-headed households are less well-endowed with than 
their male counterparts. Another factor in tenure security is mode of production, or how the 
land is used. The patriarchal nature of Amhara society, and various cultural norms and 
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traditions, restrict women from certain modes of production, such as ploughing, that can help 
them secure their land holdings. All these constraints encourage female land holders in the 
region to rent out more of their land than male land holders do, to community members with 
better farming-resource endowments in exchange for share-cropped returns. 
The protection of a woman’s land rights in Amhara is strongly correlated with the level 
of family support she can mobilize. For example, if a woman has able male family members, 
it is considered an embarrassment for them if they do not protect her rights (Teklu, 2005). 
Family support is even more important in societies where female illiteracy is high, is this can 
hinder women’s ability to safeguard their own rights.  
Finally, social capital is also expected to determine women’s land rights in the Amhara 
region. In the literature on rural land reform, informal channels of securing resource rights 
include “social capital,” which is defined by many aspects: as an aggregate of actual and 
potential resources linked to membership in a group; as a stock of trust and emotional 
attachment to a group (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988); as tacit knowledge; as a collection of 
networks; as an aggregation of reputations and organizational capital; and as features of social 
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit (Stiglitz, 1999; Putman, 1995). Social capital, in the form of 
organizational membership, networks, and support systems, is expected to affect the status of 
women in the community, and in turn to determine their land-tenure security.  Whether formal 
or informal means are used to achieve it, the objective of this security is to “allow right holders 
to gain a social and legal recognition of their rights and to reaffirm it against challenging 
claims” (Burnod et al., 2012). Although this paper recognizes the role of social capital in 
strengthening tenure security, the forthcoming analyses do not incorporate it, due to data 
limitations in variables to capturing the concept. 
Even though the primary goal of the rural land-certification program was to strengthen 
women’s land entitlements, this paper argues that improvements in the socioeconomic status 
of landholders, especially female ones, could play a key role in enhancing tenure security.  This 
chapter incorporates these factors into the analyses to seek evidence supporting this argument. 
 
5.3 Literature Review 
 
The extensive body of empirical literature on land-use certificates and their impact on tenure 
security provides important insights into the usefulness of land titling that falls short of granting 
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private ownership. Nonetheless, the mainstream literature on this topic has not formally 
incorporated gender-differential impacts of land-certification schemes. Given that women face 
greater traditionally defined productive constraints than men, which could hurt tenure security, 
the exclusion of gender from formal analysis can lead to spurious results and mislead policy 
decisions about such certification schemes.  
Burnod et al. (2012) examined the impact of the Malagasy land reform, which 
introduced land certificates, on households’ “sense of tenure security,” using cross-sectional 
data on rural households in four regions and nine communes of Madagascar. The authors 
defined tenure insecurity as “land holders’ perceptions that someone can challenge their land 
rights, and eventually, make them lose their rights” (p. 8). This definition is based on the 
context of Madagascar, in which the authors assert that possession of a land title does not imply 
tenure security for several reasons: “land conservation system is not up-to-date, torn or lost 
land register, title in the name of the dead parents, or if State land administration practices are 
not transparent (clientelism, corruption).” 
The authors added that landholders may feel secure about their land holdings even 
without possessing documentation securing their rights by having “strong social recognition” 
(Burnod et al., 2012, p.8). They applied a linear probability model in two sets of regressions: 
(1) a regression examining correlations between plot and household characteristics and lack of 
fear, in terms of a “feeling of security”; and (2) a regression exploring whether the effect of a 
document, such as a title, certificate, petits papiers,18 or tax receipt, differs between plots 
attained through purchase, inheritance, and other modes of acquisition. They found that the 
reform contributed significantly to reduced perceptions of tenure insecurity and led to fewer 
households fearing competing claims on their plots in the short term. However, most of the 
households acknowledged that they were not protected against all risk of contestation in the 
long term. The authors concluded that land certificates were viewed as complements to petits 
papiers: increased demand for land-use certificates did not lead to a reduced demand for petits 
papiers.  
Specifically, the results showed that the probability of tenure insecurity increased when 
a plot’s economic value increased (through production of rice and perennial crops), when plots 
were obtained through improvement (especially in the absence of a land document), and when 
plots were owned by the family or received through donation. Tenure insecurity was also higher 
                                                          
18 “A system in Madagascar in which “people try to prove their property rights to a particular plot pf land by 
having a piece of paper describing their plot of land drafted on a computer and stamped by any government 
office” (Sandra F. Joireman, 2012, p. 78) 
80 
among the foreign-born and newcomers to the village (interviewees whose family tombs were 
not in their village of residence). The regressions also showed that the distance between the 
house and the plot had no impact on perceived tenure insecurity. Among female landholders in 
Madagascar, perceptions of tenure security are not affected by the fact that women may not 
fare well in local inheritance rules in addition to facing the risk of plot expropriation by their 
in-laws upon being widowed. Burnod et al. (2012) also found that the probability of perceived 
tenure insecurity falls when the number of plots (a proxy for the wealth or importance of the 
family) increases. A strong sense of tenure security was correlated with inherited and donated 
plots, due to the owners of such plots being protected from claims by relatives (the owners 
enjoying a “strong social role and position inside their large family,” p. 12), whereas this social 
role might not protect them from competing claims by outsiders on purchased plots. Household 
wealth was not a significant determinant of perceived tenure insecurity. The analyses also 
showed that the probability of tenure insecurity decreased when landholders’ rights were 
formalized and legalized. However, the authors noted that in Madagascar, a lack of land 
documents does not necessarily mean household is tenure-insecure, as most people are not 
concerned about losing their rights in the short term. 
Using data from four waves of a rural panel survey conducted in the Amhara region, 
Deininger et al. (2011) empirically investigated the impact of the land-certification program on 
perceived tenure security. They used two dependent variables: the regressands take a value of 
1 if a household expects an increase or decrease in the size of its land holdings due to 
administrative intervention in the five years following the survey. The empirical model 
assessed the effect of changes in the size of households’ land holdings (increases or decreases) 
on various independent variables, including the treatment variable (certification status). That 
is, whether the household lived in a treated village and the treatment was at the household level; 
a vector of controls at the household level; household-specific unobserved effects; time 
dummies; and the iid error term.  
Deininger et al. (2011) tested the hypothesis that certification increases tenure security. 
They used the Chamberlain random-effects probit, allowing for correlation between household-
specific unobserved effects and the average of the time-varying covariates at the household 
level. For robustness checks, they used a household fixed-effects linear probability model. 
They found that despite certification in the Amhara region failing to eliminate tenure insecurity, 
it did significantly reduce fear of land loss, by nearly 10 percentage points. This result was 
found to be robust across specifications. Specifically, land tenure for households with 
certificates was found to be significantly more secure because of reduced expectations of 
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administrative interventions. The Chamberlain village-level estimation results indicated that 
certification decreased the share of people expecting to gain from land redistribution by nearly 
14 percentage points, and the share of those expecting to lose by nearly 9 percentage points. 
The robustness-check estimates from the household fixed-effects linear probability model 
showed that the results were consistent for decreases in landholding size but insignificant for 
increases. The authors concluded that although certification had a positive impact, substantial 
levels of tenure insecurity remained due to the threat of expropriation resulting from Ethiopia’s 
land-policy environment. Deininger et al. (2011) pointed out that a full realization of the 
potential of certification requires, in addition to honoring the existing certificates, that the 
policy environment does not undermine the certificates. 
 None of the aforementioned works undertook an empirical assessment of the gender 
impact of land-use certificates. They did not assess, for instance, whether the certification 
program had different effects on male- and female-headed households, or what mechanisms 
drove this difference. 
Other important determinants of rural land tenure security have been discussed by 
empiricists in the formal literature. For example, Deininger et al. (2011) found that household 
composition (the number of adult males and adult females between 15 and 60) had an 
insignificant effect on the household’s expectation of an increase or decrease in land holdings 
due to redistribution or reallocation over the next five years. Older households, and a higher 
per-capita endowment than the village median, were correlated with fear of land loss due to the 
expectation of administration redistribution measures. A larger share of high-quality land was 
found not to be an important factor by officials in the decision-making process for land 
redistributions. In addition, education and possession of iron roofs and oxen were found to have 
a little impact on expectations of changes in the size of land holdings. These results were 
consistent regardless of whether the land-certification treatments were examined at the 
household or village level. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways: First, it undertakes an empirical 
assessment of the gender differentials in the determination of perceived tenure security. 
Second, it takes into account the endogeneity of the certification process, which was 
determined in Chapter 4. Third, it explores the effect of gender differentials on perceived tenure 
security as a result of household socioeconomic factors. These contributions build on the 
existing literature by presenting the mechanisms by which households’ perceived tenure 
security can differ by sex of the household head, and by ensuring that the empirical findings 
are robust when endogeneity of certification is incorporated into the analyses. 
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5.4 Data and Description 
 
5.4.1 Data Source 
 
The analyses in this chapter are undertaken at the household level using unbalanced panel data 
from the 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2007 rounds of the “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the 
Ethiopian Highlands” survey, and cross-sectional data from the 2007 survey. I use household-
level analyses because the question in the survey that captures the dependent variable, 
“perceived tenure security” was asked of household heads. The data are unbalanced because, 
as noted in Chapter 3, the larger sample size relative to the balanced panel provides an 
opportunity to undertake a gender-disaggregated analyses. I use the 2007 cross-section data too 
because variation in households’ certification status is evident only in the final round of the 
survey. This is because, although the certification program started in 2002, delays in 
implementation (see Chapter 3) meant that most certifications occurred in the later years 
(2005–07). Because the first follow-up survey after 2004 was in 2007, the variations in 
household certification status are best captured in the 2007 survey. 
 The unbalanced household-level panel data include 6,541 observations of 1,864 
households; 82% of the observations are from male-headed households. The numbers of both 
male- and female-headed households increased between 1999 and 2007. Details of the 
household level data are provided in Section 3.3.3.1.  
As for the certification status of households captured in the unbalanced panel data, 
nearly 21% of the observations were of households with certificates, and of these observations, 
nearly 80% were of male-headed households. A substantial proportion of both male and female 
household heads acquired certificates from 2005 to 2007 (see Chapter 3), even though 2002 
was the pilot year, due to the lengthy certification process and delays in implementation. 
Further details of household-level data and certification status are provided in Section 3.3.3.1.  
The analyses in this chapter capture independent variables representing household 
characteristics that are likely to explain perceived tenure-security differentials between male 
and female household heads in the Amhara region.19 This is in addition to capturing the 
households’ certification status variable (whether households have land-use certificates), which 
                                                          
19 Although “social capital” is expected to be an important determinant of tenure security, this study excludes 
proxies of social capital in the analyses due to lack of variation and an insufficient number of observations in the 
survey data.  
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is also expected to determine the perceived tenure security of the household heads. 
 
5.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This sub-section provides a descriptive overview of the perceived tenure security of the 
household heads over their land holdings disaggregated by sex of the household head, 
certification status, and survey year; provides variable descriptions and summary statistics; and 
a discussion of the household characteristics by outcome and certification status disaggregated 
by sex of the household head, and survey year. The descriptive statistics presented in this 
section are important in assessing the potential channels by which land certificates could impact 
tenure security, in addition to exploring the heterogeneity of these channels and household 
characteristics which affect perceived tenure security across male versus female household 
heads. 
 
5.4.2.1 Household Perceptions of Changes in the Size of Land Holdings, by Gender 
and Certification Status 
 
The survey captured two variables that can act as proxies for households’ perceptions of tenure 
security: (1) “Have you ever been concerned about land related conflicts?” and (2) “What are 
your expectations about changes in the size of your land holdings in the next five years?” This 
paper does not use the first, but only the second, as Deininger et al. (2011) did. The first 
question was rejected because it only captured the household’s past perceptions, which makes 
it ill-suited to correlating a household’s current certification status with its perceieved tenure 
security. 
Given these limitations, the second question is preferable. The possible responses to it 
in all the survey years (1999, 2002, 2004, and 2007) included “increase,” “decrease,” “no 
change,” and “don’t know.” I use these categories to infer whether a household is perceived to 
be tenure-secure or -insecure. Note, though, that the question captures “expected” rather than 
unexpected changes in the size of land holdings. This means that as long as the change is 
expected, a decrease in land holdings may not mean that the household head feels tenure-
insecure, in contrast with an unexpected decrease, in which case it is plausible to infer that the 
household is perceived as being tenure-insecure. In addition, in some situations, such as a 
decline in household size, a decrease in the land holdings might not contribute to the household 
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head feeling tenure-insecure, since there may be less need for a large land area. 
Similarly, an increase in land holdings, whether expected or unexpected, may not mean 
that the household is perceived as tenure-secure. In fact, an increase in holdings may cause the 
head to feel more insecure, due to fear of land loss through, for example, expropriation or 
conflict. 
While at first glance, the “don’t know” response represents uncertainty about the 
changes to land holdings, those who “don’t know” could in fact end up with an increase 
(implying perceived tenure security) or a decrease (implying insecurity) in land holdings over 
the next five years. This paper recognizes the difficulties in defining a household’s perceived 
tenure insecurity and notes that the definition is open to various interpretations. 
 Despite the difficulty of identifying household perceptions of tenure security using 
expectations of changes to the land holdings, I argue that the nature of Ethiopia’s land-tenure 
system—land is state-owned, and holdings can change for mainly administrative reasons—as 
indicated in the survey data (most households cite redistribution and reallocation as the reasons 
for change) makes it reasonable to infer the following about perception of tenure security: (1) a 
household expecting an “increase” in land size is perceived to be tenure secure, as the state is 
awarding it additional land. (2) A household expecting no change in holdings is also perceived 
to be tenure secure, as this expectation represents confidence that the state will not intervene. 
(3) A household expecting a “decrease” is perceived to be tenure insecure, as this implies a loss 
of holdings due to the state taking away land, even though it is expected. To avoid difficulty of 
interpreting “don’t know” responses, this category is excluded from the sample.20 
Survey respondents were asked about the reasons for their expectations for the next five 
years. In the Amhara context, expected changes to the size of land holdings could occur for 
two kinds of reasons: administrative and non-administrative ones. Administrative reasons 
include village redistribution and land reallocation. These land-size changes are community-
wide and induced by the government for specific purposes, such as tackling population 
pressure. Non-administrative reasons include family redistribution, inheritance (from the 
head’s parents, the spouse’s parents, or other relatives), buying, mortgaging, and bequests or 
gifts to others. These changes are not induced by the government and affect only a few 
                                                          
20 There are 576 observations (576 households) in the “don’t know” response category. Nearly 76 percent of these 
observations are from male-headed households; and 79 percent have a certificate. In addition, these observations 
are random i.e. their characteristics in terms of age, years of schooling, number of prime-age males in the 
household, number of bulls/oxen owned by the household, whether the households grow perennial crops, and size 
of total parcels in the household are not considered to be outliers to the total sample average. Therefore, this paper 
does not consider the exclusion of “Don’t know” observations to be influencing the analyses.  
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members of the community. Most of the observations (50 percent) came from households that 
cited administrative factors as their reasons for expecting changes to their holdings. Fewer 
(12.21 percent) cited non-administrative factors.21 But because a gender analysis needs 
plentiful observations from female-headed households, this paper does not distinguish between 
administrative and non-administrative reasons. However, because only 12 percent of 
respondents cited non-administrative reasons, I expect the results to be driven by the 
administrative factors, reflecting the nature of Ethiopia’s land-tenure system. 
 This definition of household perceived tenure security departs from Deininger et al. 
(2011). In their paper, household perceived tenure security was whether the household “expects 
an increase or decrease in land holdings over the coming 5 years due to land redistribution and 
reallocation.” I chose to categorize the variable of interest by grouping the responses (increase, 
decrease, no change) as much as possible to ensure enough observations of female-headed 
households for a gender analysis. For the same reason, this paper does not distinguish between 
administrative and non-administrative reasons for expected changes. 
 Using the panel information from the survey, Table 5.122 presents household heads’ 
perceptions off the size of their land holdings in each year, disaggregated by sex of the head, 
but regardless of the reasons for the expectation. Nearly 28 percent of the households reported 
negative views of their land-tenure security, as reflected by responses of “decrease.” On the 
other hand, nearly 72 percent reported positive perceptions, as reflected by “no change” or 
“increase.”  
 
Table 5.1: Expectations of changes in land holdings, by gender 
 
 
                                                          
21 Nearly 38 percent did not provide reasons for their expectations of change, as they had answered “no change” 
to the earlier question. 
22 The 1999, 2002, and 2004 surveys did not have the “don’t know” category for expectations of changes to land 
holdings. In 2007, 32.78 percent responded “don’t know.” Between male- and female-headed households, 31.03 
and 40.12 percent, respectively, gave the same response. 
1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Decrease (%) 24.12 28.11 29.20 30.23 27.68 24.6 28.62 29.97 31.8 28.47 21.69 25.23 25 22.66 23.52
"Perceived tenure insecurity" (%) 24.12 28.11 29.20 30.23 27.68 24.6 28.62 29.97 31.8 28.47 21.69 25.23 25 22.66 23.52
No change (%) 26.38 33.40 39.26 57.92 38.12 24.44 32.86 38.79 56.24 56.24 36.14 36.49 41.86 66.01 44.56
Increase (%) 49.50 38.49 31.54 11.85 34.20 50.96 38.52 31.24 11.96 11.96 42.17 38.29 33.14 11.33 31.91
"Perceived tenure security" (%) 75.88 71.89 70.80 69.77 72.32 75.4 71.38 70.03 68.2 68.2 78.31 74.78 75 77.34 76.47
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Total Male Household Heads Female Household Heads
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Disaggregating the responses on expectations by sex of the household head shows that 
perceived tenure insecurity is lower among female than male heads of household. A potential 
reason is that, according to the 2007 survey, a greater percentage of male household heads than 
female (47 vs. 39 percent) felt that the land they farmed belonged to the government.23 A sense 
of ownership may indicate less fear of land being taken away through administrative measures. 
Another reason could be that some female household heads are less aware of the nature of 
Ethiopia’s land-tenure system (see Section 3.4.7 for details). 
The last land redistribution in the Amhara region was in 1996 E.C., which corresponds 
to 2002/2003 A.D. Although households’ perceived tenure insecurity increased from 2002 to 
2007 in the total and male-household-head samples, the increase was only slight, which 
suggests that once the certification program was being rolled out in the kebeles, households 
started to feel more secure in their land holdings (Table 5.1). Interestingly, among the female 
heads, there was a noticeable decline in perceived tenure insecurity after 2004. This could mean 
that they were more sensitive to the issuance of usufruct rights than their male counterparts 
were. In other words, certificates might be having a greater impact on the tenure security 
perceptions of females than of males. And, as Chapter 4 showed, female heads were more likely 
to be certified in the later rounds of the certification process, which could explain the drop in 
perceived insecurity after 2004. 
Table 5.2 depicts household heads’ expectations of changes in the size of their land 
holdings, by certification status. It shows that certification is correlated to reductions in 
perceived tenure insecurity. The expectation of a decrease in holdings is lower in households 
with certificates than without certificates, as noted in the 2007 survey year. 
 
Table 5.2: Expectations of changes in land holdings, by certification status 
 
 
                                                          
23 52 percent and 59 percent of male- and female-headed households felt that the land they farmed belonged to 
them. 
1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Decrease (%) 24.12 28.11 29.28 43.5 27.98 -- -- 0 26.18 26.1
"Tenure insecure" (%) 24.12 28.11 29.28 43.5 27.98 -- -- 0 26.18 26.1
No change (%) 26.38 33.4 39.28 42.75 33.06 -- -- 33.33* 62.49 62.39
Increase (%) 49.5 38.49 31.44 13.75 38.96 -- -- 66.67** 11.33 11.51
"Tenure secure" (%) 75.88 71.89 70.72 56.50 72.02 -- -- 100 73.82 73.9
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Note: * no of observtations=1; ** no. of observations=2
No Certificates Certificates
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Table 5.3 shows the correlation between household heads’ expectations of changes in 
their holdings, by sex head and by certification status in each year. The table indicates that 
certification may have reduced expectations of changes to land holdings in both males and 
females. Note that more female-headed households with certificates expect “no change” than 
their male counterparts. One potential explanation is a relative lack of knowledge of the land-
policy environment among female household heads. 
 
Table 5.3: Expectations of changes in land holdings, by gender and certification status 
 
 
Table 5.4 depicts the reasons for household heads’ expectations of changes in the size 
of their land holdings. Given Ethiopia’s land-policy environment, most of the households 
expected changes due to administrative reasons, regardless of their certification status. 
However, the table also suggests that certification provides some level of tenure security from 
administrative changes to holdings. This holds for both male and female heads, although there 
is no visible difference between the female-headed households with and without certificates. 
The last administrative change in the Amhara region was in 1996 E.C. (2003/2004 A.D.) and 
was due to village redistribution. The table also shows a declining trend of households citing 
administrative reasons for their expectations of changes in the size of their holdings from 1999 
to 2004, After which administrative reasons are increasingly cited, seemingly as people recall 
the most recent redistribution. 
Looking at the data to explain households’ perceived tenure security by reasons for 
1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Decrease (%) 24.6 28.62 30.03 43.18 28.48 -- -- 0 28.34 28.27
"Tenure insecure" (%) 24.6 28.62 30.03 43.18 28.48 -- -- 0 28.34 28.27
No change (%) 24.44 32.86 38.76 44.09 32.17 -- -- 50* 59.87 59.84
Increase (%) 50.96 38.52 31.2 12.73 39.34 -- -- 50* 11.79 11.89
"Tenure secure" (%) 75.4 71.38 69.96 56.82 71.51 -- -- 100 71.66 71.73
1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Decrease (%) 21.69 25.23 25.15 44.9 25.33 -- -- 0 15.58 15.48
"Tenure insecure" (%) 21.69 25.23 25.15 44.9 25.33 -- -- 0 15.58 15.48
No change (%) 36.14 36.49 42.11 36.73 37.77 -- -- 0 75.32 74.84
Increase (%) 42.17 38.29 32.75 18.37 36.9 -- -- 100* 9.09 9.68
"Tenure secure" (%) 78.31 74.78 74.86 55.1 74.67 -- -- 100 84.41 84.52
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Note: * no. of observations=1
Male Household Heads
No Certificates Certificates
Female Household Heads
No Certificates Certificates
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expectations about changes in the size land holdings (Table 5.5) reveals that most household 
heads who felt tenure-secure or insecure cited administrative reasons for expecting changes to 
their holdings. The effect does not differ between male and female household heads. 
 
Table 5.4: Reasons for expected changes in holdings, by gender and certification status 
 
 
Table 5.5: Reasons for expected changes in holdings, by gender and perceived tenure 
security 
 
 
5.4.2.2 Household Perceptions of Changes in Holdings, by Kebele and Gender 
 
Because the certification program was implemented at the kebele level, it is useful to examine 
the distribution of perceived tenure security across kebeles and genders using the panel data. 
Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007 Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007
Non-administrative (%) 17.4 11.6 22.4 22.3 9.94 25.6 -- -- -- 25.4
Administrative (%) 82.5 88.4 77.6 77.7 90.1 74.4 -- -- -- 74.6
Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007 Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007
Non-administrative (%) 17.5 11.9 22.1 22 9.9 26.4 -- -- -- 26.49
Administrative (%) 82.5 88.1 77.9 78 90.1 73.6 -- -- -- 73.51
Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007 Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007
Non-administrative (%) 17.5 9.7 24.1 23.6 10 19.5 -- -- -- 17.5
Administrative (%) 82.5 90.3 75.9 76.4 90 80.5 -- -- -- 82.5
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
No Certificate With Certificate
Male Household Heads
Female Household Heads
No Certificate With Certificate
No Certificate With Certificate
Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007 Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007
Non-administrative (%) 23.92 22.1 29.56 19.93 22.57 14.16 6.53 17.51 24.28 15.56
Administrative (%) 76.08 77.9 70.44 80.07 77.43 85.84 93.47 82.49 75.72 84.44
Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007 Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007
Non-administrative (%) 24.24 22.92 29.76 18.99 23.53 14.07 6.65 16.84 24.48 16.96
Administrative (%) 75.76 77.08 70.24 81.01 76.47 85.93 93.35 83.16 75.52 83.04
Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007 Panel 1999 2002 2004 2007
Non-administrative (%) 21.86 17.31 28.3 26.47 15.91 14.66 5.83 21.43 23.21 8.7
Administrative (%) 78.14 82.69 71.7 73.53 84.09 85.34 94.17 78.57 76.79 91.3
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Tenure Insecure
Male Household Heads
Tenure Insecure Tenure Secure
Female Household Heads
Tenure Insecure Tenure Secure
Tenure Secure
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Overall, the patterns in the distribution of perceived tenure security and insecurity seem similar 
in both male- and female-headed households and within and across kebeles. In each kebele, the 
majority of both male and female household heads felt tenure secure. With the exception of 
Wolkite, Yamed, and Addis Mender, a greater percentage of female-headed households felt 
tenure-secure than their male counterparts. Kete is the kebele with the highest percentage of 
male- and female-headed households feeling tenure secure.  
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Table 5.6: Households’ perceived tenure security across kebeles, by gender (%) 
 
Kebeles Insecure Secure Total Inecure Secure Total 
Ammanuel 144 248 392 11 32 43
36.73 63.27 100 25.58 74.42 100
11.38 7.8 8.82 5.53 4.95 5.08
Debre Elias 143 237 380 15 35 50
37.63 62.37 100 30 70 100
11.3 7.46 8.55 7.54 5.41 5.91
Kebi 131 217 348 13 45 58
37.64 62.36 100 22.41 77.59 100
10.36 6.83 7.83 6.53 6.96 6.86
Wolkite 123 281 404 13 27 40
30.45 69.55 100 32.5 67.5 100
9.72 8.84 9.09 6.53 4.17 4.73
Telma 121 265 386 14 36 50
31.35 68.65 100 28 72 100
9.57 8.34 8.69 7.04 5.56 5.91
Sekla Debir 109 252 361 22 59 81
30.19 69.81 100 27.16 72.84 100
8.62 7.93 8.13 11.06 9.12 9.57
Kete 126 488 614 21 104 125
20.52 79.48 100 16.8 83.2 100
9.96 15.36 13.82 10.55 16.07 14.78
Godguadit 67 241 308 16 80 96
21.75 78.25 100 16.67 83.33 100
5.3 7.58 6.93 8.04 12.36 11.35
Amba Mariam 96 237 333 28 80 108
28.83 71.17 100 25.93 74.07 100
7.59 7.46 7.49 14.07 12.36 12.77
Yamed 86 196 282 23 48 71
30.5 69.5 100 32.39 67.61 100
6.8 6.17 6.35 11.56 7.42 8.39
Addis Mender 47 209 256 9 35 44
18.36 81.64 100 20.45 79.55 100
3.72 6.58 5.76 4.52 5.41 5.2
Chorisa 35 226 261 8 40 48
13.41 86.59 100 16.67 83.33 100
2.77 7.11 5.87 4.02 6.18 5.67
Indod Ber 17 47 64 3 9 12
26.56 73.44 100 25 75 100
1.34 1.48 1.44 1.51 1.39 1.42
Addis Gulit 20 34 54 3 17 20
37.04 62.96 100 15 85 100
1.58 1.07 1.22 1.51 2.63 2.36
Total 1,265 3,178 4,443 199 647 846
28.47 71.53 100 23.52 76.48 100
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Male Household Heads Female Household Heads
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5.4.2.3 Variable Descriptions and Basic Summary Statistics 
 
Tables D.1 to D.9 in the Appendix provide variable descriptions and summary statistics of the 
panel and cross-sectional data at the household level. The information in these tables is 
disaggregated by sex of the household head for both the panel and the 2007 data. The variables 
in the tables were selected to best capture the socioeconomic context of the Amhara region by 
gender and potential correlation with perceived tenure security. In addition, these variables are 
similar to the ones used in the literature on the impact of land-use certificates on tenure security, 
such as Deininger et al. (2011). 
The “sex” variable is included to assess the gender differences in perceived tenure 
security and differences in the socioeconomic contexts of male- and female-headed 
households. “Age” acts as a proxy for the generational cycle (as explained by Deininger et al., 
2011) that land goes through: older households are expected to be tenure insecure, as their land 
is being passed on to younger generations by the state to meet increased population pressure. 
Older households could be also less likely to protect their land holdings, making them more 
vulnerable to loss. “Years of schooling” is used to capture households’ awareness of land-
related policies and the nature of the land-tenure system: more-informed households are 
expected to be more tenure secure than less informed ones, as the former would know better 
how to protect their holdings.  
“Number of prime-age males” is considered because it represents to some extent the 
amount of male labor available to the household for farming and for protecting land holdings, 
as this is a key variable in the case of female landholders in the Amhara region. Households 
with more prime-age males are expected to feel more tenure secure because male labor is 
needed for farming (especially for households that are culturally restricted in the farming 
activities women can engage in) both to sustain livelihoods and to ensure that land is being 
used appropriately to avoid expropriation by the state. “Number of bulls/oxen” is included to 
capture household wealth, which is expected to reduces households’ perceived tenure security, 
as wealthier households can be targeted by the state for redistribution of lands to poorer people 
in the community. But wealth could also be correlated with a reduction in perceived insecurity, 
as it could indicate status, influence, and social networks which could be leveraged to safeguard 
land holdings. 
“Total parcel size” is important because in the context of the Amhara region, land 
redistributions have been carried out by the state to meet increased demand from a growing 
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rural population. Households with larger parcels are thus expected to feel less secure. “Share 
of fertile parcels,” “share of rented parcels,” and “perennial crops” are all proxies for how land 
is used. A high share of fertile parcels, and growing of perennial crops are expected to increase 
perceived tenure security, as these could indicate that the household is managing the land well 
in accordance with the region’s Rural Land Administration and Use Proclamations (see 
Chapter 2 for details). An increase in “share of rented parcels” could either increase or decrease 
perceived tenure security: land is rented out, especially by female landholders, when a 
household lacks the resources to farm or manage the land themselves. If land is rented out, a 
household might feel more tenure-secure for knowing that its land is being managed well. On 
the other hand, the household might feel more tenure-insecure as there is a risk that the land 
will not be returned, especially if there are no formal mechanisms securing land holdings. 
 Overall, it is evident from the panel data derived from the male- and female-headed 
households sample that most of the observations (72%) belong to households who feel tenure 
secure, although only 21% of the observations are certified. The data reflect the fact that the 
majority of the observations (83%) are of male-headed households, the average age in the 
sample is 49, most have low educational attainment (one year of schooling), and more than half 
the sample observations have a prime-age male present in the household, with an average of 
one prime-age male present. On average, more than half the households in the sample own 
bulls or oxen (the mean number owned is 1), the average parcel size is 0.0553 hectares, most 
of the parcels are fertile, and a few are rented-out and grow perennial crops.  
 Disaggregating the panel data by sex of the household head shows the following: 
slightly more female- than male-headed households feel tenure-secure and have certificates, 
and female-headed households are slightly older (by two years) and have less educational 
attainment. More than half the male- and female-headed households have prime-age males, 
with an average of one prime-age male present. Most of the female-headed households do not 
own bulls or oxen, and they own fewer on average than male-headed households. Female-
headed households have slightly larger parcels and fewer fertile parcels, rent-out a greater 
fraction of their parcels, and are less likely to grow perennial crops.  
 The summary statistics from the 2007 sample of male- and female-headed households 
indicates the following: Most of the observations (70 percent) belong to households who feel 
tenure-secure, and most of the households (79 percent) have certificates. The majority of the 
observations (80 percent) are of male-headed households, the average age is 51, most have low 
educational attainment (1 year of schooling), more than half the households have a prime-age 
male present, with an average of one prime-age. On average, more than half the households 
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own bulls or oxen (the mean number owned is 1), the average parcel size is 0.1907 hectares, 
most of the parcels are fertile, and a few are rented-out and grow perennial crops. 
 Comparing the 2007 summary statistics by sex of the household head reveals the 
following: More female- than male-headed households feel tenure secure, similar percentages 
of male- and female-headed households have certificates, and female-headed households are 
slightly older (by two years) and have less educational attainment. More than half the male- 
and female-headed households have prime-age males, with an average of one prime-age male 
present. Most of the female-headed households do not own bulls or oxen, and they own fewer 
than male-headed households. Female-headed households have slightly larger parcels and 
fewer fertile parcels, and they rent out a greater fraction of their parcels than do male-headed 
households. However, both male- and female-headed households are unlikely to grow 
perennial crops. 
 
5.4.2.4 Household Characteristics, by Outcome and Sex of Household Head 
 
This section discusses household characteristics by outcome variable (perceived tenure 
security), with the data disaggregated by sex of household head to assess gender differentials. 
The description covers a number of variables that are expected to determine households’ 
perceived tenure security. 
Certification is included in the analyses because it is expected to enhance perceived 
tenure security, as it is expected to strengthen land-holding right. Older household heads are 
expected to feel tenure insecure, as their capacity to protect their land holdings may have 
decreased. Increases in years of schooling are expected to enhance households’ perceived 
tenure security, because this is a proxy for knowledge that could be used to protect land-holding 
rights. Households with prime-age males present and with higher numbers of them are expected 
to protect their land holdings by using labor to maintain and work the land and to exercise their 
rights in formal legal proceedings to protect their lands. Households with larger parcels may 
have negative perceptions of tenure-security, as these parcels could be subject to land 
redistributions by kebele officials, for example in response to local population increases. 
Households with fertile parcels and growing perennial crops are expected to feel secure in their 
holdings because this suggests that their lands are being maintained and used in accordance 
with regulations and may not be seized. Households that rent out their lands are expected to 
have a positive perception of tenure security because rented out land is likely to be maintained 
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and used properly, lowering the risk of its being taken away. Ownership of bulls or oxen is 
expected to reduce perception of tenure security because cattle are a proxy for households’ 
wealth, and wealth could mean a greater risk of losing land. 
Tables 5.7a through c describe household characteristics by outcome variable for all 
households and survey years, and disaggregate them by sex of the household head. It is evident 
from the descriptive statistics that feeling tenure-secure may not be correlated to households’ 
certification status. For example, most households that feel tenure-secure or tenure-insecure 
lack certificates (82.37% and 83.72%, respectively), and this pattern holds for both male- and 
female-headed households, although slightly more female-headed households that feel tenure 
secure (20.25%) do have certificates than their male counterparts (17.09%). Households that 
feel tenure secure are younger, have more schooling on average, and have fewer prime-age 
males. This pattern also holds for both male- and female-headed households. 
As for the correlation between perceptions of tenure security and parcel characteristics 
across all households, those who feel tenure-insecure have larger average land holdings than 
those who feel tenure-secure. This may be due to increased vulnerability to redistributions of 
large holdings. The same holds true across male- and female-headed households. In addition, 
for the entire sample and for both male- and female-headed households those who feel tenure-
secure have a greater share of their land rented out (as a fraction of their total land) than those 
who feel tenure-insecure. This may be because households that rent out their land can have 
their land used, which increases their sense of tenure-security due to a reduced fear of the land 
being taken away for neglect. Furthermore, households that feel tenure-secure have more fertile 
parcels (as a share of total number of parcels) than households that feel insecure. However, the 
opposite is true with female-headed households. 
In the pooled sample, there is no visible difference between households feeling tenure-
insecure and tenure-secure in whether they grow perennial crops, and this holds for male-
headed households. Among female-headed households, there are more that are tenure-secure 
and grow perennial crops (10.95 percent) than are tenure-insecure and do not grow perennial 
crops (7.65 percent). Notably, the percentage of households growing perennial crops increased 
significantly after 2004 in all samples. The increased issuance of certificates after 2004 may 
have provided households with sufficient incentives for doing so. Also interestingly, 
households that feel tenure-insecure own more cattle than tenure-secure ones, among both 
male- and female-headed households. Wealthier households may feel threatened that their 
resources, including land, will be taken away. 
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Table 5.7a: Male- and female-headed household characteristics, by outcome variable 
 
 
Table 5.7b: Male-headed household characteristics, by outcome variable  
 
Household Characteristics 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Certification status (%)
No 100.00 100 100 32.96 83.72 100 100 99.62 18.47 82.37
Yes --- --- 0 67.04 16.28 --- --- 0.38 81.53 17.63
Age 48.27 48.56 49.75 51.78 49.53 45.9 48.02 49.9 49.42 48.07
Years of schooling 1.70 1.06 1.21 0.84 1.20 1.43 1.11 1.19 1.12 1.22
Number of prime-age males 0.72 0.86 1.18 1.26 0.99 0.62 0.77 1.03 1.14 0.86
Parcel size 0.0006 0.0038 0.0022 0.2676 0.0700 0.0008 0.0038 0.0020 0.1334 0.0300
Share of rented-out parcels 0.1634 0.1766 0.2046 0.2022 0.1858 0.1874 0.1941 0.2123 0.1873 0.1944
Share of fertile parcels 0.5731 0.6159 0.5884 0.5689 0.5878 0.6161 0.6085 0.5935 0.5802 0.6015
Perrenial crops (%)
No 85.03 92.34 91.05 70.00 85.06 91.63 91.03 93.91 61.10 85.70
Yes 14.97 7.66 8.95 30.00 14.94 8.37 8.97 6.09 38.90 14.30
Number of bulls/oxen 1.2459 1.2810 1.4154 2.0056 1.4788 1.0386 1.0829 1.2348 1.6820 1.2301
Observations 362.00 420.00 325.00 357.00 1464.00 1139.00 1074.00 788.00 824.00 3825.00
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Tenure SecureTenure Insecure
Household Characteristics 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Certification status (%)
No 100 100.00 100.00 30.74 83.06 100.00 100.00 99.70 18.77 82.91
Yes --- --- 0.00 69.26 16.94 --- --- 0.30 81.23 17.09
Age 47.95 48.10 48.78 51.42 49.03 45.46 47.47 49.62 49.33 47.70
Years of schooling 1.88 1.18 1.35 0.99 1.33 1.61 1.24 1.36 1.25 1.38
Number of prime-age males 0.71 0.84 1.17 1.27 0.99 0.61 0.76 1.00 1.13 0.84
Parcel size 0.0005 0.0037 0.0022 0.2232 0.0578 0.0008 0.0039 0.0011 0.1420 0.0330
Share of rented-out parcels 0.1379 0.1489 0.1604 0.1531 0.1498 0.1446 0.1482 0.1581 0.1271 0.1447
Share of fertile parcels 0.5720 0.6132 0.5847 0.5738 0.5872 0.6192 0.6176 0.6033 0.5898 0.6092
Perrenial crops (%)
No 83.39 91.99 90.75 68.56 83.99 90.46 90.83 93.17 60.84 85.04
Yes 16.61 8.01 9.25 31.44 16.01 9.54 9.17 6.83 39.16 14.96
Number of bulls/oxen 1.3669 1.3764 1.5177 2.1576 1.5976 1.1706 1.1938 1.3612 1.8711 1.3638
Observations 308.00 364.00 282.00 311.00 1265.00 944.00 908.00 659.00 667.00 3178.00
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Tenure SecureTenure Insecure
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Table 5.7c: Female-headed household characteristics, by outcome variable  
 
 
5.4.2.5 Household Characteristics, by Certification Status and Sex of Head  
 
This section discusses household characteristics by the treatment variable (certification status), 
with the data disaggregated by sex of household head to assess gender differentials. Tables 
5.8a, 5.8b, and 5.8c describe across the survey years and by sex of the head. They show that 
overall certification did not eliminate tenure insecurity, and in both male- and female-headed 
households. In fact, there is no difference in perceived tenure security between households with 
and without certificates, and regardless of the sex of the household head. 
Households with certifications are older, have fewer years of schooling in both male- 
and female-headed households, and have more prime-age males. This holds for both the male- 
and female-headed households.  
 As for correlations between parcel characteristics and certification status, certified 
households have larger parcels than those without certificates. Comparing both male- and 
female-headed households shows that the latter group with certificates have larger total parcel 
sizes. In addition, certified households rent out less land (though the difference with non-
certified households is insignificant), with female-headed households renting out greater shares 
Household Characteristics 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Certification status (%)
No 100 100 100 47.83 87.94 100 100 99.22 17.2 79.75
Yes --- --- 0 52.17 12.06 --- --- 0.78 82.8 20.25
Age 50.09 51.5 56.14 54.27 52.74 48.04 51.06 51.36 49.79 49.9
Years of schooling 0.67 0.32 0.28 0.02 0.34 0.55 0.38 0.34 0.58 0.47
Number of prime-age males 0.74 0.96 1.26 1.2 1.02 0.66 0.83 1.19 1.18 0.94
Parcel size 0.0012 0.0041 0.0026 0.5660 0.1376 0.0009 0.0032 0.0070 0.0972 0.0276
Share of rented-out parcels 0.3090 0.3563 0.4943 0.5343 0.4145 0.3950 0.4451 0.4893 0.4430 0.4383
Share of fertile parcels 0.5790 0.6334 0.6127 0.5353 0.5916 0.6008 0.5589 0.5436 0.5394 0.5637
Perrenial crops (%)
No 94.34 94.64 93.02 83.87 92.35 97.35 92.12 97.67 62.5 89.05
Yes 5.66 5.36 6.98 16.13 7.65 2.65 7.88 2.33 37.5 10.95
Number of bulls/oxen 0.5556 0.6607 0.7442 0.9783 0.7236 0.4 0.4759 0.5891 0.879 0.5734
Observations 54 56 43 46 199 195 166 129 157 647
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Tenure Insecure Tenure Secure
97 
of their parcels than their male counterparts, regardless of the certification status. Furthermore, 
there is no difference overall in the share of fertile parcels between certified and non-certified 
households. However, certified male-headed households have a higher share of fertile parcels 
than male-headed households without certificates. The opposite is true in female-headed 
households. 
As for the correlation between certification and growing perennial crops, Tables 5.8a, 
5.8b, and 5.8c show that in the overall sample and in the male- and female-headed households, 
certification may have provided more incentive for certified households than uncertified 
households to grow perennial crops. It also seems that certification provided greater incentive 
for male-headed households to undertake such productive activities than for female-headed 
households.  
Moreover, households with certificates have a higher average number of bulls or oxen 
than households without certificates, regardless of the sex of the head of household. Male-
headed households with certificates own more bulls or oxen than female-headed households, 
irrespective of the certification status. 
 
Table 5.8a: Male- and female-headed household characteristics, by certification status  
 
Household Characteristics 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Certification status (%)
No 24.12 28.11 29.28 43.49 27.98 --- --- 0.00 26.18 26.10
Yes 75.88 71.89 70.72 56.51 72.02 --- --- 100* 73.82 73.90
Age 46.51 48.23 50.04 50.94 48.53 --- --- 50.19 51.25 51.24
Years of schooling 1.49 1.08 1.19 0.69 1.21 --- --- 1.48 1.03 1.04
Number of prime-age males 0.64 0.79 1.06 1.01 0.86 --- --- 0.76 1.25 1.24
Parcel size 0.0008 0.0038 0.0021 0.2340 0.0207 --- --- 0.0004 0.1765 0.1741
Share of rented-out parcels 0.1819 0.1887 0.1967 0.2516 0.1941 --- --- 0.3058 0.1872 0.1890
Share of fertile parcels 0.6071 0.6126 0.5843 0.5127 0.5939 --- --- 0.3719 0.5934 0.5900
Perrenial crops (%)
No 90.06 91.44 94.26 78.92 91.13 --- --- 95.24 58.06 58.67
Yes 9.94 8.56 5.74 21.08 8.87 --- --- 4.76 41.94 41.33
Number of bulls/oxen 1.09 1.13 1.35 1.54 1.22 --- --- 1.10 1.80 1.79
Observations 100.00 100.00 98.80 22.20 78.82 --- --- 1.20 77.80 21.18
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Note: *no. of observations=3
No Certificate Certificate
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Table 5.8b: Male-headed household characteristics, by certification status  
 
 
Table 5.8c: Female-headed household characteristics, by certification status 
 
Household Characteristics 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Certification status (%)
No 24.60 28.62 30.03 43.18 28.48 --- --- 0.00 28.34 28.27
Yes 75.40 71.38 69.97 56.82 71.52 --- --- 100.00 71.66 71.73
Age 46.14 47.72 49.57 50.86 48.09 --- --- 47.79 50.76 50.72
Years of schooling 1.67 1.21 1.35 0.75 1.36 --- --- 2.21 1.18 1.20
Number of prime-age males 0.64 0.78 1.05 1.06 0.85 --- --- 0.86 1.25 1.24
Presence of prime-age males (%)
No 55.73 49.69 41.91 41.14 48.26 --- --- 50* 35.73 35.91
Yes 44.27 50.31 58.09 58.86 51.74 --- --- 50* 64.27 64.09
Parcel size 0.0007 0.0038 0.0018 0.2334 0.0201 --- --- 0.0004 0.1727 0.1707
Share of rented-out parcels 0.1433 0.1485 0.1388 0.1850 0.1464 --- --- 0.1362 0.1219 0.1221
Share of fertile parcels 0.6091 0.6180 0.5918 0.5156 0.5991 --- --- 0.4112 0.6078 0.6053
Perrenial crops (%)
No 88.74 91.20 93.60 78.93 90.42 --- --- 92.86 57.77 58.22
Yes 11.26 8.80 6.40 21.07 9.58 --- --- 7.14 42.23 41.78
Number of bulls/oxen 1.22 1.24 1.48 1.78 1.35 --- --- 1.36 2.01 2.00
Observations 100.00 100.00 99.03 22.36 79.44 --- --- 0.97 77.64 20.56
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Note: * no. of observations=7
No Certificate Certificate
Household Characteristics 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total 1999 2002 2004 2007 Total
Certification status (%)
No 21.69 25.23 25.15 44.9 25.33 --- --- 0 15.58 15.48
Yes 78.31 74.77 74.85 55.1 74.67 --- --- 100* 84.42 84.52
Age 48.42 51.11 52.24 51.27 50.73 --- --- 55.00 53.26 53.31
Years of schooling 0.57 0.36 0.43 0.44 0.45 --- --- 0.00 0.39 0.38
Number of prime-age males 0.68 0.86 1.11 0.77 0.89 --- --- 0.57 1.26 1.24
Presence of prime-age males (%)
No 52.99 42.11 35.74 49.32 43.64 --- --- 42.86* 33.83 34.07
Yes 47.01 57.89 64.26 50.68 56.36 --- --- 57.14** 66.17 65.93
Parcel size 0.0010 0.0035 0.0036 0.2369 0.0241 --- --- 0.0004 0.1919 0.1877
Share of rented-out parcels 0.3766 0.4160 0.4670 0.5398 0.4332 --- --- 0.6448 0.4563 0.4611
Share of fertile parcels 0.5974 0.5820 0.5494 0.5001 0.5678 --- --- 0.2933 0.5338 0.5276
Perrenial crops (%)
No 96.72 92.83 97.38 78.85 94.78 --- --- 100.00 59.61 60.95
Yes 3.28 7.17 2.62 21.15 5.22 --- --- 0.00 40.39 39.05
Number of bulls/oxen 0.43 0.51 0.74 0.49 0.57 --- --- 0.57 0.95 0.94
Observations 100.00 100.00 97.76 21.53 75.84 --- --- 2.24 78.47 24.16
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” panel survey.
Note: * no. of observations=3; ** no. of observations=4
No Certificate Certificate
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5.5 Estimation Strategy and Results 
 
5.5.1 Estimation Strategy 
 
The estimation strategy in this paper takes into account the fact that the certification process, 
as empirically tested in Chapter 4, was found to be endogenous. Therefore, in addition to using 
the actual certification variable to test for impacts on the outcome of interest—perceived tenure 
security—I apply predicted certification with kebele-fixed effects from Chapter 4 (Tables 4.8 
and 4.9, specification g in) to the estimations to test for robustness of results. I also make an 
instrumental variable estimation to account for the endogeneity of certification. And as I noted 
earlier, because variation in household certification status is captured only in the 2007 survey, 
the estimation methods are applied using both the panel data and the 2007 cross-section data.  
 This paper does not use the difference-in-difference estimation strategy (DID). 
Although panel data are used, the DID does not apply when the treatment variable does not 
necessarily have an immediate impact on the outcome variable. Households’ perceptions of 
changes in their land holdings may not immediately change when they are issued land-use 
certificates. In these cases, the treatment variable could be wrongly interpreted as having no 
impact on the outcome. In addition, the DID approach requires treatment and control groups. 
In the context of the Amhara region survey, the objective of the certification program was to 
issue land-use certificates to all landholders. As such, households without certificates may have 
adjusted their perceptions of tenure security even if they were eventually issued certificates. 
Therefore, having a control group in a non-experimental survey design does not meet a core 
requirement of the DID estimation strategy. 
 Given the socio-economic constraints on female landholders in the Amhara region and 
the nature of Ethiopia’s land-tenure system, I hypothesize that (1) certification reduces but does 
not eliminate perceived tenure insecurity in both male- and female-headed households; (2) 
certification enhancing perceived tenure security more for female- than male-headed 
households; and (3) socioeconomic factors play a more significant role in enhancing perceived 
tenure security in female- than in male-headed households. These hypotheses will be tested 
using the Chamberlain random-effects probit, linear probability model, and probit estimations. 
 The estimation strategy involves the use of unbalanced panel data followed by the use 
of cross-sectional data. There are two estimation strategies using the panel data: (1) 
Chamberlain random-effects probit; and (2) linear probability model. These two estimations 
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will be undertaken using the actual household certification status variable. Then cross-sectional 
data will be used in the probit estimation strategies with both the actual and predicted household 
certification status variables. 
 
5.5.1.1 Panel Data Estimations 
 
a) Chamberlain Random-Effects Probit 
 
The impact of land certification on households’ perceived tenure security is estimated using 
Equation 1, which follows the empirical strategy of Deininger et al. (2011). A household’s 
perceived tenure security, Yit, is modeled to depend on its land-certification status and a number 
of household-level explanatory variables to control for observed differences among households 
over the survey years. This builds on Deininger et al.’s strategy in examining the gender 
dimension of certification impacts in more detail, by isolating household characteristics that 
are relevant to the rural livelihoods of female-headed households in the Amhara region. 
Specifically, this paper explores the mechanisms through which certifications affects female 
versus male-headed households, and considers the interplay between the certification status 
and key socioeconomic variables.  
 Yit = λt + β 1w it + β 2x it + ci + u it, (1) 
Here, Yit is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if household i at time t feels “tenure secure” 
about the size of its land holdings (expecting an increase or no change) in the face of 
administrative or non-administrative interventions in the next five years, and 0 otherwise; w it 
is the policy variable of interest for household i at time t (1 if the household has a land holding 
certificate, 0 otherwise); x it is a vector of controls for household i at time t that include the 
head’s gender, age, and years of schooling, family support (number of prime-age males), 
wealth (cattle owned), parcel characteristics (share of fertile parcels, share of parcel rented out, 
total household parcel size), and mode of production or land-use (whether the household grows 
perennial crops). Finally, ci captures household-specific unobserved effects (through the kebele 
dummy variable, as the certification process was undertaken at the kebele level), t is a full set 
of time dummies; and u it is an iid error term. Equation 1 uses the actual household certification 
variable. 
Equation 1 is estimated using Chamberlain’s (1980) random-effects probit model. A 
traditional random-effects probit model would have sufficed if ci were known to follow a 
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normal (0, Ϭ2u) and iid distribution. We can avoid this arbitrary assumption by using 
Chamberlain’s model, which is a special case of the traditional model that permits dependence 
between ci and the vector of control variables, where ci represents potential unobserved 
heterogeneity in the model (Chamberlain, 1980; Chamberlain, 1984; Wooldridge, 2001). In 
effect, Chamberlain’s model works under a correlated random-effects framework in which 
unobserved heterogeneity is independent of the time-dependent covariates. In other words, this 
approach maintains the strict exogeneity assumption on x it conditional on ci, but allows for 
arbitrary correlation between ci and x it in the following way: 
 ci = γ + x̅I ζ + ai , (1a)  
In Equation 1a, x̅i represents a vector of the mean time-varying household covariates 
for household i across the years, and ai is an error term. The idea behind this approach is to 
replace the unobserved effect ci with its linear projection onto the explanatory variables in all 
time periods, in addition to the projection error (Woolridge, 2002). This continues to be a fixed-
effects estimation, and xit comprises only time-varying explanatory variables. This approach 
was used in one empirical study to assess the impact of a similar land reform on land-related 
investment and productivity, and in another to assess the impact on tenure security, by Holden 
et al. (2009) and Deininger et al. (2011), respectively. A conditional logit model with 
household-fixed effects would also work but would result in dropping a large part of the sample 
and would have less flexibility for computing the marginal effects (Woolridge, 2002). 
Unbalanced panel data are used to estimate Equation 1 with the Chamberlain random-
effects probit, and this estimation is taken as the baseline strategy when the panel data are 
applied. Marginal effects of the estimations will be derived to assess the marginal impact of 
certification and socioeconomic variables on the likelihood of a household enhancing its 
perceived tenure security. 
 The equation is estimated using an aggregate sample of observations from male- and 
female-headed households, and on separate samples of both. Re-estimating the equations using 
the disaggregated data allows us to determine whether the impact of each control variable is 
similar in male- and female-headed households. Given that the socio-economic status of female 
farmers in the Amhara region differs from that of males, it is plausible that the marginal impacts 
on perceived tenure security could be different.  
 
b) Linear Probability Model 
 
Next, I use a linear probability model with kebele-fixed effects to check the sensitivity of the 
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Chamberlain random-effects probit as Deininger et al. (2011) did. The equation to be estimated 
is the following: 
 P ( Yit = 1|Xit ) = β0 + β1X1t + β2X2t + … + βkXkt  ,          t = 1, 2, …, T, (2) 
where Yit  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if household i at time t feels “tenure-
secure” in the size of its land holdings (expects an increase or no size change) in the face of 
administrative and non-administrative interventions in the next five years, and 0 otherwise; Xit 
represents the explanatory variables for household i at time t (including a kebele dummy 
variable): household certification status, the head’s gender, age, and years of schooling, family 
support (number of prime-age males), wealth (bulls or oxen owned), parcel characteristics 
(share of fertile parcels, share of parcel size rented out, total parcel size), and mode of 
production or land-use (whether the household grows perennial crops).  
The estimation assumes that X1 is not functionally related to the other explanatory 
variables, β1 = ∂P (y = 1|x) / ∂x1. Therefore, β1 is the change in the probability of success given 
a one-unit increase in X1. On the other hand, if Xi is a binary explanatory variable, β1 represents 
the difference in the probability of success when X1 = 1 and X1 = 0, holding the other Xj fixed. 
The linear probability approximates the response probability for common values of the 
covariates, and this takes care of potential values of X that may not be within a restricted range 
(Woolridge, 2002). As the linear probability model with exogenous explanatory variables is 
based on standard regression, the zero-conditional mean assumption E(ε|X) = 0 is assumed to 
hold. The estimation uses the actual household certification variable. 
Equation 2 will be estimated using the unbalanced panel data. In addition, the equations 
will be estimated for the total sample of male- and female-headed households, followed by 
separate estimations for each. 
 
c) Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation 
 
Endogeneity of the variable capturing the certification status of the household is a 
significant econometric concern when we are estimating certification effects on the 
household’s perceived tenure insecurity, resulting in biased estimates. As Chapter 4 showed, 
several factors affect which parcels and households are certified. This makes it difficult to 
determine whether perceived tenure security is driven by the household’s certification status or 
by an unobserved variable jointly determining certification status and perceived security. If 
land-use certificates were assigned randomly, establishing causality would be as easy as 
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ascertaining whether certification and perceived tenure security were correlated. 
In the presence of endogeneity or measurement error, the corresponding assumption 
E(ε|X) = 0 applies, with the set of instruments Z, including the exogenous elements of X. Given 
that household certification status in Equation 3 is potentially endogenous, a linear probability 
model by two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) is estimated, in which  
  y1 = 1[z1 δ1 + α1 y2 + u1 > 0], and (3) 
 y2 = 1[z δ2 + v2 > 0] (4) 
 The instrument chosen to undertake the IV estimation is “years since certification” and 
kebele-fixed effects. This is based on the approach taken by Holden et al. (2009), who used 
“years since certification” to capture the loss of certificates by households after receiving them, 
and changes in household heads with the new heads failing to acquire certificates. Holden et 
al. (2009) also used “kebele-fixed effects” as instruments to predict administrative failures that 
could have contributed to incomplete registration and certification in some communities.  The 
IV estimation will be undertaken using the total sample of male and female household heads.  
 
5.5.1.2 Cross-Section Data Estimations 
 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the empirical analysis is also undertaken using the 2007 
cross-sectional data because variation in households’ certification status is evident only in the 
final round of the survey. This section describes two probit estimations using the 2007 cross-
section data. The first uses the actual household certification status variable, and the second 
uses the predicted variable derived from Chapter 4.  
 
a) Probit Estimation with Actual Household Certification Variable 
 
Equation 3 is estimated to compare the results of estimating Equations 1 and 2 using the panel 
data. It follows a probit estimation with kebele-fixed effects, which will be the baseline 
estimation strategy when cross-section data is applied. The following is the equation to be 
estimated: 
 Yi = λt + β 1w i + β 2x i + Dk + u i, (3) 
where Yi  is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when household i feels “tenure-secure” 
in the size of its land holdings (expecting an increase or no change in size) regarding 
administrative and non-administrative interventions in the next five years, and 0 otherwise; wi 
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is the policy variable of interest (1 if the household has a land-holding certificate, 0 otherwise); 
xit is the same vector of controls at the household level as was used in the Chamberlain random-
effects probit and the linear probability model estimations; Dk is the kebele dummy variables; 
and u i is an iid error term. This probit estimation is made using the actual certification variable. 
The equation is estimated using an aggregate sample of observations from male- and female-
headed households, as well as on separate samples.  
 
b) Probit Estimation with Predicted Certification Variable 
 
Recall that the empirical analyses in Chapter 4 found that the certification process in the 
Amhara region was endogenous and thus that parcel-certification status was an endogenous 
outcome determined by various parcel and household characteristics. In this section, I gauge 
the robustness of the results of the probit estimations with the actual certification status 
variable, as in Equation 3, by using the predicted certification status variable. 
Chapter 4 used the following equation to determine parcel certification status: 
 CSih = α30 + α31Pih + α32Hih + α33Dk + e3ih.  (4) 
CSih is 1 if parcel i in household h has a certificate (actual certification status variable), and 0 
otherwise; Pih is a vector of parcel characteristics; Hih is a vector of household characteristics; 
Dk is a vector of kebele dummies; and e3ih is the error term. Observable household 
characteristics include the household head’s sex, age, and average years of schooling, the 
number of prime-age males, the mean number of bulls or oxen owned, and distance to the 
nearest road. Proxies for parcel characteristics include parcel type, depth, slope, quality, size, 
and whether the parcel has SWC maintenance.  
 Equation 4 was estimated in Chapter 4 using the 2007 cross-section data at the parcel 
level. Because the analyses in this paper are at the household level, the predicted parcel 
certification status variable CSih was aggregated to the household level by taking the mean 
predicted certification status across the parcels owned by the household to derive the 
households’ predicted certification variable ѿi.  
Third, Equation 3 is re-estimated using a probit estimation with kebele-fixed effects 
and including the predicted household certification status in the following way: 
 Yi = λt + β 1ѿ i + β 2x i + Dk + u i, (5) 
in which both Yi, wi, xi, and Dk are the same as in Equation 3, with one exception: Equation 5 
is estimated using the predicted household certification status ѿi instead of wi, derived from 
the aggregation of the parcel certification status outcome in Equation 4 to the household level. 
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 The predicted certification status variable was estimated using the 2007 data in Chapter 
4. Therefore, the application of predicted certification to determine perceived tenure security 
is works only in the context of analyses using the cross-section data. Equation 5 is estimated 
using an aggregate sample of observations from male- and female-headed households, and on 
separate samples of each. 
 
5.5.2 Estimation Results 
 
5.5.2.1 Panel Data Estimation Results 
 
a) Chamberlain Random-Effects Probit  
 
Table 5.9 reports baseline results from the Chamberlain random-effects probit model 
estimation of Equation 1. Columns 1 to 3 shows the impact of land certification on perceived 
tenure security of male- and female-headed households across different specifications of parcel 
characteristics (total household parcel size, share of parcel size rented out, and share of fertile 
parcels in the household). In particular, the results from the pooled sample indicate that, overall, 
land-use certificates did not eliminate tenure insecurity in rural Amhara. Nonetheless, 
certifications significantly improved tenure security at the 1-percent level, and positive 
certification status is associated with an increase in the perceived probability of the households’ 
land holdings increasing or remaining unchanged. This result is robust across specifications 
involving different measures of parcel characteristics. 
The nature of Ethiopia’s land-tenure system may explain why certification did not 
eliminate perceived tenure insecurity. In Ethiopia, land is state-owned and landholders are 
granted only usufruct rights, so regional authorities can expropriate land from its holders for 
public purposes. This is indicated in the household’s land-use holding certificate under 
“Responsibilities of the Holder,” which provides guidance to landholders on the regulations 
they are expected to follow. Therefore, the results of the estimations on the total sample suggest 
that even in the presence of certificates, perceived tenure insecurity will remain. 
Next, Equation 1 is separately re-estimated for male- and female-headed households, 
and the results are reported in columns 4 to 9. Under all specifications employing different 
parcel characteristics, the results of estimating Equation 2 for male- and female-headed 
households are closely consistent with the pooled estimation results, showing a strong positive 
106 
impact of certifications on perceived tenure security among male and female land-holders. 
What is interesting to note is that the results with the female sample show a higher effect. This 
could be attributed to the fact that female landholders in Amhara are economically and socially 
vulnerable, giving them a lower baseline perception of tenure security and making the marginal 
impact of certification larger for them than for male landholders. In addition, the results for the 
female sample suggest that certification not only enhances their perceived tenure security but 
eliminates perceived tenure insecurity. While this is surprising, given that Ethiopia’s land-
tenure system allows land to be expropriated for public use, which causes some level of tenure 
insecurity to remain, the findings could reflect the importance of legal land-holding rights, 
especially for female landholders. These findings indicate that certification is more crucial for 
the protection of land-holding rights for the rural female population of the region than for their 
male counterparts. This could be because to greater socio-economic vulnerabiliy of the female 
landholders makes “legal” rights ensuring securing land holdings more critical for them than 
for male landholders. 
The impact of household characteristics on perceived tenure security is as follows: The 
effect of the “sex” variable on the outcome indicates that households headed by females are 
more likely to feeling tenure-secure than their male counterparts, and the impact is significant. 
One potential explanation is that female landholders are less well informed about the nature of 
Ethiopia’s land tenure system. As I noted in Chapter 3, although there is low overall awareness 
of land laws among both male and female household heads, this lack of awareness is in some 
instances greater among female than male heads. 
In the pooled sample, older households have a higher likelihood of feeling insecure, 
and the impact is significant. This is also true in the male sample, but age has an insignificant 
impact in the female sample. Increased years of schooling decrease likelihood of being tenure-
secure in the aggregate and male samples, but the impact is significant only in specifications 1 
and 3. The impact of schooling is insignificant in the female sample. This suggests that even 
with increased education, cultural constraints among females in rural Amhara, such as limited 
participation in the community, still act as barriers to women protecting their land holdings 
through formal legal platforms.  
The number of prime-age males in the household is insignificant only in the female 
sample. In addition, an increase in prime-age males decreases perceived probability that the 
households’ land holdings will increase or remain unchanged. This suggests an interplay 
between the power structure in the household (the presence of more male members may suggest 
a reduction in the households’ holdings through future family redistribution) and the economic 
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need for income-generating labor (male members is particularly necessary in female-headed 
households due to cultural constraints in Ahmara restricting women’s role on the farm, and due 
to human-resource constraints). The insignificant impact on the female sample is puzzling. One 
possible explanation is that, because female landholders are economically disadvantaged 
against their male counterparts, the presence of prime-age males may not make a difference in 
their ability to secure their land holdings. However, it is important to note that the results from 
the female sample are derived from a small number of observations, and this could be driving 
the insignificant result. 
Wealth, as proxied by the number of cattle owned by the household, decreases the 
perceived probability that a household’s land holdings will increase or remain unchanged. This 
is significant in all the specifications of the female sample and specification 3 in the aggregate 
sample. Wealthy female-headed households may fear a reduction of their holdings in favor of 
poor landholders through redistributions by the state. The impact is insignificant in the male 
sample, however, perhaps because male landholders have better mechanisms for securing their 
landholdings than their female counterparts.  
Parcel characteristics do not seem to have a significant impact on households’ 
perceptions of tenure security except in specifications 1 and 7, where an increase in the average 
size of parcels belonging to the household decreases perceived tenure security, as households 
may fear future land redistributions reducing their holdings. Mode of production or livelihood 
strategy, such as growing cash crops, has an insignificant impact on perceived tenure security 
in all samples: overall, the results do not change due to different parcel characteristics, such as 
total size, share of fertile parcels, or share of rented-out parcels. 
 The overall results of Deininger et al. (2011) are similar to these: certification in the 
Amhara region reduced tenure insecurity significantly:  it reduced in fear of land loss by nearly 
10 percentage points. This result was also found to be robust across specifications. Specifically, 
land tenure for households with certificates was significantly more secure due to less 
expectation of administrative intervention. While the Chamberlain random-effects probit 
estimation in this paper reaches a similar conclusion, that certification did reduced tenure 
insecurity, Deininger et al. (2011) did not undertake a gender assessment to examine 
differentials between male and female landholders and potential mechanisms for them. 
 
b) Linear Probability Model Estimation 
 
Table 5.10 shows the results of estimating Equation 2 using the household fixed-effects linear 
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probability model. These are robust in terms of significance and direction of impact with the 
results obtained from the Chamberlain random-effects probit model, across all samples and 
specifications. The most notable difference between the two is the magnitude of the effects of 
certification and other variables. 
Certification continues to have a significant positive impact on perceived tenure 
security, but the magnitude of the impact appears smaller in all specifications and samples 
according to the results obtained under the linear probability estimations. The magnitude of the 
impact on perceived tenure security in the female sample remains larger than that for the male 
sample. Nevertheless, under the linear probability model there is a significant drop in the size 
of the marginal impact of certification, especially in the female sample. This seems consistent 
with the expected implications of Ethiopia’s land-tenure system: expropriation of land by the 
state is expected even in the presence of certification. 
 The “sex” variable remains significant, but its impact is smaller than in specifications 
1 to 3 using the Chamberlain random-effects probit. Being a female-headed household 
increases perceived tenure security. The impacts of the other control variables are similar to 
those reported in Table 5.9. 
The robustness-check estimates from the household fixed-effects linear probability 
model in Deininger et al. (2011) showed that the results were consistent for the case of 
decreases in the landholding size, but insignificant for increases. In other words, certification 
significantly reduced fear of reduction in holdings but had no significant impact on 
expectations about increases in holdings. 
 
c) Instrumental Variable Estimation 
 
The results of the instrumental-variables linear probability model are reported in Table 5.11. 
In the first-stage regressions, “years since certification” significantly determines certification 
status (1% significance level). Furthermore, wealth and production of perennial crops appear 
to significantly increase likelihood of certification. This implies that household wealth and 
livelihood strategies determine who obtains land-use certificates. 
Land-use certificates remain a significant and positive determinant of perceived tenure 
security, as exhibited in the second-stage IV regression, a result similar to the Chamberlain 
random-effects probit and linear probability estimation without the IV. In particular, the IV 
estimation indicates that land-use certificates lead to a 29 percent increase in the perceived 
probability of the household’ land holdings increasing or at least remaining unchanged. The 
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impact of the “sex” variable on perceived tenure security remains significant and positive, a 
result similar to the joint findings of the baseline model and the linear probability estimation. 
 
Table 5.9: Determinants of perceived tenure security: Chamberlain random-effects probit 
(1999, 2002, 2004, 2007) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Certification Status 0.591*** 0.581*** 0.580*** 0.533*** 0.519*** 0.519*** 1.147*** 1.094*** 1.097***
(0.104) (0.104) (0.103) (0.112) (0.111) (0.111) (0.308) (0.302) (0.303)
Sex 0.127** 0.107* 0.115** --- --- --- --- --- ---
(0.058) (0.058) (0.057)
Age -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 0.008 0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Age-squared 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of schooling -0.014* -0.012 -0.012 -0.014* -0.012 -0.012 0.002 0.003 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Number of prime-age males -0.045** -0.036* -0.038* -0.048** -0.042* -0.042* -0.043 -0.011 -0.006
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
Parcel size -0.101** -0.072 -0.295**
(0.048) (0.052) (0.140)
Share of rented-out parcels 0.046 0.001 0.124
(0.063) (0.073) (0.130)
Share of fertile parcels -0.035 0.007 -0.267
(0.063) (0.069) (0.167)
Number of bulls/oxen -0.023 -0.026 -0.030* -0.007 -0.015 -0.015 -0.123* -0.109* -0.113*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063)
Perennial crops -0.077 -0.075 -0.077 -0.102 -0.096 -0.096 0.050 0.036 0.022
(0.061) (0.060) (0.060) (0.064) (0.063) (0.063) (0.211) (0.204) (0.205)
2002 -0.105** -0.123** -0.122** -0.111** -0.128** -0.128** -0.068 -0.100 -0.097
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.057) (0.055) (0.055) (0.138) (0.133) (0.133)
2004 -0.071 -0.076 -0.074 -0.069 -0.081 -0.081 -0.105 -0.075 -0.064
(0.057) (0.056) (0.056) (0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.151) (0.149) (0.149)
2007 -0.501*** -0.526*** -0.522*** -0.514*** -0.527*** -0.527*** -0.516* -0.603** -0.592**
(0.097) (0.095) (0.095) (0.104) (0.103) (0.103) (0.269) (0.265) (0.265)
Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4867 5119 5117 4130 4337 4336 737 782 781
Log Likelihood -2798.4 -2910.1 -2910.0 -2404.6 -2495.4 -2495.3 -378.5 -401.8 -400.8
Standard errors in parentheses, and clustered at the Kebele level
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Determinants of Perceived Tenure Security
Marginal Effects from Chamberlain Random Effects Probit Model
Total Sample Male Household Head Sanple Female Household Head Sample
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Table 5.10: Determinants of perceived tenure security: Linear probability model (1999, 
2002, 2004, 2007) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Certification Status 0.205*** 0.203*** 0.202*** 0.189*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.333*** 0.329*** 0.328***
(0.0522) (0.0546) (0.0543) (0.0578) (0.0597) (0.0595) (0.0571) (0.0644) (0.0618)
Sex 0.0398** 0.0330* 0.0357** --- --- --- --- --- ---
(0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0152)
Age -0.00796** -0.00842** -0.00840** -0.0101** -0.0103** -0.0103** 0.00226 0.000559 0.000747
(0.00350) (0.00316) (0.00316) (0.00451) (0.00411) (0.00413) (0.00476) (0.00469) (0.00503)
Age-squared 6.36e-05* 6.74e-05** 6.77e-05** 8.72e-05** 8.81e-05** 8.82e-05** -4.68e-05 -3.14e-05 -3.37e-05
(2.96e-05) (2.62e-05) (2.65e-05) (3.77e-05) (3.38e-05) (3.45e-05) (4.84e-05) (4.89e-05) (5.21e-05)
Years of schooling -0.00447* -0.00372 -0.00367 -0.00468* -0.00384 -0.00382 0.000561 0.00101 0.00157
(0.00242) (0.00212) (0.00212) (0.00257) (0.00221) (0.00220) (0.00673) (0.00643) (0.00682)
Number of prime-age males -0.0147** -0.0120* -0.0124* -0.0160* -0.0141 -0.0141 -0.0125 -0.00316 -0.00204
(0.00643) (0.00638) (0.00619) (0.00870) (0.00837) (0.00818) (0.0136) (0.0118) (0.0125)
Parcel size -0.0362* -0.0261 -0.0938***
(0.0170) (0.0184) (0.0210)
Share of rented-out parcels 0.0147 -0.000201 0.0368
(0.0256) (0.0288) (0.0355)
Share of fertile parcels -0.0108 0.00256 -0.0802**
(0.0224) (0.0244) (0.0342)
Number of bulls/oxen -0.00827 -0.00930 -0.0104* -0.00264 -0.00528 -0.00526 -0.0380* -0.0342 -0.0355*
(0.00511) (0.00637) (0.00553) (0.00510) (0.00711) (0.00596) (0.0182) (0.0199) (0.0193)
Perennial crops -0.0247 -0.0231 -0.0234 -0.0328 -0.0300 -0.0299 0.00849 0.00649 0.00312
(0.0341) (0.0336) (0.0333) (0.0336) (0.0341) (0.0338) (0.0495) (0.0504) (0.0508)
2002 -0.0310 -0.0356 -0.0353 -0.0338 -0.0378 -0.0378 -0.0146 -0.0237 -0.0228
(0.0331) (0.0313) (0.0313) (0.0305) (0.0292) (0.0292) (0.0683) (0.0629) (0.0625)
2004 -0.0189 -0.0196 -0.0191 -0.0186 -0.0217 -0.0217 -0.0238 -0.0141 -0.0111
(0.0577) (0.0573) (0.0577) (0.0521) (0.0513) (0.0515) (0.0928) (0.0973) (0.0987)
2007 -0.175*** -0.183*** -0.182*** -0.180*** -0.185*** -0.185*** -0.162** -0.192** -0.187**
(0.0536) (0.0553) (0.0554) (0.0553) (0.0570) (0.0572) (0.0713) (0.0678) (0.0674)
Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,867 5119 5117 4130 4337 4336 737 782 781
R-squared 0.019 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.016 0.048 0.037 0.039
Standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the Kebele level
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Linear Probability Model
Total Sample Male Household Head Sample Female Household Head Sample
Determinants of Perceived Tenure Security
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Table 5.11: Determinants of perceived tenure security: IV estimation using linear  
probability model (1999, 2002, 2004, 2007) 
 
Second Stage IV 
Regression 
First Stage IV 
Regression 
Variables Tenure Security Certification Status
Certification status 0.288*** ---
(0.0916)
Sex 0.158** -6.84e-05
(0.0718) (0.0114)
Age -0.0136 -0.00110
(0.00979) (0.00142)
Age-squared 0.000110 7.21e-06
(9.13e-05) (1.35e-05)
Years of schooling -0.00921 -0.00113
(0.00963) (0.00153)
Number of prime-age males -0.0519** 0.00422
(0.0248) (0.00450)
Number of bulls/oxen -0.0114 0.0337***
(0.0226) (0.00468)
Parcel size -0.104* 0.0142
(0.0592) (0.0153)
Perennial crops -0.0759 0.111***
(0.0809) (0.0166)
(0.198) (0.0549)
Years since certification 0.566***
(0.0145)
Constant 0.603** 0.0503
(0.248) (0.0351)
Kebele FEs Yes Yes
Observations 3,261 3,261
Robust standard errors in parentheses, and clustered at the kebele level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Linear Probability Model
Determinants of Perceived Tenure Security
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5.5.2.2 Cross-Sectional Data Estimation Results 
 
a) Probit Estimation with Actual Certification Status Variable 
 
The results of estimating Equation 3 with probit estimation using kebele-fixed effects and the 
2007 data are reported in Table 5.12. Overall, the Table 5.9 results derived from the 
Chamberlain random-effects probit seem to be sensitive to the changes in data from panel to 
cross-section. Using the 2007 data reveals that household certification status is no longer 
significant for perceived tenure security in the total and male samples, though it remains 
significant with a greater positive impact in the female sample (but with level of significance 
dropping from 1 to 5 percent). This is surprising, given that certification is expected to enhance 
perceived tenure security in both male and female landholders. Nevertheless, the results 
continue to suggest that certification is more useful for female landholders, as they are the 
socioeconomically marginalized group. 
Even more evident is the substantial drop in the size of the marginal contribution of 
certification on perceived tenure security across all specifications. Specifically, in the female 
sample, certification no longer eliminates perceived tenure insecurity, a result consistent with 
the implications derived from Ethiopia’s land-tenure system. 
 On the robustness of the results predicting the impacts of other control variables on 
perceived tenure security, the following emerges: female-headed households are more likely 
to have a positive perception of tenure security than male-headed households. Years of 
schooling in the female sample now has a positive significant impact on perceived tenure 
security in one of the specifications. On the other hand, number of prime-age males is now 
insignificant in all specifications. The insignificance of variables can be attributed to the 
sensitivity of the results to drops in the number of observations between the data samples.  
  
b) Probit Estimation with Predicted Certification Status Variable 
 
The results of estimating Equation 5 with probit estimation using the predicted certification 
variable are reported in Table 5.13. Note that the number of observations drops for all samples 
when predicted certification status rather than actual certification is used. The results of 
comparing the robustness of the baseline estimations are summarized as follows: the 
determinants of perceived tenure security on a smaller number of observations could explain 
113 
the insignificance of the impact of predicted certification on perceived tenure security across 
all samples.  
 The results of the probit estimation using the actual certification status variable also 
seem to be sensitive when we examine the impact of socioeconomic variables, with the 
exception of the “sex” variable. Being a female-headed household enhances perceived tenure 
security. But interestingly the significance has increased from 5 percent in the Chamberlain 
random-effects probit estimation to 1 percent in the results using the cross-section data with 
actual and predicted certification. On the other hand, all the other variables but “age” have an 
insignificant impact on perceived tenure security in all samples.  
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Table 5.12: Determinants of perceived tenure security: Probit estimation using actual 
certification status variable (2007) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Certification Status 0.1102 0.1005 0.1033 0.0833 0.0711 0.0759 0.2552*** 0.2418*** 0.2352***
(0.081) (0.082) (0.087) (0.099) (0.100) (0.106) (0.046) (0.049) (0.053)
Sex 0.1035*** 0.1071*** 0.1020*** --- --- --- --- --- ---
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
Age -0.0169*** -0.0167*** -0.0169*** -0.0209*** -0.0206*** -0.0208*** 0.0188 0.0239 0.0242
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Age-squared 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of schooling -0.0047 -0.0033 -0.0035 -0.0054 -0.004 -0.0041 0.0612 0.0713* 0.0701
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.038) (0.041) (0.043)
Number of prime-age males -0.0053 -0.0047 -0.0038 -0.0056 -0.006 -0.0048 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0039
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.036) (0.032) (0.032)
Parcel size -0.0322* -0.0261 -0.0624***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.023)
Share of rented-out parcels -0.0292 -0.0498 -0.1027
(0.055) (0.057) (0.080)
Share of fertile parcels -0.0119 -0.01 0.0767
(0.043) (0.050) (0.105)
Number of bulls/oxen -0.0074 -0.0098 -0.0077 -0.0038 -0.0077 -0.0047 -0.0500* -0.0594** -0.0522**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023)
Perennial crops 0.0011 -0.0066 -0.0065 -0.0197 -0.0293 -0.0281 0.0567 0.0697 0.0775
(0.053) (0.054) (0.054) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) (0.089) (0.085) (0.086)
Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1077 1082 1082 927 932 932 132 132 132
Pseudo R-Squared 0.099 0.0939 0.0936 0.0884 0.0851 0.0845 0.2058 0.1889 0.1857
Standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the Kebele level
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Determinants of Perceived Tenure Security
Marginal Effects from Probit Model Using Actual Certification (2007)
Total Sample Male Household Head Sanple Female Household Head Sanple
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Table 5.13: Determinants of perceived tenure security: Probit estimation using predicted 
certification status variable (2007) 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Understanding the impact of land-holding rights on tenure security, especially for female 
landholders, is critical: First, women account for 70 percent of Africa’s food production, so 
Predicted certification status 0.4194 0.3892 0.3993 0.3192 0.2863 0.308 0.5384 0.4543 0.419
(0.285) (0.290) (0.310) (0.313) (0.329) (0.354) (0.636) (0.666) (0.606)
Sex 0.1347*** 0.1387*** 0.1341*** --- --- --- --- --- ---
(0.047) (0.052) (0.049)
Age -0.0145** -0.0141** -0.0141** -0.0160** -0.0154*** -0.0156*** 0.0313 0.0393* 0.0416
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028)
Age-squared 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001* 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0001** -0.0003 -0.0004* -0.0004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Years of schooling -0.002 -0.0017 -0.0016 0.0016 0.0021 0.0023 0.0281 0.0274 0.0282
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036)
Number of prime-age males -0.0099 -0.0094 -0.0086 -0.0112 -0.0119 -0.0104 -0.0186 -0.0177 -0.0162
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.040) (0.041) (0.047)
Total household parcel size -0.0236 -0.0262 -0.0725
(0.018) (0.019) (0.048)
Share of parcel size rented-out -0.0344 -0.0658 -0.0324
(0.047) (0.052) (0.131)
Share of fertile parcels in household 0.0243 0.0154 0.077
(0.050) (0.069) (0.146)
Number of bulls/oxen -0.0052 -0.0087 -0.0068 -0.003 -0.0082 -0.0047 -0.0479 -0.0454 -0.0475
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.041) (0.045) (0.039)
Growing perennial crops 0.0098 0.0034 0.0061 -0.0096 -0.0184 -0.0141 0.1615 0.1551 0.1604
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.062) (0.062) (0.064) (0.110) (0.110) (0.117)
Kebele FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 893 895 895 703 705 705 73 73 73
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0873 0.0849 0.0847 0.0741 0.0724 0.0714 0.1974 0.1832 0.1853
Standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the Kebele level
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Total Sample Male Household Head Sample Female Household Head Sample
Determinats of Perceived Tenure Security
Marginal Effects from Probit Model (2007) Using Predicted Certification
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agricultural-sector strategies must ensure that this group is not marginalized. Second, allocating 
resources to rural land reform programs in developing countries can only be justified by 
comprehensive assessments of the reform’s impacts on various matters of interest to the sector 
and rural development. Third, for other developing countries with similar land-tenure systems 
this research could provide valuable lessons on usufruct rights and gender in agriculture. 
 An extensive body of literature provides insights into the effects of strong land-holding 
rights, especially for female landholders. Some of this research has examined the impact of 
land-use certificates on tenure security in Ethiopia and elsewhere and found that certification 
did enhance perceived tenure security among landholders. However, empirical literature on the 
gender impact of land-use certificates on tenure security is missing. I attempt to fill this gap. 
In this paper, I infer that (1) certification reduces but does not eliminate perceived 
tenure insecurity in both male- and female-headed households; (2) certification enhances 
perceived tenure security more for female- than for male-headed households; and 
(3) socioeconomic factors play a more significant role in enhancing perceived tenure security 
for female- than for male-headed households. The analysis is aimed at determining whether the 
Ethiopian land policy or local socio-economics plays a key role in strengthening the land-
holding rights of women in rural Amhara. 
 The empirical analysis was aimed at determining households’ perceived tenure security 
while controlling for their certification status and various other socio-economic characteristics. 
The baseline estimation strategy using the panel data was the Chamberlain random-effects 
probit, which assumes strict exogeneity of the vector of controls, in this case at the household 
level, conditional on the household’s unobserved effects. A linear probability model estimation 
with kebele-fixed effects was used to test the robustness of the Chamberlain random-effects 
probit estimation. These estimations were based on actual household certification status. IV 
estimations using the panel data were also undertaken to take into account the endogeneity of 
certification. Next, given that variation in household certification status was captured only in 
the 2007 survey data, probit estimations were undertaken using the cross-sectional data and the 
actual and predicted certification status variables. This allowed for comparison with the results 
of the estimations using the panel data.  
 The empirical results reveal that the issuance of usufruct rights (land-use certificates) 
in the Amhara region enhanced perceived tenure security in both male- and female-headed 
households. The impact was greater in female-headed households. This result holds across all 
specifications, using the total and disaggregated samples with both the Chamberlain random-
effects and linear probability model estimations. The findings also hold with the use of the IV 
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estimation. On the other hand, the robustness checks show that the results are sensitive to the 
use of cross-section data and predicted certification.  In all the estimation strategies, the results 
show that female-headed households tend to have greater perceptions of tenure security than 
male-headed households. The impact of key socioeconomic factors seems to be smaller than 
that of certification, in some estimations insignificant, on perceived tenure security. This 
applies in all estimation strategies. The findings suggest that what consistently matters most in 
this, for both male and female landholders, is certification: legally documented rights to land 
holdings. This is simply due to the nature of Ethiopia’s land-tenure system.  
The sample of female-headed households is rather small and places analytical 
limitations on the gender analysis. Despite that, this paper makes a first cut at understanding 
the gender dimension of strengthening land-holding rights through land-use certification. 
The findings of this chapters suggest that although advancing women’s socioeconomic 
standing is important, legally strengthening land-holding rights is even more important for 
female landholders of rural Amhara, who are economically and socially more marginalized 
than their male counterparts. Therefore, it is critical that these usufruct rights are enforced. In 
addition, because Ethiopia’s land-tenure system permits only usufruct rights, households 
normally expect that land can be taken away from them for public purposes, as the land-use 
certificate states. Therefore, the certification program is limited in its ability to eliminate 
perceived tenure insecurity in both male- and female-headed households. 
 This paper contributes to the literature by applying a gender lens to tenure security in 
the context of usufruct rights. Its findings are similar to those of Holden et al. (2009), Burnod 
et al. (2012), Deininger et al. (2008a), and Do et al. (2008): namely, usufruct rights enhance 
perceived tenure security. But this chapter adds to these findings the relevance of certification 
and socio-economic factors, in the cases of both male and female heads, and takes into account 
the endogeneity of certification. 
From here, future research should dive deeply into the constraints and opportunities 
female landholders face at both the individual and household levels. Only then can we assess 
the ability of legal rights to enhance tenure security of female versus male landholders. 
Meanwhile, policy makers ought to consider mechanisms for strengthening the tenure security 
of landholders in contexts where usufruct rights are granted, for female landholders. 
Certification is a necessary first step to reducing tenure insecurity, especially its gender 
differentials. But policy makers must ask whether this is sufficient to improve rural livelihoods 
and development at large, especially in the case of gender. This is essentially the central 
question of the analyses of Chapter 6.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Gender, Rural Land Certification, 
and Investment 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Land-holding rights form the foundation for secure land holdings, which can lead to enhanced 
land-related economic outcomes (North et al., 1973; Knack et al., 1995; Acemoglu et al., 2001; 
Besley et al., 2010). The current literature points to three channels by which secure property 
rights can affect land ownership, use, investment, and transfer: First, well-defined rights to land 
and the ability to draw on public enforcement lower the risk of eviction, reduce the need for 
landowners to expend resources defending claims, and increase incentives for land-related 
investments (Goldstein & Udry, 2008; Besley, 1995). Second, registration of land ownership 
reduces the cost of renting and selling transactions and encourages increased exchange, 
enhancing the “possibilities for gains from trade” (Besley, 1995). Third, formalization of land 
rights facilitates the use of land as collateral and improves access to credit (Besley, 1995; de 
Soto, 2000; Goldstein & Udry, 2008; Deininger et al., 2011).  
One critical outcome of strengthened land-holding rights is land-related investments 
that enhance agricultural productivity and livelihood. Place and Hazell (1993), Besley (1995), 
and Gavian and Fafchamps (1996) pointed to the fact that land-investment decisions are 
affected by tenure security. Various authors have argued that there is a correlation between 
formalized land rights and the efficiency with which agricultural resources are allocated, 
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especially land-related investments. Goldstein and Udry (2008) indicated that expectations of 
rights over the returns on these investment—and thus the nature of property rights 
themselves—influence investment incentives. Several works on property rights have presented 
this argument: Desoto (2000), North (1981), Jones (1986), Mokyr (2002), and Engerman and 
Sokoloff (2003). 
Although these authors have argued for the importance of land titling to outcomes such 
as land investments, the empirical evidence is not clear and definite. Holden et al. (2011) noted 
that although many researchers have studied the impact of land rights on investment, most of 
their studies did not take into account the endogeneity of land rights. 
Empirically estimating the effects of land titling is difficult due to the endogenous 
nature of titling: the allocation of titles to households is not random (Kassa, 2014). But from a 
conceptual perspective, Kassa (2014) makes the following argument that improvements in land 
rights through titling may not lead to increased investment: First, in the context of land markets 
in developing countries, which may not be efficient and free, the anticipated gains in efficiency 
from trade may not be observed, thus reducing incentives to investment. Second, property 
titling could lead to “rent seeking” by local elites who might have better access to information 
about land registration procedures (this could actually increase investment, due to the 
investment capacity of the local elites). Third, land registration could fuel conflict, uncertainty 
over land rights, and increased transaction costs for landholders who depend on informal 
mechanisms to safeguard their rights. 
The issuance of land-use certificates in the Amhara region was expected to provide 
incentives for landholders to undertake activities that improve their livelihood, such as 
increased land-related investments. But female landholders in the region face greater resource 
and cultural constraints than their male counterparts, which could contribute to gender 
differentials in investment outcomes. 
Deininger et al. (2008a), Holden et al. (2009), and Deininger et al. (2011) have 
empirically investigated the impact of usufruct rights on land investment. But none of them 
investigated gender-differentiated impacts and the endogeneity of land rights. This paper 
investigates the impact of land-use certificates on investment by gender. It attempts to identify 
the pathways by which certification impacts can differ on land belonging to male- and female-
headed households. The analysis also takes into account the endogeneity of certification, as 
determined in Chapter 4. 
The research question addressed in this chapter is important for several reasons: First, 
it informs policy on whether investing in rural land reforms can spur land-related investments 
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and increase rural incomes, or whether complementary investments need to occur 
simultaneously, especially for female landholders. Second, rural land reforms, especially in 
developing countries are costly, and assessments of their impacts can informs similar programs 
elsewhere on whether this investment is justified. Third, this research will assess whether there 
is a difference in land-investment when endogeneity is taken into account. 
 Cross-sectional data are used to undertake the analyses at the parcel level. The probit 
estimations of the likelihood of investment use actual and predicted parcel-certification status 
and control for unobserved kebele heterogeneities and parcel and household characteristics. IV 
estimation will be also undertaken to account for the endogeneity of certification.  
 The findings reveal that certification has a significant and positive marginal impact on 
the likelihood of both new SWC investments and SWC maintenance being undertaken, in both 
male- and female-headed households, and that parcels belonging to female-headed households 
are less likely to have both types on investment on them. While the findings show that 
certification is important for both new and maintenance investments, they also show that in for 
female-headed households, other factors significantly determine the likelihood of investment. 
These factors include land rental, availability of male labor, and wealth. The findings are also 
sensitive to the use of predicted certification, but only in the case of new SWC investments, for 
which predicted certification has an insignificant impact. The effect of predicted certification 
on SWC maintenance is significant across all specifications. 
 The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2 provides the 
background context. Section 6.3 reviews the literature. Section 6.4 discusses the data and 
descriptions. Section 6.5 presents the estimation strategy and results. Section 6.6 concludes, 
discusses policy implications, and outlines areas for future research. 
 
6.2 Background 
 
Land degradation is a serious challenge facing male and female farmers in the Amhara region. 
It takes three main forms: soil erosion, nutrient depletion, and deforestation.  Nearly 29 percent, 
31 percent, 10 percent, and 30 percent of land in Amhara experiences high, moderate, very 
high, and low soil erosion rates, respecively (Desta et al.). High rainfall and a topography of 
steeply sloping plateaus are the main natural factors behind soil erosion in the region. As 
indicated by Desta et al., nutrient depletion occurs through inadequate recycling of dung and 
crop residues in the soil, low usage of chemical fertilizers, declining fallow periods, soil 
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erosion, and burning of soil and organic matter. Furthermore, deforestation is a common 
practice and there is a lack of replacement of harvested trees, leading to the washing away of 
fertile topsoil into lakes and rivers. 
These factors all cause land degradation directly, but several socio-economic factors 
underlying them. These include population pressure, poverty, limited and costly access to 
agricultural inputs and credit, fragmentation of land holdings, and lack of awareness among 
farmers of suitable technologies for land management (Desta et al.). Berhanu and Fayera (2005) 
pointed out that land degradation in the region is also thought to be accelerated by “inadequate” 
land-property rights, and that in an environment where property rights are not secure, land 
degradation will be aggravated. 
 The consequences of land degradation are evident and significant. It reduces the 
productivity of arable land. In an agricultural context of small landholders in which subsistence 
farming dominates, food insecurity becomes a crucial threat. Rural livelihoods become 
vulnerable, and there are adverse impacts on poverty. 
 The construction of soil and water conservation (SWC) structures is one of the primary 
measures used by farmers to tackle soil degradation. These structures take various forms, such 
as stone bunds, soil bunds and watersheds. They are effective for retaining important soil 
characteristics from erosion and for increasing and sustaining agricultural production. 
Investment in SWCs, through either new construction or maintenance, is a labor-intensive 
activity. In addition, small farm holders who mostly engage in subsistence farming may not 
have the incentive to undertake such investments in the absence of economies of scale, when 
the returns are often realized only in the long term. Therefore, SWCs may not be financially 
viable, let alone profitable, as poverty in rural communities of the Amhara region is high. 
 Managing land degradation is difficult for all landholders, but it is particularly difficult 
for female landholders. Structural and social factors limit women’s ability to invest in 
improving the quality of their land. For example, according to Frank (1999), most male farmers 
and Peasants Association (PA) leaders view women as incapable of undertaking autonomous 
farming initiatives, as women are not regarded as farmers (regarding them as farmers is 
considered a “threat to the social fabric of rural communities”; Frank, 1999). This attitude 
limits women’s access to extension services on the effective use of agricultural inputs and 
technologies, as these initiatives are almost exclusively directed toward male farmers. This 
constrains the management of land, and the productive capacity of female-headed households 
with rights to land. 
The labor requirement for constructing and maintaining SWC means that female-
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headed households with insufficient male labor may be unable to undertake this kind of land 
related-investment. Furthermore, the fact that female landholders in the Amhara region are 
constrained in their access to farming resources and are poorer than their male counterparts 
could make them less likely to undertake land-related investments. 
These constraints induce female landholders to engage in land-rental activities with 
others who have access to the resources needed for land-related investments. This increases the 
likelihood that the necessary investments are undertaken on their lands. On this end, in addition 
to assessing the impact of certification on land-related investments, it is equally important to 
assess the impact of renting-out of land, especially by female landholders, on the likelihood 
that investments are undertaken on the rented-out lands. 
 
6.3 Literature Review 
 
Several empirical studies have examined the impact of land-use certificates on land-related 
investments in Ethiopia using nationwide data (Ethiopia) and regional data (Tigray and Amhara 
regions). These have not taken into account the gender-differentiated implications of 
certification on land-related investments. In addition, these studies have treated the certification 
process as exogenous to their contexts of study. This section summarizes the literature. 
Holden et al. (2009) empirically assessed the investment impact of the Tigray region’s 
land-certification program using plot-level panel data (1998, 2001, and 2006). Three dependent 
variables were used as proxy for the type of investments undertaken by the households: 
(1) stone terracing and soil bunds, (2) maintenance or improvement of soil conservation 
structures, and (3) tree stock and tree planting. The hypothesis was that farm-plot certificates 
improved land-related investments on the plot through the building of new conservation 
structures, improvement and maintenance of existing structures, and the planting of trees. In 
addition, the authors tested the hypothesis that land-use certificates did not increase tree 
planting (especially eucalyptus trees) because of restrictions on tree planting in the land 
proclamations. 
Holden et al. (2009) used different empirical methods to test these hypotheses, 
depending on the dependent variable in question. A household random-effects probit and fixed-
effects logit panel data models were used with “stone terraces and soil bunds” as a proxy for 
investment. A household random-effects proportional-odds ordered logit panel data model was 
used with “maintenance/improvement of soil conservation structures” as the dependent 
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variable. And a random-effects tobit panel data model was used with “tree stock and tree 
planting.” The regressions used several independent variables to capture the impact on land 
investments not only of certification but of household-head characteristics, plot characteristics, 
ownership of livestock, and whether there was any public investment in the plot.  
Holden et al. (2009) found the following results: For the “soil bunds” models, the 
certificate variable was never significant. For the “stone terrace” variable, certification had a 
positive but weak impact. This was explained by the presence of a strong role for public 
investment and local collective action in soil conservation. The “public investment” variable 
in the regression was highly significant and positive in all the model specifications, leading to 
the conclusion that the majority of this investment was driven by public efforts. With 
“maintenance or improvement of conservation structures,” the effects of certification were 
positive and significant at the 10% level. The authors also found that maintenance was better 
on homesteads and large plots, and poorer on shallow and distant plots. On “investment in 
trees,” certification had a positive and significant (5% level) impact. On the basis of this 
finding, the authors rejected the hypothesis that restrictions on planting trees did not lead 
certificates to contribute to tree planting. In fact, they found that certification enhanced tree 
planting, including the planting of eucalyptus trees.  Tree planting was also significantly lower 
in distant plots. The authors suggested that this might have be a result of lower tenure security 
on distant plots. 
Deininger et al. (2008a) assessed the impact of certification on land-related investment 
using a second-round country-wide panel survey of about 2,300 households in 115 villages. 
The data included whether households had undertaken new land-related investment, mainly on 
terracing and bunding, in the last 12 months, and the amount of labor spent on such works. The 
authors assumed that land certification was exogenous and that the expectation of having their 
land certified in the not-too-distant future would not affect households’ investment behavior. 
Probit and tobit regressions were used to estimate the investment impact of certification for 
households owning plots and residing in certain kebeles (villages), using vectors of household 
and plot characteristics. The results showed a positive and highly significant investment effect 
of certification in probit and tobit methodologies. 
 Using data from the last two rounds of a rural panel survey conducted in the Amhara 
region, Deininger et al. (2011) assessed the early effects of certificate issuance on land-related 
investment. They used two dependent variables: the regressand was equal to 1 if the plot owned 
by the household received soil- or water-conservation investment (repairs or new investment) 
in the past 12 months, or the same number of hours spent in such investment in the past 12 
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months. The empirical model assessed the impact on land investment using various 
independent variables, including the treatment variable (certification status), a vector of 
controls representing household-head characteristics, and a vector of controls for taking plot 
characteristics into account. The authors noted that although information on land investment 
was captured at the plot level, the fact that a single certificate is issued for all of a household’s 
plots means that impact can be assessed on average at the household level, by controlling the 
right-hand-side variables. 
Deininger et al. (2011) used the Chamberlain random-effects probit to measure impacts 
on repairs and new investment in the preceding 12 months, and a tobit model to assess the 
impact on hours spent on repairs and new investment in the last 12 months. They tested the 
hypothesis certification creates higher investment incentives. The last two rounds of the survey 
were used because comparable information on investment was available for those two years 
and because plots cannot be matched over time. Their approach excluded any initial stock of 
investments. The econometric results showed a significant positive impact of certification on 
land-related investment, regardless of whether the outcome variable was in soil or water 
conservation, or in the number of hours spent on such investment. 
 This paper contributes to the literatures in several ways: First, it undertakes a detailed 
assessment of the gender differentials in investments and tries to uncover the mechanisms for 
any differentials. Second, it takes into account the endogeneity of the certification process, as 
demonstrated in the empirical findings in Chapter 4.  
 
6.4 Data and Description 
 
6.4.1 Data Source 
 
Unlike Deininger et al. (2011), I use parcel-level information to study the determinants of 
investment, because certification was captured at the parcel level. In addition, parcels cannot 
be matched across the survey years which limits the analysis in this chapter to the use of cross-
section data. 
The cross-sectional dataset used for the analysis consists of 7,988 parcels belonging to 
1,759 households from the 2007 survey. Nearly 83 percent of the observations (parcels) are 
from male-headed households. Seventy-nine percent of the parcels are certified. As indicated 
in Chapter 3, of this 79 percent, 83 percent belong to male-headed households. The 2007 survey 
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indicates that 15 percent of the parcels were certified in 1997 E.C.,24 49 percent in 1998 E.C., 
and 15 percent in 1999 E.C. Almost 21 percent do not have years of certification recorded.  
 
6.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This section provides an overview of the type and incidence of land-related investments 
undertaken by households on their parcels, disaggregated by sex of the household head and 
parcel-certification status. It also includes a discussion of the socio-economic characteristics of 
the surveyed households, differentiated by the type of investments made and by the sex of the 
household head. This lets the statistics identify plausible pathways for land-use certificates to 
influence land-related investments in both male and female-headed households. 
 The 2007 dataset captures several parcel-level variables representing land-related 
investments. Two of these are binary, simply capturing whether households undertook land-
related investments: (1) Did you make new/additional Soil and Conservations (SWC) structures 
during the past 12 months? (2) Did you undertake SWC maintenance during the past 12 
months? The remaining variables are continuous, in that they capture the amount of investment: 
(1) the average number of hours worked per day for new/additional SWC during the past 12 
months, (2) the number of trees and bushes on the parcel, and (3) the number of eucalyptus 
trees on each parcel.  
For the average hours worked per day on SWC, the following data are recorded: out of 
the 7,988 parcel observations, there are 783 with information on this variable, of which 700 
and 83 are from parcels belonging to male- and female-headed households, respectively. For 
the number of trees and bushes on the parcel, there are 2,663 observations, of which 2,244 and 
419 are from parcels belonging to male- and female-headed households, respectively. For the 
number of eucalyptus trees, there are 2,643 observations, of which 2,224 and 419 are from 
parcels belonging to male- and female-headed households, respectively.  
For the binary variables on new and additional SWC structures undertaken in the past 
12 months, there are 4,083 observations, of which 3,330 and 753 belong to male- and female-
headed households, respectively. For the variable capturing SWC maintenance in the past 12 
months, there are 7,948 observations, of which 6,606 and 1,342 are from parcels belonging to 
male- and female-headed households, respectively. 
Given the number of observations available for each variable, for this analysis only the 
                                                          
24 Years are recorded in Ethiopian Calendar (E.C.) 
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binary variables will be used. The rest of the variables have insufficient observations for a 
gender analyses, which requires disaggregating the variables by sex of the household head.  
 
6.4.2.1 New and Additional SWC and Maintenance, by Parcel-Certification Status 
and Gender 
 
Despite the Amhara region’s vulnerability to soil erosion and degradation, the 2007 survey data 
show that the incidence of new and additional SWC investments is low (19%). The incidence 
of SWC maintenance is also low (31%). Because some parcels do have SWC on them, there 
may be a greater need to maintain existing structures to retain parcel quality, and this 
maintenance might be less costly than new or additional SWC investments. 
 Table 6.1 shows the distribution of each type of investment by sex of the household 
head to which the parcel belongs. Although most of the parcels in male- and female-headed 
households have neither type of investment, a greater percentage of the parcels belonging to 
male heads have new or additional SWC investments as well as SWC maintenance. This could 
be because female landholders in this region are socioeconomically constrained and prefer to 
use their limited resources to maintain existing investments rather than undertake new ones.  
Furthermore, the majority of the investments of each type in the data sample belong to 
male heads. Among parcels with new SWC investments on them, 89% belong to male heads; 
for total SWC maintenance undertaken, nearly 85% belong to male heads.  
 
Table 6.1: Land investments, by gender (%) 
 
 
6.4.2.2 Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics 
 
Tables E.1, E.2, and E.3 the Appendix provide the variable descriptions and summary statistics 
Parcels from Male 
Household Heads
Parcels from Female 
Household Heads
New/Additionl SWC Structures
No 79.10 88.58
Yes 20.90 11.42
SWC Maintenance
No 68.51 72.21
Yes 31.49 27.79
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” 2007 survey
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for the parcel-level data used in this analysis. These variables are similar to those used by 
Deininger et al. (2011), as this paper examines the relationship of land investment to 
certification in the same region. 
The tables show that nearly 79% of the parcels are certified. Approximately 17% of the 
parcels are owned by female-headed households. Parcels in male-headed households more 
often have investments in SWC maintenance than parcels in female-headed households. 
Likewise, more parcels belonging to male-headed households have new SWC investments. 
As for parcel characteristics, there is no distinct variation in characteristics between 
male- and female-headed households: they have a nearly equal distribution of best parcel traits 
across the various characteristics. Most of the parcels are “flat” (56% and 57% in female- and 
male-headed households, respectively); 73% are “fertile” (66% and 73% in female- and male-
headed households). Parcels in female-headed households are on average larger than those in 
male-headed households. Because this is average parcel size, however, parcel area in female-
headed households is distributed on a smaller sample than in male-headed households.  
 As for differences in household characteristics, parcels belonging to male-headed 
households have heads who are more literate and wealthier than female-headed households. 
On the other hand, the average number of prime-age males in the household (a proxy for the 
availability of male labor) is nearly the same in the two groups. 
Given the socioeconomic status of female farmers in the Amhara region, I hypothesize 
that parcels belonging to female-headed households are less likely to have new SWC 
investments and SWC maintenance. Parcels with the “best” characteristics and larger size are 
expected to increase the likelihood of new SWC investments and maintenance. Large parcels 
could decrease the cost of parcel investment through economies of scale. As for the impact of 
household characteristics on new SWC investments and maintenance, I expect wealth and 
number of prime-age males to increase the likelihood. Increased wealth implies the ability to 
afford the cost of investment and maintenance, and prime-age males mean availability of the 
male labor required as input to new SWC investments and maintenance. Years of schooling 
could increase the likelihood of investment and maintenance, as this could be a proxy for the 
household having the required knowledge to undertake such activities. In addition, I expect 
that parcels belonging to older households are less likely to have new SWC investments and 
maintenance, as both of these are labor intensive, and younger households might be physically 
better able to undertake them. 
It is important to note the difference in the shares of land rented out by male- and 
female-headed households (a proxy for the level of rental activity in the household). Nearly 
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45% of the parcel area belonging to female-headed households is rented out, but only 13% is 
rented out by male-headed households. This points to the significance of land-rental activities 
by female heads as a way of overcoming socioeconomic constraints to ensure the sustainability 
of their livelihoods. These constraints include access to key farming resources like male labor 
and oxen. In addition, female farmers face cultural constraints on performing farming activities 
that are traditionally considered more suitable for males. Renting-out their land helps them 
overcome these barriers, so there is a high correlation between investing and renting, especially 
among women.  
Furthermore, it is likely that female heads with no prime-age males in their households 
will opt to rent out more of their land to meet the labor and farming requirements and overcome 
the gender-based division of labor defined by Amhara cultural norms (Table 6.2). Although 
both male and female heads rent out more of their land when they lack male labor in the 
household, rental activity is significantly greater in female-headed households. The relevance 
of rental activity to female heads suggests that they are substantially constrained in the labor 
needed to farm and undertake investments. 
 
Table 6.2: Availability of male labor and land-rental in the household 
 
 
6.4.2.3 Variable Characteristics, by Outcome Variable and Gender 
 
Table 6.3 reports on the variable characteristics that will be used in the empirical analysis by 
outcome variables—that is, by whether parcels have new or additional SWC structures or 
maintenance. First, the majority of parcels with and without investments are certified. In the 
case of new and additional investments, there is no distinct variation in certification status 
between invested and non-invested parcels. However, a greater proportion of parcels with 
maintenance investment than without are certified. When we apply the gender lens to the 
samples of invested and non-invested parcels, we find no difference between the proportions 
No Prime-age Males 
in Household 
Prime-age 
Males in 
Household Total 
No Prime-age 
Males in the HH
Prime-age Males 
in the Household Total 
No Prime-age 
Males in 
Household 
Prime-age Males 
in Household Total 
Share of rented-out parcels 0.1664836 0.1547637 0.1291482 0.6615304 0.4528225 0.445518 0.2507784 0.2066347 0.1827346
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” 2007 survey.
Male Headed Households Female Headed Households Male and Female Headed Households
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of parcels held by male and female heads that are certified. 
Parcels with new or additional SWC investments are smaller than parcels without. The 
same is true for SWC maintenance. Parcels belonging to female heads are larger regardless of 
investment status or type. Furthermore, for each parcel-investment type, the majority of parcels 
in both male- and female-headed households with investments are fertile and flat. However, 
more of these parcel characteristics are found on parcels belonging to female heads, regardless 
of investment status.  
In each of the two types of investment, a greater share of parcels held by females are 
rented out. This shows the importance of renting out land as a way for female heads to 
overcome socioeconomic constraints. There is no significant difference in the age of household 
heads with and without investments, and there is no marked variation in age by sex of the 
household head. However, there is a difference in years of schooling: investments are more 
likely to be undertaken by heads with more education, regardless of sex. Wealthier heads are 
also more likely to undertake SWC investments. The number of prime-age males is higher on 
average in female-headed households with either type of investment. SWC maintenance is 
undertaken more by younger heads of household.  
 
130 
Table 6.3: Household characteristics, by outcome variable and gender 
 
 
6.4.2.4 Variable Characteristics, by Treatment Variable and Gender 
 
Table 6.4 shows variable characteristics by treatment variable. Certificates appear to have more 
impact on SWC maintenance on new or additional SWC structures. This applies to parcels 
belonging to both male- and female-headed households.  
Regardless of certification status, most of the parcels are flat, although this is more 
often the case with certified than non-certified parcels. Female-headed households rent out 
more of their parcels than their male counterparts, regardless of certification status. In addition, 
certified parcels belong more often belong to heads with more schooling when they belong to 
male-headed households, but this is not the case for female heads. Certified parcels also belong 
to wealthier households (in particular to male heads) and to households with more prime-age 
males. This holds regardless of the sex of the household head. 
Male Headed 
Households 
Female Headed 
Households Total
Male Headed 
Households 
Female Headed 
Households Total
Male Headed 
Households 
Female Headed 
Households Total
Male Headed 
Households 
Female Headed 
Households Total
Certification status (%)
No 15.77 11.63 15.3 14.07 16.56 14.57 13.01 11.91 12.84 24.35 24.97 24.46
Yes 84.23 88.37 84.7 85.93 83.44 85.43 86.99 88.09 87.16 75.65 75.03 75.54
Parcel size (hectares) 0.0209 0.0629 0.0255 0.0236 0.1262 0.0442 0.0173 0.0940 0.0288 0.0343 0.1124 0.0481
Parcel quality (%)
Fertile 52.52 66.28 54.03 55.62 61.62 56.83 56.73 63 57.68 50.87 61.51 52.75
Medium-fertile 28.92 19.77 27.91 32.99 32.23 32.84 30.67 30.29 30.62 32.66 28.07 31.85
Infertile 18.56 13.95 18.05 11.39 6.15 10.33 12.6 6.7 11.7 16.47 10.42 15.4
Parcel slope (%)   
Flat 62.93 76.74 64.45 64.87 70.46 66.00 64.55 70.78 65.5 74.98 77.5 75.43
Medium 28.74 17.44 27.49 29.78 23.39 28.48 29.2 23.86 28.38 20.15 17.54 19.69
Steep 8.33 5.81 3.06 5.36 6.15 5.52 6.25 5.36 6.12 4.86 4.95 4.88
Share of rented-out parcels 0.0742 0.1816 0.0860 0.1060 0.4260 0.1706 0.0629 0.2753 0.0952 0.1598 0.5126 0.2220
Age (mean) 49.7856 50.4217 49.8535 51.0407 52.8521 51.4053 50.6600 50.9378 50.7020 51.5761 54.1287 52.0268
Years of schooling (mean) 1.3358 0.5060 1.2451 1.2788 0.4070 1.1014 1.2811 0.4000 1.1451 1.0234 0.4105 0.914
Number of bulls/oxen (mean) 2.0273 1.1047 1.5562 1.7286 0.8756 1.9258 1.8202 1.1019 1.711 2.179 0.8689 1.948
Number of prime age male (mean) 1.1552 1.5233 1.1957 1.2221 1.2399 1.2257 1.2274 1.3887 `1.2519 1.3166 1.192 1.2946
Observations (%) 89.00 11.00 19.15 79.79 20.21 80.85 84.79 15.21 30.86 82.37 17.63 69.14
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” 2007 survey.
No SWC MaintenanceNew/Additional SWC Stuctures No New/Additional  SWC Structures SWC Maintenance
131 
Table 6.4: Household characteristics, by parcel-certification status and gender 
 
 
Given the greater constraints female landholders face, I hypothesize that 
(1) certification has a significant impact on land investments in parcels belonging to both male- 
and female-headed households, and (2) socioeconomic constraints such as the availability of 
labor have a greater impact on land investments in parcels belonging to female-headed 
households. 
 
 
6.5 Estimation Strategy and Results 
 
6.5.1 Estimation Strategy 
 
The estimation strategy in this paper takes into account the endogeneity of the certification 
process: in addition to using the actual parcel certification status variable to test the impact of 
certification on SWC investments, it uses predicted parcel certification status for robustness 
Household Characteristics
Male Headed 
Households 
Female 
Headed 
Households Total
Male Headed 
Households 
Female Headed 
Households Total
New/Additional SWC Stuctures (%)
No 79.44 87.64 80.91 77.17 91.45 80
Yes 20.56 12.36 19.09 22.83 8.55 20
SWC Maintenance (%)
No 65.71 69.31 66.31 80.49 84.75 81.22
Yes 34.29 30.69 33.69 19.51 15.25 18.78
Parcel size (hectares) 0.025 0.1063 0.0386 0.0461 0.1173 0.058
Parcel quality (%)
Fertile 56.34 62.87 57.44 38.68 54.96 41.47
Medium-fertile 30.82 29.00 30.51 36.56 30.14 35.46
Infertile 12.84 8.13 12.05 24.76 14.89 23.07
Parcel slope (%)
Flat 72.68 75.69 73.19 67.77 73.76 68.79
Medium 22.20 19.04 21.67 26.30 21.63 25.50
Steep 5.12 5.26 5.14 5.93 4.61 5.71
Share of rented-out parcels 0.1147 0.4132 0.1647 0.1818 0.5887 0.2517
Age (mean) 51.5155 54.1000 51.9517 50.7061 50.0605 50.5951
Years of schooling (mean) 1.1352 0.3602 1.0028 0.7856 0.5893 0.7513
Number of bulls/oxen (mean) 2.1417 1.0144 1.9527 1.7750 0.6831 1.7458
Number of prime age male (mean) 1.3471 1.3081 1.3406 1.0862 0.8873 1.0520
Observations (%) 83.23 16.77 79.03 82.82 17.18 20.97
Source: Own estimation from “Studies for Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands” 2007 survey.
With Certificates No Certificates
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checks, as determined in Chapter 4.  
The empirical strategy of this paper departs from that of Deininger et al. (2011), who 
also estimated the impact of certification on land investments, in the following ways: (1) This 
paper explores the mechanisms by which the propensity to invest in parcels may differ between 
male- and female-headed households. (2) The estimations are made at the parcel level, because 
certification is at the parcel level. (3) The analysis is undertaken using cross-sectional data from 
2007, because there is no variation in the certification variable in the survey years before 2007. 
(4) This paper distinguishes between new SWCs and SWC maintenance. (5) This paper takes 
into account the endogeneity of certification. One data limitation of this paper is that parcels 
cannot be matched across time.  
 
6.5.1.1 Probit Estimation with Actual Parcel-Certification Status Variable 
 
Besley (1995) provided the basic estimation framework for determining investment on land:  
 Yijk = f (Rij , Pij , Xij , εij ), (1) 
in which Yijk is the investment level
25 K by household i on plot j. Rij is the plot’s property-rights 
status, Pij is a vector of plot characteristics, Xij is a vector of household characteristics, and εij 
is the stochastic element. Given the binary choice-dependent variable of this paper, K 
represents a household’s decision to undertake a land-related investment on its parcel.  
In this paper, the impact of land certification on land-related investments is estimated 
using Equation 2, following the basic framework in Equation 1. In Equation 2, investment in a 
parcel in a household, Yji, is modeled as depending on actual parcel certification status and a 
number of observable parcel and household characteristics. The model applies a kebele dummy 
variable to control for unobserved heterogeneities among kebeles. Two dependent variables 
represent households undertaking land-related investments on each parcel: (1) whether the 
household made new or additional SWC structures on each parcel, and (2) whether the 
household conducted SWC maintenance on each parcel in the past 12 months. Each dependent 
variable is equal to 1 if the household did undertake this kind of investment, and 0 otherwise. 
The following is the empirical strategy to be estimated using probit estimations: 
 Yji = β0 + β1Cji + β2Xji + β3Pji + Dk+ uji (2) 
Here, Yjit is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a land-related investment was undertaken 
                                                          
25 For purposes of this paper, this will be whether parcels have land-related investments undertaken on them by 
the household. 
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on parcel j by household i, and 0 otherwise. Cji is the parcel-certification status in household I 
(1 if certified, 0 otherwise); xi is a vector of controls representing characteristics of household 
i to which parcel j belongs, which include the household head’s gender, age, years of schooling, 
and wealth (number of cattle owned by the household), and the number of prime-age males; Pji 
is a vector of controls at the parcel level (characteristics of parcel j belonging to household i, 
including parcel size, quality, and slope).26 Finally, Dk captures kebele-specific unobserved 
effects (a dummy variable representing the kebele parcel that j is located in), and uji is a parcel-
specific error term. The estimation uses the actual household certification variable. Given that 
the decisions to invest in and to rent out land are closely related, especially for female 
landholders, the regressions are estimated without using “share of rented-out parcels” as an 
independent variable. 
 Equation (7) is estimated using three data samples: (1) the aggregate sample of parcels 
belonging to male- and female-headed households, (2) the sample of parcels belonging to male-
headed households, and (3) the sample of parcels belonging to female-headed households. To 
test the robustness of the probit estimation results, the models for all samples are estimated 
using the linear probability model. The results are reported in the Appendix.  
 
6.5.1.2 Probit Estimation with Predicted Parcel-Certification Status Variable 
 
The probit estimation in Equation 2 could be limited by the potential endogeneity of 
certification, as found in Chapter 4. While certification is expected to enhance investment in 
parcels, it is possible that farmers might undertake investments simply to safeguard their land 
holdings (Besley, 1995). Therefore, to recognize the endogeneity of certification, this section 
undertakes a robustness check of the results of Equation 2 using “predicted” parcel certification 
status instead of “actual” parcel certification status. The predictions are derived from 
specifications g in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 which yield the following equation for determining parcel 
certification status: 
 CSih = α30 + α31Pih + α32Hih + α33Dk + e3ih (3) 
CSih is equal to 1 if parcel i in household h has a certificate (actual certification status variable), 
and 0 otherwise; Pih is a vector of parcel characteristics; Hih is a vector of household 
characteristics; Dk is a vector of kebele dummies; and e3ih is the error term. The observable 
                                                          
26 The variable “number of years since parcel certification” is not included to take into account the time effect of 
investment. This is due to the high correlation with the variable capturing parcel-certification status.  
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household characteristics include the household head’s sex, age, and average years of 
schooling, the number of prime-age males, the mean number of bulls or oxen owned, and the 
distance to the nearest road. Proxies for parcel characteristics include parcel type, depth, slope, 
quality, and size, and whether the parcels has SWC maintenance.  
 Equation 3 was estimated using three different data samples: (1) the aggregate data of 
parcels belonging to male- and female-headed households, (2) the data of parcels belonging to 
male-headed households; and (3) the data of parcels belonging to female-headed households. 
The predicted parcel certification status determined in Chapter 4 through Equation 3 is then 
applied to Equation 2 to estimate the likelihood of investing in a parcel using probit estimation 
in the following way: 
 Yji = β0 + β1Ĉji + β2Xji + β3Pji + hw + uji, (4)  
in which the dependent and independent variables are similar to those in Equation 2, with the 
exception of the parcel certification status variable: Ĉji is the predicted parcel-certification 
status, whereas in Equation 2, Cji is the actual parcel-certification status.  
 Equation 4 is estimated using the same three data samples. The predicted certification 
status variable will differ depending on the sample used to estimate the predictions, whether 
derived from the aggregate sample or from either of the male- or female-headed household 
sample. 
 
6.5.1.3 Probit Estimation Instrument Variable (IV) 
 
As with the estimation strategy of Chapter 5, this paper follows the approach of Holden et al. 
(2009) to take into account the endogeneity of certification. The instrument variables to be 
applied are “years since certification” and “kebele-fixed effects.” Given that household 
certification status in Equation 2 is potentially endogenous, the following equation is estimated 
with an IV probit estimation:   
  y1 = 1[z1 δ1 + α1 y2 + u1 > 0] (5) 
 y2 = 1[z δ2 + v2 > 0], (6) 
where y1 captures the likelihood of SWC investment (new or maintenance), z1 captures 
household and parcel characteristics, y2 captures certification status, and z captures “years since 
certification” and “kebele fixed effects.”  
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6.5.2 Estimation Results 
 
6.5.2.1 Probit Estimation with Actual Parcel-Certification Status Variable 
 
The results of the probit estimation to determine the impact of parcel certification status on the 
likelihood that a new SWC investment is undertaken are presented in Table 6.5. Parcel-
certification status has a significant positive impact on the likelihood of new SWC investment 
being undertaken on the parcel in the aggregated data and the male-headed household sample. 
On the other hand, as shown in column 3, the impact is not significant for parcels belonging to 
female-headed households. 
 The significant impact for the aggregated and male-headed samples can be explained 
by the fact that certification is expected to enhance households’ perceived tenure security, and 
as such to translate into an increased likelihood of investment. Because such investment is 
costly for the small farmers of the Amhara region, it is not likely to occur unless farmers 
perceive a decreased likelihood of their land holdings being expropriated. Certification is 
expected to reduce this risk to justify a costly investment. Moreover, certification is significant 
at the 5% level in the aggregate sample. 
 On the other hand, the insignificant impact in the female-headed households sample 
could be attributed to the small sample size. Another plausible explanation is that female heads 
of household more often feel that the land they farm belongs to them and thus always have 
lower expectations that their land holdings will be reduced. This higher initial perception of 
the security of their holdings could make certificates less valuable to female than male 
landholders. 
The impact of parcel characteristics is mixed, depending on the data sample applied to 
the estimation. Overall, the results show that new SWC investments are more likely to be 
undertaken on parcels with the “best” characteristics. New SWC investments are less likely if 
the parcels are of less than “fertile” quality—“medium” quality, for example. This is consistent 
across all the data samples. However, the impact of slope is significant only in the female-
headed sample: in that group, a medium or steep-sloped (rather than flat) parcel reduces the 
likelihood of new SWC investment. 
In regards to household-head characteristics on, parcels belonging to female heads are 
less likely to see new SWC investments than parcels belonging to male heads. Female 
landholders in the Amhara region are resource-constrained in terms of the farming assets and 
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labor needed to undertake land investments. 
 In addition, older household heads are less likely to make new SWC investments on 
them, though this result is significant only in the aggregate sample and specification 3 of the 
male sample. Years of schooling, which is a proxy for level of knowledge about SWC 
investments, is an insignificant factor in the likelihood of SWC investments. Parcels belonging 
to female-headed households with more prime-age males are more likely to get new SWC 
investments. This result is significant at the 5% level. It indicates that because new SWC 
investments are labor-intensive activities, the availability of male labor is critical because 
females are constrained in their access to farming resources such as labor; the impact is 
insignificant in the aggregate and male-headed samples. The impacts of wealth and schooling 
are also insignificant in all the data samples.  
 Table 6.6 reports the likelihood of SWC maintenance being undertaken on parcels. The 
table shows that certification increases the likelihood that SWC maintenance is undertaken, but 
the result is significant only in the aggregate and male-headed household samples. It seems 
certification generates relatively more incentives for farmers to undertake SWC maintenance 
initiatives rather than new land related investments. This could suggest that the type of 
investment on parcels may matter as investments are accompanied with costs that need to be 
justified with sufficient returns i.e. it could be relatively easier and cheaper to maintain existing 
SWC structures rather than build new/additional ones. Similar to the earlier results on the 
impact of certification using the female-headed households sample, since female land holders 
in the Amhara region feel relatively more tenure secure over their land holdings, this could 
contribute to the insignificant impact of certification on the likelihood that a parcel will have 
SWC maintenance.  
Parcel characteristics are insignificant determinants of SWC maintenance, except for 
slope: the likelihood of SWC maintenance being undertaken is higher if the parcel is “medium” 
or “steep” than if it is “flat.” This result is intuitive, as SWC initiatives are intended to prevent 
soil erosion, which is often needed on steep land.  
In regards to the impact of household-head characteristics, parcels belonging to female-
headed households are less likely to receive SWC maintenance. The reason is similar to the 
case of new SWC investments: female heads are more resource constrained and culturally 
constrained from undertaking such investments. Parcels belonging to older household heads 
are also less likely to have SWC maintenance, but the impact is insignificant for male-headed 
households. Wealth seems to have a significant impact on the likelihood of SWC maintenance, 
but only among female-headed households, which tend to be more resource constrained. A 
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linear probability model estimation was done to measure the impact of actual parcel 
certification status variable and check the sensitivity of the probit estimation results when 
applying a linear probability model. The results are reported in Tables E.4 and E.5 in the 
Appendix.27 
                                                          
27 The results using the linear probability model are similar to the results of the baseline probit estimations.  
However, the results in the case of SWC maintenance change. First, certification has a significant impact on the 
likelihood that SWC maintenance is undertaken on parcels belonging to female-headed households. Second, 
wealth becomes a significant variable across all data samples. Third, the presence of males in the household 
becomes significant, but only in the female-headed sample. The change in results for the female-headed 
households could be attributed to the increased number of observations, implying that the results for this group 
are sensitive to sample size.  
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Table 6.5: Determinants of new and additional SWC investment: Marginal effects from 
probit estimation with actual parcel-certification status variable 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Certification Status 0.1010** 0.0955** 0.0923
(0.041) (0.048) (0.069)
Parcel size -0.0065 0.0037 -0.0018
(0.019) (0.026) (0.017)
Medium parcel quality -0.0660*** -0.0740*** -0.0566*
(0.019) (0.022) (0.032)
Infertile parcel quality -0.0151 -0.0313 0.0645
(0.023) (0.026) (0.040)
Medium parcel slope -0.0227 -0.013 -0.0622*
(0.017) (0.019) (0.037)
Steep parcel slope -0.0066 0.0095 -0.1290**
(0.027) (0.031) (0.056)
Age -0.0014* -0.0012 -0.0011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sex -0.0745** --- ---
(0.031)
Years of schooling 0.0012 0.0012 0.0073
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.0049 0.0061 -0.0189
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
Number of prime-age males -0.0023 -0.0084 0.0386**
(0.010) (0.012) (0.018)
Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes
N 3903 3184 718
Pseudo R Squared 0.1104 0.11 0.1748
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard error in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
Parcels from Male and 
Female Headed 
Households
Parcels from Male 
Headed 
Households
Parcels from 
Female Headed 
Households
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Table 6.6: Determinants of SWC maintenance: Marginal effects from probit estimation 
with actual parcel-certification status variable 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Certification Status 0.1350*** 0.1527*** 0.0754
(0.032) (0.038) (0.054)
Parcel size -0.0188 -0.0441** 0.004
(0.013) (0.020) (0.016)
Medium parcel quality -0.0094 -0.0099 0.003
(0.016) (0.017) (0.036)
Infertile parcel quality -0.0264 -0.0196 -0.0632
(0.021) (0.023) (0.061)
Medium parcel slope 0.1175*** 0.1200*** 0.1047***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.038)
Steep parcel slope 0.1016*** 0.1081*** 0.0539
(0.025) (0.028) (0.056)
Age -0.0015** -0.0009 -0.0034**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sex -0.0648*** --- ---
(0.023)
Years of schooling -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0094
(0.003) (0.004) (0.012)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.0086 0.0062 0.0342*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.018)
Number of prime-age males 0.0036 -0.0039 0.0263
(0.008) (0.009) (0.019)
Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes
N 7628 6326 1252
Pseudo R Squared 0.1641 0.1678 0.1812
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard error in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
Parcels from Male and 
Female Headed 
Households
Parcels from Male 
Headed 
Households
Parcels from 
Female Headed 
Households
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6.5.2.2 Probit Estimation with Predicted Parcel-Certification Status Variable 
 
The results from the robustness checks using probit estimation with predicted parcel-
certification status to determine the likelihood of new or additional SWC investments (Table 
6.7) show that the only result that changes is the variable capturing certification status. The 
marginal impact of the variables capturing parcel and household characteristics are similar to 
the results in Table 6.5 using the actual certification variable. Table 6.7 shows that predicted 
certification has no significant impact on the likelihood of SWC maintenance in any of the 
samples. One explanation could be the sensitivity of the estimations to a drop in the number of 
observations, particularly in the female sample. It is important to note that when predictions 
are estimated from the determinants of parcel certification status in Chapter 4, variables with 
any missing observations will lead to missing predictions for that particular parcel observation. 
This tends to reduce the number of observations for the predicted-certification variable. 
However, the overall results of the robustness checks in the case of SWC maintenance 
(Table 6.8) retain their significance in the aggregate and male-headed household samples. 
Interestingly, the results now show a significant impact on the female-headed households too. 
The predicted certification status variable also has a higher positive marginal impact on the 
likelihood of SWC maintenance than the actual certification variable. Recall that SWC 
maintenance has more observations than the variable capturing new and additional SWC 
investments. This ensures that even when the predicted certification is used in the estimation, 
a fairly decent sample size is captured, especially in the female-headed household sample. This 
could explain the significance of the certification status. 
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Table 6.7: Determinants of new and additional SWC investment: Marginal effects from 
probit estimation with predicted certification status variable 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Predicted Certification Status 0.0533 0.0328 0.2825
(0.159) (0.188) (0.356)
Parcel size -0.007 -0.0049 0.0159
(0.023) (0.034) (0.021)
Medium parcel quality -0.0606*** -0.0729*** -0.0739*
(0.021) (0.026) (0.042)
Infertile parcel quality -0.0121 -0.0207 0.0485
(0.028) (0.034) (0.073)
Medium parcel slope -0.0157 -0.0185 -0.0809
(0.019) (0.023) (0.055)
Steep parcel slope 0.0025 0.0108 -0.1529**
(0.030) (0.037) (0.074)
Age -0.0013 -0.0007 -0.0050**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Sex -0.0914*** --- ---
(0.035)
Years of schooling 0.0014 0.0012 0
(0.005) (0.006)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.002 0.0125 -0.0298
(0.010) (0.012) (0.025)
Number of prime-age males -0.0005 -0.0164 0.0491**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.025)
Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes
N 3265 2450 367
Pseudo R Squared 0.1035 0.1062 0.1943
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Parcels from Male and 
Female Headed 
Households
Parcels from Male 
Headed 
Households
Parcels from 
Female Headed 
Households
Standard error in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
142 
Table 6.8: Determinants of SWC maintenance: Marginal effects from probit estimation 
with predicted certification status variable 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Predicted Certificaton Status 1.0492*** 0.9534*** 1.2712***
(0.129) (0.135) (0.283)
Parcel size -0.0051 -0.0148 0.0213
(0.016) (0.025) (0.023)
Medium parcel quality 0.0199 0.0174 0.0305
(0.017) (0.020) (0.042)
Infertile parcel quality 0.0008 0.0166 -0.1604*
(0.023) (0.026) (0.085)
Medium parcel slope 0.0924*** 0.0779*** 0.1202**
(0.017) (0.020) (0.046)
Steep parcel slope 0.0721*** 0.0417 0.0228
(0.026) (0.030) (0.067)
Age -0.0018*** -0.0015* -0.0062***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Sex -0.0026 --- ---
(0.027)
Years of schooling -0.001 -0.0016 0.0297
(0.004) (0.004) (0.020)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.0199** 0.0133 0.0671***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.021)
Number of prime-age males 0.0045 -0.0031 -0.0053
(0.008) (0.010) (0.022)
Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes
N 6375 4858 735
Pseudo R Squared 0.1767 0.1902 0.175
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard error in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
Parcels from Male and 
Female Headed 
Households
Parcels from Male 
Headed 
Households
Parcels from 
Female Headed 
Households
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6.5.2.3 Probit Estimation with Instrument Variable (IV) 
 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 report the results of using the IV estimation to determine the 
likelihood of new or additional SWC investment and SWC maintenance. In both tables, 
the first-stage regressions show the instrument variable “years since certification” to be 
positive and significant at the 1% level. However, the magnitude of the instrument 
variable’s impact on certification status is 0. Moreover, the results of the second-stage 
regressions show that certification has an insignificant impact on likelihood of new or 
additional SWC investments, while certification has a significant impact (1% level) on 
the likelihood of SWC maintenance. Interestingly, both IV estimations reveal that 
female household heads are less likely to undertake either type of investment, a result 
confirmed by the baseline estimation and by applying predicted certification in the 
estimations. 
 Regardless of whether predicted certification or IV estimation is used, the results 
show that female household heads may require additional support beyond certification 
to increase their incentive to undertake land-related investments. As the empirical 
analyses show, depending on the type of investment, wealth and the availability of male 
support are significant determinants of these investments. 
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Table 6.9: Determinants of new and additional SWC investment: Probit estimation with  
                 IV 
 
 
Second Stage IV 
Regression 
First Stage IV 
Regression 
New/Additional SWC Certification Status
Certification status 0.0069 ---
(0.365)
Parcel size -0.0267 -0.0267
(0.077) (0.077)
Medium parcel quality -0.2721*** -0.2721
(0.077) (0.077)
Infertile parcel quality -0.0708 -0.0708
(0.097) (0.097)
Medium parcel slope -0.0895 -0.0895
(0.070) (0.070)
Steep parcel slope -0.0237 -0.0237
(0.112) (0.112)
Age -0.0055 -0.0055
(0.003) (0.003)
Sex -0.3217*** -0.3217
(0.124) (0.124)
Years of schooling 0.0046 0.0046
(0.018) (0.018)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.0214 0.0214
(0.036) (0.036)
Number of prime-age males -0.0056 -0.0056*
(0.042) (0.042)
Years since certification 0.0000***
(0.000)
Kebele FEs Yes Yes
Observations 3903 3903
Robust standard errors in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6.10: Determinants of SWC maintenance: Probit estimation with IV 
 
 
 
 
Second Stage IV 
Regression 
First Stage IV 
Regression 
SWC Maintenance Certification Status
Certification status 0.5647*** ---
(0.178)
Parcel size -0.0635 -0.0635**
(0.045) (0.045)
Medium parcel quality -0.0301 -0.0301**
(0.054) (0.054)
Infertile parcel quality -0.0863 -0.0863***
(0.073) (0.073)
Medium parcel slope 0.4005*** 0.4005***
(0.054) (0.054)
Steep parcel slope 0.3454*** 0.3454***
(0.086) (0.086)
Age -0.0052** -0.0052
(0.002) (0.002)
Sex -0.2204*** -0.2204*
(0.081) (0.081)
Years of schooling -0.0092 -0.0092
(0.012) (0.012)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.0303 0.0303
(0.023) (0.023)
Number of prime-age males 0.0114 0.0114**
(0.027) (0.027)
Years since certification 0.0000***
(0.000)
Kebele FEs Yes Yes
Observations 7628 7628
Robust standard errors in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
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6.6 Conclusion 
 
Land-related investments are important for enhanced rural livelihoods. They can increase 
farmers’ productivity and incomes, which is especially important for small farmers and for 
socioeconomically marginalized and vulnerable groups such as female landholders. Positive 
gains of this sort for rural communities were expected from the certification programs in the 
various regions of Ethiopia, such as the Amhara region. 
 Understanding the impact of certification land-related investments is thus important for 
several reasons. First, it informs policy on whether investment in rural land reforms is enough 
to spur land-related investments and increase incomes, or whether complementary investments 
need to occur simultaneously, especially for female land holders. Second, rural land reforms, 
especially in developing countries, are costly, and assessments of their impact can inform future 
other reforms about whether the investment is justified. Third, this research assesses whether 
there is a difference in the land investment when endogeneity is taken into account so it can 
inform agricultural policies and strategies.  
 Various researchers have looked at the impact of certification in different regions of 
Ethiopia. None of them has studied gender-differentiated impacts. I have attempted to fill this 
gap by identifying pathways by which certification can differently affect land-related 
investments in parcels belonging to male and female landholders.  
 To do so, I explored the determinants of two types of land-related investments: new 
SWC investments and SWC maintenance. The analyses used probit estimation as the baseline 
estimation strategy with the actual parcel-certification status variable. A probit estimation with 
the predicted certification status variable, and IV probit estimation were used as robustness 
checks for taking the potential endogeneity of certification into account. The analysis employed 
cross-sectional parcel level data to empirically assess the outcomes. The estimations controlled 
for parcel and household characteristics and for unobserved kebele heterogeneities. The 
analyses was also undertaken using aggregate and disaggregated data samples of parcels 
belonging to male- and female-headed households. 
 The empirical results from the baseline estimation strategy reveal that certification has 
a significant and positive marginal impact on both new SWC investments and SWC 
maintenance in the total and separated samples. In addition, parcels belonging to female-
headed households are less likely to have both types on investment. Although the findings show 
that certification is important for both new and maintenance SWC investments, they also show 
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that for female-headed households, other factors significantly determine the likelihood of 
investments. These include wealth and the presence of males in the household. The findings 
are also sensitive to the use of predicted certification, but only in the case of new SWC 
investments, for which predicted certification has an insignificant impact. The results from the 
IV estimations show that female household heads are less likely to undertake land-related 
investments, a result similar to the baseline estimation and application of predicted 
certification. However, in the IV estimations, wealth and male support are insignificant. 
 These findings are similar to those of Holden et al. (2009), Deininger et al. (2008a), and 
Deininger et al. (2011): usufruct rights enhance land-related investments. This chapter adds to 
these findings by exploring in detail and through a gender lens whether certification is the main 
contributor to land-related investments, especially for female land holders. 
 These findings suggest that policy makers should take into account the fact that where 
rural contexts are defined by certain socio-economic constraints, complementary investments 
into enhancing productive capabilities and resources might be equally necessary to ensure that 
the anticipated benefits of land reforms are realized. This is especially important in the case of 
resource-poor and generally marginalized rural community members. This thesis suggests 
overall that providing men and women with equivalent opportunities is an initial step, but true 
gender equality will not arrive without gender equity by via the provision of necessary 
compensations based on the differentiated needs and life experiences of men and women.  
 Future research should consider gender-differential contexts both socioeconomically 
and culturally when estimating various impacts of formalized land rights. Supplementing 
quantitative analyses with qualitative analyses might help researchers explain gender 
differences in these outcomes. In addition, the existing literatures on the impact of certification, 
which assumes its exogeneity, could be compared to new research findings taking into account 
the endogeneity of certification.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have studied the rural land reform process and impacts by gender in the Amhara 
region of Ethiopia. The first paper explored the gender differentials in the rural land-
certification process. It examined the factors that determine which lands are included in a 
household’s land-use certificate, when in the process they are included, and whether there are 
gender differentials in either of these outcomes. This is an important topic because by 
understanding the reform process we can ensure that vulnerable community members are not 
excluded from receiving documented land-holding rights. The findings suggest that the 
certification process in the Amhara region was not systematic—it was biased especially in 
terms of gender, in both certification status and timing. 
The second paper explored the gender-differential impact of land-use certificates and 
socioeconomic factors on perceived household tenure security. This is an important topic 
because one objective of Ethiopia’s land reform program was to secure land holding rights, 
especially for women. The findings suggest that what consistently matters most for enhancing 
perceived tenure security, of everyone but particularly of female landholders in the context of 
Ethiopia’s land-tenure system, is possession of legal documentation of rights to land 
holdings— that is, land-use certificates. The impact of socioeconomic factors such as male 
presence in the household, mode of production, and land use do not seem to matter to perceived 
tenure security. 
The third paper explored the gender-differential impact of land-use certificates on land-
related investments. This an important area for research because the rural land-reform program 
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was expected to improve the livelihood of farmers, especially female landholders, through 
enhanced tenure security. The findings suggest that land-use certificates are significant 
determinants for enhancing land investments among both male and female land holders, 
although the impact on the latter group is rather smaller. But the results also suggest that various 
socioeconomic factors are also relevant for female landholders, including male presence in the 
household and wealth. 
 The overall implication of the first paper is that policy makers should recognize that in 
rural contexts defined by certain socio-economic constraints, land reforms can fall short of their 
objectives if vulnerable groups are not purposefully targeted and supported. Merely treating all 
groups in communities as similar will not ensure equal access to the reform and its benefits.  
 The policy implication of the second paper is the following: policy makers ought to 
consider further mechanisms for strengthening the tenure security of landholders in contexts 
where usufruct rights are granted, especially for female landholders. Certification is a necessary 
step to reducing insecurity and gender differentials. But policy makers should investigate 
whether this is enough to induce better rural livelihoods and rural development, especially in 
terms of gender. This is especially important in the context of resource-poor rural communities.  
 The implication of the third paper is that policy makers understand that in rural contexts 
defined by certain socio-economic constraints, complementary investments could be necessary 
in addition to the granting of land titles to ensure that other influences on investment outcomes 
do not discourage investments even when landholders have documented rights. 
In the rest of this chapter, I discuss the main limitations of this research and explore 
avenues for extending it. The largest limitation of the first paper is its use of survey data that 
were not originally designed to capture the certification program. The survey was imperfect at 
capturing certain variables that theoretically play a role in certification outcomes. These 
missing variables include observable kebele characteristics that could capture whether 
observed differences between kebeles could explain certification-process differentials in terms 
of whether parcels are certified and when, and whether this played a role in the gender 
differentials of the outcomes. One of the essay’s main objectives was to gain insights into the 
certification process in the Amhara region, and this requires capturing not only parcel and 
household characteristics, but kebele heterogeneities. The survey did not capture variables 
representing various kebele characteristics that might have been useful for deepening its 
insights into kebele differentials in the certification process. 
 The first paper does open avenues for future research. For example, it is important to 
re-assess the impact of certification on the various outcomes considered in the literature once 
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the endogeneity of certification is taken into account rather than simply using actual 
certification as the studies do. This will help us test the robustness of the results, which can 
have implications for the policy recommendations put forward. 
 The second paper acknowledges that the sample of female-headed households is small 
and puts analytical limitations on an extensive gender analysis. Despite these, the paper takes 
a first step toward understanding the gender dimension of strengthening land-holding rights 
through land-use certification. Another limitation is that although panel data are used, the fact 
that variation in certification status was captured mainly in the 2007 survey year made it 
difficult to assess pre- and post-certification impacts. A third limitation is that households’ 
perceptions of changes to land holdings might not immediately change when they are issued 
land-use certificates. In such cases, the treatment variable, certification status, could be 
wrongly interpreted as having no effect on perceived tenure security. A related limitation is the 
definition of perceived tenure security used in the paper’s analyses. Tenure security is captured 
through expectations of changes to land holdings, which is based on a future outlook. A more 
accurate way of capturing tenure security might be via a variable that asks households about 
their current tenure-security situations, such whether they are experiencing an event that 
making them feel more or less tenure-secure.  
One avenue for extending the research in the second paper is to take a deep dive into 
the constraints and opportunities that female landholders face, at both the individual and 
household levels. Only then will we be able to assess the extent to which legal rights can 
enhance the tenure security of female versus male land holders. A qualitative survey to capture 
the socioeconomic and cultural contexts of male and female land holders would complement 
the quantitative analyses by exploring variables that cannot be captured well quantitatively. 
The third paper has the following notable limitations. First, parcels cannot be matched 
across time, and there is no variation in the certification variable before 2007. Both of these 
contributed to the use of cross-section data, which limited the choice of estimation approaches. 
Second, due to data limitations, land investment could be only captured in binary variables, not 
continuous ones, making it hard to assess the extent to which certification enhanced 
investments—that is, hard to identify the optimal level of investment, given a household’s 
certification status.  
 Future research should consider gender-differential contexts, both socioeconomically 
and culturally, when estimating the impacts of formalized land rights. Current literature that 
has investigated the impacts of certification while assuming its exogeneity can be compared to 
newer research findings to test the robustness of their results, perhaps using the predicted 
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certificate variable.  
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A.1 Chapter 2 Appendix Figures 
  
 
Source: http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/et(.html) 
Figure A.1: Map of Ethiopia 
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Source: http://www.ethiodemographyandhealth.org/Amhara.html 
Figure A.2: Map of Amhara Region 
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Figure A.3: Household land-use certificate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture of land holder      Picture of spouse 
1. The holder’s full name and address 
 
1.1 . Holder’s name Sex Date of birth 
  a.------------------ --- -------------- 
  b.----------------- --- -------------- 
  
1.2. Care taker’s name Sex date of birth 
 ------------ --- ---------- 
 
1.3 Spouse’s name  Sex date of birth 
 a.------------  ---- --------------- 
 b.------------  --- --------------- 
 
1.4 Family members/Inheriting under age children 
 Name  Sex Date of Birth Relationship Remark 
. a.---------- --- -------  ----------- --------- 
 b.---------- --- -------  ----------- --------- 
 c.---------- --- -------  ----------- --------- 
 
1.5 Holder’s permanent address 
Killil----------  Zone------ Woreda------ Kebele------------ 
Sub-Kebele-------- Sub-sub Kebele (Gote)-------- Remark---------- 
 
 
2. ID number of the land 
2.1 This book is given to testify the legal protection that rural land holders enjoy to use their land. 
2.2 The holder of this book is considered as the user of the land described in here.  
2.3 Till a precise map indicating the exact location of the land is prepared, the land owner will be given the ‘first 
stage’ certificate document indicated in item 6.  
2.4 When the map indicating the exact location is ready, the land owner will be given ‘the second stage’ certificate 
document indicated in item 7.  
2.5 The rights and responsibilities indicated in this book are equally applicable to both the first stage and second 
stage certificates.  
2.6 Incentives will be given to those who are exemplary in their use and management of own land.  
2.7 Fee free certification renewal service will be provided for those who transfer land in order to consolidate their 
holdings.  
2.8 This book is valid only if signed and sealed by the appropriate officials.  
2.9 This book is a 20 page legal document. 
3. The rights of the holder. 
3.1 So long as the holder properly uses the land given to him under item 6.2/7.1, he has the right to use the land and has 
a legal guarantee not to lose his holding. 
3.2 The holder has a constitutional right to accumulate asset on his holding. Unless it is required for public use, the holder 
has undeniable use right on his holding.  
3.3 Whenever according to the law the holder is disposed of his holdings for public use, s/he has the right to get a 
replacement whenever is appropriate and get a compensation for her/his asset on the holdings. 
3.4 The holder has the right, according to the law, to rent out and inherit his/her holdings. 
3.5 The holder has the right to borrow against assets on own holdings. 
3.6 The holder can terminate his rights to hold the land at any time. When dispossessing once land voluntarily, one has 
the right to recover all the assets on the holdings. 
3.7 In carrying out his responsibility of properly using the land, the holder has the right to ask for assistance from 
appropriate government offices. 
3.8 When the holder is disposed of his land for irrigation development, s/he has the right to get a comparable land that 
used the newly developed irrigation system. 
3.9 The holder has the right to harvest and maintain/replace tree that s/he planted on the side of feeder roads. 
3.10 The holder has the right to collectively develop and use CPRs within the village. 
3.11 In the absence of own entry and exit to the holdings, the holder has the right to enter and exit her/his livestock to own 
land using holdings owned by other person(s). 
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Figure A.3: Household land-use certificate, cont’d. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  The responsibilities of the holder. 
4.1 The holder has the obligation to properly maintain the land under his possession. 
4.2 The holder can prepare land use plan in consultation with appropriate professionals.  The land use plan 
shall consider the safety of the environment and the holder has the obligation to reduce environmental damages. 
4.3 The holder has the obligation to confirm that land related improvements on his land shall not have any 
adverse effects on the neighboring parcels. 
4.4 The holder has the obligation to construct suitable flood control structures. 
4.5 In case of expropriation of land for public interest, the holder has the obligation to cooperate with the 
authorities after receiving the appropriate compensation. 
4.6 The holder has the obligation to give access to his land if irrigation canals and other related 
infrastructures have to pass through his land. 
4.7 If the holder benefits from an irrigation scheme, part of the irrigable land will be taken to compensate the 
person who lost land due to the construction of the irrigation infrastructure 
4.8 If the land is adjacent to a river or cliff, the holder has the obligation to plough within a certain distance, 
which will be decided by the concerned authority, from the river or the cliff. In additions, the holder has the 
obligation to properly maintain the borders by planting trees and has the right to use the benefits from the trees. 
4.9 If the land is adjacent to main or feeder roads, the holder has the obligation to plant trees alongside the 
road, and to properly maintain them, and he has the right to use the benefits. 
4.10 The holder has the obligation to contribute in the protection of communal land in accordance with the 
customary laws of the community. 
4.11 The holder has the obligation to cooperate in measuring or surveying and demarcation of his land when 
asked by the appropriate authority. 
4.12 As long as they are not harmful, the holder has the obligation to give due care to wild animals found 
around his land to protect them from harm. 
4.13 The holder shall not plant/grow any trees (species) that are hazardous to the society. 
4.14 The holder has the obligation to provide land related information when asked by the appropriate 
authorities for the purpose of making land administration related studies. 
4.15 The holder shall keep this book of possession and he has the obligation to show it when asked by the 
appropriate authorities. 
 
5. Effects of failure to discharged obligations 
5.1 Any land possessor who fails to properly maintain his land (if the land is damaged due to negligence) 
shall be punished in accordance with the regulations issued for the implementation of proclamation 46/92. 
5.2 Any possessor who does not cooperate in maintaining common property land shall be punished 
according to the law. 
5.3 Any land possessor who fails to respect his obligations and cause any damage on others land shall be 
punished on the ground of committing breach of law and he will be also obliged to pay compensation in 
accordance with the country’s civil law. 
5.4 A punishment will be imposed on the ground of committing breach of law against a holder who refuses 
to cooperate with the community to protect communal land, who does not provide others access to their land, and 
who cause danger to wildlife that are not harmful in any way. 
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Figure A.3: Household land-use certificate, Cont’d. 
6. First stage land possession certificate        
6.1 Holding identification number 
____________  Local area measurement unit___________ 
6.2 Holding details         
Parc
el 
ID 
No. 
Current 
land use 
Adjacent (neighbor) parcels 
Parcel 
size in 
local 
measure
ment 
unit 
Soil 
quality 
(relative) 
Mode of 
acquisition 
Location of the parcel Remark 
East West South North 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
                 
Total                
 
6.3 This first stage land possession certificate is issued to the holders whose names are 
entered in 1.1 on condition that they properly maintain and use the parcels listed in 6.2 
above. 
 
6.6 Name and signature of the officials who certified the book of possession 
a Kebele rural land administration committee chairman 
 
6.4 Date issued or updated   Name________________________ Signature___________ 
Day _______________ Month ______________ Year_________________ b Woreda environmental protection and rural land administration bureau, official 
6.5 Holders signature     Name__________________Singature____________  
Name ____________________________ Signature____________       
Name __________________________ Signature_______________       
 Note: The soil quality of each parcel should be recorded as high, medium or low, relatively. 
A           
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Figure A.3: Household land-use certificate, cont’d. 
7. Second stage land possession certificate        
7.1 Holding identification number__________        
        
7.2 Holding details          
Parcel 
ID 
No. 
Current land use 
Reference 
map 
number 
Type of cadastral survey 
instrument 
GPS coordinates of the parcel (at the 
center of the parcel) 
Parcel 
size in 
hectare 
Soil of quality 
Mod
e of 
acqui
sition 
Location 
of the 
parcel 
Remark 
North East 
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
                      
Total                     
 
7.3 This first stage land possession certificate is issued to the holders whose names 
are entered in 1.1 on condition that they properly maintain and use the parcels listed 
in 6.2 above. 
 
7.4 Date issued or updated 
 
 
 
7.6 Name and signature officials 
  
Name_______________________
Signature___________ 
 
 
Day _______________ Month ______________ Year_________________ 
b Woreda environmental protection and rural land administration bureau, 
official 
7.5 Holders signature   
Name ____________________________ Signature____________    
Name __________________________ Signature_______________       
163 
 
Figure A.4: Joint land-use certificate in the Amhara region 
 
Source: Haile, Zerfu (2010) 
 
Figure A.5: Land-use certificate of a female household head in the Amhara region 
 
Source: Haile, Zerfu (2010) 
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Chapter 3 Appendix 
 
B.1 Chapter 3 Appendix Tables  
 
Table B.1: Conversion of Ethiopian Calendar (E.C.) to Gregorian Calendar 
  
Source: http://calendar-converter.com/index.php?p=ethiopian  
Ethiopian Calendar (E.C.) Gregorian Calendar
Septmber 1, 1996 September 11, 2003
October 1, 1996 October 11, 2003
November 1, 1996 November 10, 2003
December 1, 1996 December 10, 2003
January 1, 1996 January 9, 2004
February 1, 1996 February 8, 2004
March 1, 1996 March 10, 2004
April 1, 1996 April 9, 2004
May 1, 1996 May 9, 2004
June 1, 1996 June  8, 2004
July 1, 1996 July 08, 2004
August 1, 1996 August 7, 2004
Pagume (13th month in E.C.) September 6, 2004
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Table C.1: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (parcels belonging to male   
                  and female household heads) 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
total number of parcels belonging to both male and 
female headed households 
7,988
Total # of households total number of both male and female headed households 1,759
Certification
Certificate status equals 1 if parcel is certified, and 0 otherwise 7988 0.793 0.405 0 1
Certificate timing equals 1 if parcel is certified "late", and 0 otherwise 6330 0.805 0.396 0 1
Location of Parcel
Kebele
equals 1 if parcel is located in Amanuel; 2=Debre 
Elias; 3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 
7=Kete; 8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 
11=Aaddis Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 
14=Addis Gulit
7988 7.346 3.931 1 14
Parcel Characteristics
Parcel type equals 1 if parcel is Black; 2= Red; 3= Gray; 4= Other 7977 1.917 0.905 1 4
Parcel depth equals 1 if parcel is Deep; 2= Medium; 3= Shallow 7970 1.829 0.694 1 3
Parcel slope equals 1 if parcel is flat; 2=Medium; 3=Steep 7976 1.329 0.571 1 3
Parcel quality equals 1 if parcel is fertile; 2=Medium-fertile; 3= 
Infertile 7975 1.600 0.725 1 3
Parcel size (hectares) Average parcel size in each household 7969 0.042 0.415 0 7.13015
SWC maintenance
equals 1 if there was soil and water conservation 
structures maintenace undetaken on parcel, and 0 
otherwise
7203 0.324 0.468 0 1
Household Head Characteristics
Sex equals 0 if male; and 1 otherwise 7913 0.160 0.366 0 1
Age average age of household head 7851 51.089 14.803 13 100
Years of schooling average numer of household head schooling years 7839 1.119 2.553 0 14
Number of prime age males average number of prime-age males in the household 7913 1.161 1.176 0 8
Household Wealth Characteristics
Number of bulls/oxen average number of bulls/oxen in the household 7658 1.632 1.315 0 8
Household Accessability
Distance to nearest road 
average distance of household residence to the 
nearest road in metres
7894 31.608 32.869 0 180
Source: 2007 Survey of Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands
Note: Parcel type: "black" is the "best"; Parcel depth: "deep" is the best; Parcel slope: "flat" is the best; Parcel quality: "fertile" is the best.
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Table C.2: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (parcels belonging to male   
                  household heads) 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
total number of parcels belonging to male headed 
households 
6,649
Total # of households total number of male headed households 1,422
Certification
Certificate status equals 1 if parcel is certified, and 0 otherwise 6649 0.794104 0.404385 0 1
Certificate timing equals 1 if parcel is certified "late", and 0 otherwise 5275 0.818578 0.3854038 0 1
Location of Parcel
Kebele
equals 1 if parcel is located in Amanuel; 2=Debre 
Elias; 3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 
7=Kete; 8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 
11=Aaddis Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 
14=Addis Gulit
6649.00 7.19 3.92 1.00 14.00
Parcel Characteristics
Parcel type equals 1 if parcel is Black; 2= Red; 3= Gray; 4= Other 6641 1.921849 0.8941274 1 4
Parcel depth equals 1 if parcel is Deep; 2= Medium; 3= Shallow 6633 1.835067 0.6965324 1 3
Parcel slope
equals 1 if parcel is flat; 2=Medium; 3=Steep
6639 1.336346 0.5725386 1 3
Parcel quality equals 1 if parcel is fertile; 2=Medium-fertile; 3= 
Infertile
6638 1.623832 0.7346141 1 3
Parcel size (hectares) Average parcel size in each household
6640 0.029522 0.3216979 0 6.55974
SWC maintenance
equals 1 if there was soil and water conservation 
structures maintenace undetaken on parcel, and 0 
otherwise
6073 0.328997 0.4698876 0 1
Household Head Characteristics
Sex equals 0 if male; and 1 otherwise 6649 0 0 0 0
Age average age of household head 6594 50.86078 14.84841 13 100
Years of schooling average numer of household head schooling years 6579 1.246086 2.673206 0 14
Number of prime age males average number of prime-age males in the household 6649 1.159723 1.188365 0 8
Household Wealth Characteristics
Number of bulls/oxen average number of bulls/oxen in the household 6463 1.771004 1.302159 0 8
Household Accessability
Distance to nearest road
average distance of household residence to the 
nearest road in metres
6571 32.61642 33.46169 0 180
Source: 2007 Survey of Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands
Note: Parcel type: "black" is the "best"; Parcel depth: "deep" is the best; Parcel slope: "flat" is the best; Parcel quality: "fertile" is the best.
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Table C.3: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (parcels belonging to female   
                  household heads) 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations total number of parcels belonging to female headed 
households 
1,264
Total # of households total number of female headed households 325
Certification
Certificate status equals 1 if parcel is certified, and 0 otherwise 1264 0.77532 0.417539 0 1
Certificate timing equals 1 if parcel is certified "late", and 0 otherwise 980 0.73673 0.44063 0 1
Location of Parcel
Kebele
equals 1 if parcel is located in Amanuel; 2=Debre 
Elias; 3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 
7=Kete; 8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 
11=Aaddis Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 
14=Addis Gulit
1264 8.22389 3.822221 1 14
Parcel Characteristics
Parcel type equals 1 if parcel is Black; 2= Red; 3= Gray; 4= Other 1261 1.88898 0.958859 1 4
Parcel depth equals 1 if parcel is Deep; 2= Medium; 3= Shallow 1262 1.7916 0.688751 1 3
Parcel slope equals 1 if parcel is flat; 2=Medium; 3=Steep 1262 1.30032 0.566848 1 3
Parcel quality equals 1 if parcel is fertile; 2=Medium-fertile; 3= 
Infertile
1262 1.47227 0.665527 1 3
Parcel size (hectares) Average parcel size in each household 1254 0.11136 0.733916 0.000001 7.1302
SWC maintenance
equals 1 if there was soil and water conservation 
structures maintenace undetaken on parcel, and 0 
otherwise
1130 0.29558 0.456503 0 1
Household Head Characteristics
Sex equals 0 if male; and 1 otherwise 1264 1 0 1 1
Age average age of household head 1257 52.284 14.50713 20 90
Years of schooling average numer of household head schooling years
1260 0.45238 1.647233 0 12
Number of prime age males average number of prime-age males in the household 1264 1.16851 1.106057 0 4
Household Wealth Characteristics
Number of bulls/oxen average number of bulls/oxen in the household 1195 0.87782 1.113403 0 6
Household Accessability
Distance to nearest road 
average distance of household residence to the 
nearest road in metres
1248 27.0895 29.66495 0 180
Note: Parcel type: "black" is the "best"; Parcel depth: "deep" is the best; Parcel slope: "flat" is the best; Parcel quality: "fertile" is the best.
Source: 2007 Survey of Sustainable Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands
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Table D.1: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (male and female headed   
                   households) – 1999, 2002, 2004, 2007 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
Total number of observations belnging to male and female 
headed households in 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2007
6541
Total # of households 
Total number of male and female headed households in 1999, 
2002, 2004, and 2007 
1864
Tenure Security
Dummy for household's perceived tenure security: =0 if HH is 
insecure; 1=HH is secure
5289 0.7232 0.4475 0 1
Household's certification status
Dummy for HH certification status: = 0 if HH is not certified; 
1=HH is certified.
6534 0.2118 0.4086 0 1
Kebele
Kebele households reside in: 1=Aamanuel; 2=Debre Elias; 
3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Addis 
Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
6541 7.0610 3.6978 1 14
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 6541 0.1728 0.3781 0 1
Age Age of household head 6499 49.1120 15.5419 13 102
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 6541 1.1703 2.6076 0 19
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 6541 0.9372 1.0868 0 8
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 6541 1.3422 1.2954 0 25
Ownership of bulls/oxen
Dummy for whether a household owns bulls/oxen: 0=No; 
1=Yes
6541 0.6909 0.4622 0 1
Parcel size Total parcel size in HH (hectares) 6223 0.0553 0.4873 0 11.115
Share of fertile parcels Proportion of total land area in hectares that is fertile 6518 0.5930 0.3286 0 1
Share of rented-out parcels Proporton of total land area in hectares that is rented-out 6541 0.1934 0.3602 0 1
Perrenial Crops
Dummy for whether a household grows perrenial crops:0=No; 
1=Yes
6337 0.1543 0.3613 0 1
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table D.2: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (male-headed households) -  
                  1999, 2002, 2004, 2007 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
Total number of observations belonging to male headed 
households in 1999, 2002, 2002, and 2007 5411
Total # of households 
Total number of male headed households in 1999, 2002, 2004, 
and 2007 1622
Tenure Security
Dummy for household's perceived tenure security: =0 if HH is 
insecure; 1=HH is secure
4443 0.7153 0.4513 0 1
Household's certification status
Dummy for HH certification status: = 0 if HH is not certified; 
1=HH is certified.
5404 0.2056 0.4042 0 1
Kebele
Kebele households reside in: 1=Aamanuel; 2=Debre Elias; 
3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Addis 
Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
5411 6.8814 3.7079 1 14
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 5411 0.0000 0.0000 0 0
Age Age of household head 5375 48.6428 15.5514 13 102
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 5411 1.3240 2.7338 0 19
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 5411 0.9300 1.0950 0 8
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 5411 1.4851 1.3015 0 25
Ownership of bulls/oxen
Dummy for whether a household owns bulls/oxen: 0=No; 
1=Yes
5411 0.7588 0.4278 0 1
Parcel size Total parcel size in HH (hectares) 5152 0.0531 0.4789 0 11.115
Share of fertile parcels Proportion of total land area in hectares that is fertile 5394 0.6002 0.3268 0 1
Share of rented-out parcels Proporton of total land area in hectares that is rented-out 5411 0.1419 0.3147 0 1
Perrenial Crops
Dummy for whether a household grows perrenial crops:0=No; 
1=Yes
5303 0.1609 0.3674 0 1
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table D.3: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (female-headed households) -  
                  1999, 2002, 2004, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
Total number of observations belonging to female headed 
households in 1999, 2002, 2004, and 2007
1130
Total # of households 
Total number of female headed households in 1999, 2002, 
2004, and 2007. 450
Tenure Security
Dummy for household's perceived tenure security: =0 if HH is 
insecure; 1=HH is secure
846 0.7648 0.4244 0 1
Household's certification status
Dummy for HH certification status: = 0 if HH is not certified; 
1=HH is certified.
1130 0.2416 0.4282 0 1
Kebele
Kebele households reside in: 1=Aamanuel; 2=Debre Elias; 
3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Addis 
Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
1130 7.9212 3.5259 1 14
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 1130 1.0000 0.0000 1 1
Age Age of household head 1124 51.3559 15.3053 15 92
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 1130 0.4345 1.7091 0 18
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 1130 0.9717 1.0468 0 5
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 1130 0.6575 1.0182 0 6
Ownership of bulls/oxen
Dummy for whether a household owns bulls/oxen: 0=No; 
1=Yes
1130 0.3655 0.4818 0 1
Parcel size Total parcel size in HH (hectares) 1071 0.0657 0.5262 0 7.1393
Share of fertile parcels Proportion of total land area in hectares that is fertile 1124 0.5581 0.3355 0 1
Share of rented-out parcels Proporton of total land area in hectares that is rented-out 1130 0.4399 0.4512 0 1
Perrenial Crops
Dummy for whether a household grows perrenial crops:0=No; 
1=Yes
1034 0.1209 0.3262 0 1
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table D.4: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (male and female headed  
                  households) – 1999 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
Total number of obervations belonging to male and female 
headed households in 1999
1516
Total # of households Total number of male and female headed households in 1999 1516
Tenure Security
Dummy for household's perceived tenure security: =0 if HH is 
insecure; 1=HH is secure
1501 0.7588 0.4279 0 1
Household's certification status
Dummy for HH certification status: = 0 if HH is not certified; 
1=HH is certified.
1516 0.0000 0.0000 0 0
Kebele
Kebele households reside in: 1=Aamanuel; 2=Debre Elias; 
3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Addis 
Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
1516 6.5297 3.3565 1 12
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 1516 0.1656 0.3718 0 1
Age Age of household head 1516 46.5139 15.7293 17 100
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 1516 1.4901 2.7432 0 19
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 1516 0.6438 0.8597 0 5
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 1516 1.0871 1.2493 0 25
Ownership of bulls/oxen
Dummy for whether a household owns bulls/oxen: 0=No; 
1=Yes
1516 0.6194 0.4857 0 1
Parcel size Total parcel size in HH (hectares) 1407 0.0008 0.0052 0 0.1001
Share of fertile parcels Proportion of total land area in hectares that is fertile 1502 0.6071 0.3328 0 1
Share of rented-out parcels Proporton of total land area in hectares that is rented-out 1516 0.1819 0.3500 0 1
Perrenial Crops
Dummy for whether a household grows perrenial crops:0=No; 
1=Yes
1479 0.0994 0.2993 0 1
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table D.5: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (male and female headed  
                   households) – 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
Total number of obervations belonging to male and female 
headed households in 2002
1518
Total # of households Total number of male and female headed households in 2002 1518
Tenure Security
Dummy for household's perceived tenure security: =0 if HH is 
insecure; 1=HH is secure
1494 0.7189 0.4497 0 1
Household's certification status
Dummy for HH certification status: = 0 if HH is not certified; 
1=HH is certified.
1518 0.0000 0.0000 0 0
Kebele
Kebele households reside in: 1=Aamanuel; 2=Debre Elias; 
3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Addis 
Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
1518 6.5171 3.3561 1 12
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 1518 0.1502 0.3574 0 1
Age Age of household head 1513 48.2274 15.6627 15 102
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 1518 1.0804 2.4829 0 12
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 1518 0.7945 0.9510 0 6
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 1518 1.1331 1.0805 0 11
Ownership of bulls/oxen
Dummy for whether a household owns bulls/oxen: 0=No; 
1=Yes
1518 0.6607 0.4736 0 1
Parcel size Total parcel size in HH (hectares) 1406 0.0038 0.0255 0 0.3161
Share of fertile parcels Proportion of total land area in hectares that is fertile 1513 0.6126 0.3268 0 1
Share of rented-out parcels Proporton of total land area in hectares that is rented-out 1518 0.1887 0.3551 0 1
Perrenial Crops
Dummy for whether a household grows perrenial crops:0=No; 
1=Yes
1496 0.0856 0.2798 0 1
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table D.6: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (male and female headed  
                  households) – 2004 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
Total number of observations belonging to male and female 
headed households in 2004
1748
Total # of households Total number of male and female headed households in 2004 
1748
Tenure Security
Dummy for household's perceived tenure security: =0 if HH is 
insecure; 1=HH is secure
1113 0.7080 0.4549 0 1
Household's certification status
Dummy for HH certification status: = 0 if HH is not certified; 
1=HH is certified.
1748 0.0120 0.1090 0 1
Kebele
Kebele households reside in: 1=Aamanuel; 2=Debre Elias; 
3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Addis 
Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
1748 7.4840 3.9360 1 14
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 1748 0.1785 0.3830 0 1
Age Age of household head 1735 50.0461 15.4887 13 100
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 1748 1.1905 2.6151 0 13
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 1748 1.0584 1.1549 0 8
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 1748 1.3450 1.1336 0 8
Ownership of bulls/oxen
Dummy for whether a household owns bulls/oxen: 0=No; 
1=Yes
1748 0.7220 0.4482 0 1
Parcel size Total parcel size in HH (hectares) 1658 0.0021 0.0159 0 0.355
Share of fertile parcels Proportion of total land area in hectares that is fertile 1746 0.5818 0.3260 0 1
Share of rented-out parcels Proporton of total land area in hectares that is rented-out 1748 0.1980 0.3649 0 1
Perrenial Crops
Dummy for whether a household grows perrenial crops:0=No; 
1=Yes
1747 0.0572 0.2324 0 1
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table D.7: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (male and female headed  
                   households) – 2007 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
Total number of observations belonging to male and female 
headed households in 2007
1759
Total # of households Total number of male and female headed households in 2007 1759
Tenure Security
Dummy for household's perceived tenure security: =0 if HH is 
insecure; 1=HH is secure
1181 0.6977 0.4594 0 1
Household's certification status
Dummy for HH certification status: = 0 if HH is not certified; 
1=HH is certified.
1752 0.7780 0.4157 0 1
Kebele
Kebele households reside in: 1=Aamanuel; 2=Debre Elias; 
3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Addis 
Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
1759 7.5679 3.8873 1 14
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 1759 0.1927 0.3945 0 1
Age Age of household head 1735 51.2196 14.9434 15 97
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 1759 0.9522 2.5594 0 15
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 1759 1.1927 1.2165 0 7
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 1759 1.7396 1.5366 0 16
Ownership of bulls/oxen
Dummy for whether a household owns bulls/oxen: 0=No; 
1=Yes
1759 0.7476 0.4345 0 1
Parecel size Total parcel size in HH (hectares) 1752 0.1907 0.9042 0 11.115
Share of fertile parcels Proportion of total land area in hectares that is fertile 1757 0.5750 0.3282 0 1
Share of rented-out parcels Proporton of total land area in hectares that is rented-out 1759 0.2027 0.3685 0 1
Perrenial Crops
Dummy for whether a household grows perrenial crops:0=No; 
1=Yes
1615 0.3734 0.4839 0 1
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
177 
Table D.8: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (male-headed households) –  
                  2007 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
Total number of observations belonging to male headed 
households in 2007
1420
Total # of households Total number of male headed households in 2007 1420
Tenure Security
Dummy for household's perceived tenure security: =0 if HH is 
insecure; 1=HH is secure
978 0.682 0.4659361 0 1
Household's certification status
Dummy for HH certification status: = 0 if HH is not certified; 
1=HH is certified.
1413 0.77636 0.4168295 0 1
Kebele
Kebele households reside in: 1=Aamanuel; 2=Debre Elias; 
3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Addis 
Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
1420 7.35916 3.900347 1 14
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 1420 0 0 0 0
Age Age of household head 1399 50.8306 14.9569 15 97
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 1420 1.0831 2.696825 0 15
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 1420 1.20282 1.230224 0 7
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 1420 1.95211 1.531153 0 16
Ownership of bulls/oxen
Dummy for whether a household owns bulls/oxen: 0=No; 
1=Yes
1420 0.82535 0.3797994 0 1
Parcel size Total parcel size in HH (hectares) 1413 0.18808 0.9004386 0 11.115
Share of fertile parcels Proportion of total land area in hectares that is fertile 1419 0.5866 0.327515 0 1
Share of rented-out parcels Proporton of total land area in hectares that is rented-out 1420 0.13788 0.3122529 0 1
Perrenial Crops
Dummy for whether a household grows perrenial crops:0=No; 
1=Yes
1360 0.375 0.484301 0 1
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table D.9: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (female-headed households) – 
                   2007 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
Total number of observations belonging to female headed 
households in 2007
339
Total # of households Total number of female headed households 339
Tenure Security
Dummy for household's perceived tenure security: =0 if HH is 
insecure; 1=HH is secure
203 0.7734 0.4196672 0 1
Household's certification status
Dummy for HH certification status: = 0 if HH is not certified; 
1=HH is certified.
339 0.78466 0.4116651 0 1
Kebele
Kebele households reside in: 1=Aamanuel; 2=Debre Elias; 
3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Addis 
Mender; 12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
339 8.44248 3.712138 1 14
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 339 1 0 1 1
Age Age of household head 336 52.8393 14.79969 20 92
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 339 0.40413 1.778932 0 14
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 339 1.15044 1.158104 0 5
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 339 0.84956 1.205666 0 6
Ownership of bulls/oxen
Dummy for whether a household owns bulls/oxen: 0=No; 
1=Yes
339 0.42183 0.4945815 0 1
Parcel size Total parcel size in HH (hectares) 339 0.2016 0.9210482 0 7.1393
Share of fertile parcels Proportion of total land area in hectares that is fertile 338 0.52651 0.3270253 0 1
Share of rented-out parcels Proporton of total land area in hectares that is rented-out 339 0.47427 0.45322 0 1
Perrenial Crops
Dummy for whether a household grows perrenial crops:0=No; 
1=Yes
255 0.36471 0.4822942 0 1
Source: Own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table E.1: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (parcels belonging to male and   
                  female household heads), 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations total number of parcels belonging to both male and female headed 
households in 2007
7,988
Total # of households total number of both male and female headed households in 2007
1,759
New SWC investment
Dummy for new SWC investment on parcel: =0 if no SWC investment; 
1=if there is SWC investment
4083 0.1915 0.3936 0 1
SWC maintenance
Dummy for SWC maintenance on parcel: =0 if no SWC maintenance; 
1=if there is SWC maintenance
7948 0.3086 0.4620 0 1
Certificate status equals 1 if parcel is certified, and 0 otherwise 7988 0.7931 0.4051 0 1
Kebele
Village location of parcel equals 1 if parcel is located in Amanuel; 
2=Debre Elias; 3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Aaddis Mender; 
12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
7988 7.3461 3.9306 1 14
Parcel size Total parcel size belonging to household (hectares) 7969 0.0421 0.4145 0 7.1302
Parcel quality 1=fertile; 2=medium-fertile; 3=infertile 7975 1.6004 0.7252 1 3
Parcel slope 1=flat; 2=medium; 3=steep 7976 1.3294 0.5712 1 3
Share of rented-out parcels
Proportion total parcel area in hectares that is rented-out by the 
household
7988 0.1827 0.3516 0 1
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 7988 0.1694 0.3751 0 1
Age Age of household head 7898 51.6055 14.4218 15 97
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 7786 0.9842 2.5965 0 15
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 7988 1.2807 1.2281 0 7
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 7988 1.8729 1.6045 0 16
Source: Authors' own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table E.2: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (parcels belonging to male    
                  household heads), 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations total number of parcels belonging to male headed households in 2007 6,635
Total # of households total number of male headed households in 2007 1,420
New SWC investment
Dummy for new SWC investment on parcel: =0 if no SWC investment; 
1=if there is SWC investment
3330 0.2090 0.4067 0 1
SWC maintenance
Dummy for SWC maintenance on parcel: =0 if no SWC maintenance; 
1=if there is SWC maintenance
6606 0.3149 0.4645 0 1
Certificate status equals 1 if parcel is certified, and 0 otherwise
6635 0.7937 0.4047 0 1
Kebele
Village location of parcel equals 1 if parcel is located in Amanuel; 
2=Debre Elias; 3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Aaddis Mender; 
12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
6635 7.1590 3.9352 1 14
Parcel size Total parcel size belonging to household (hectares) 6626 0.0290 0.3210 0 6.5597
Parcel quality 1=fertile; 2=medium-fertile; 3=infertile 6624 1.6258 0.7349 1 3
Parcel slope 1=flat; 2=medium; 3=steep 6625 1.3366 0.5741 1 3
Share of rented-out parcels
Proportion total parcel area in hectares that is rented-out by the 
household
6635 0.1291 0.3006 0 1
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 6635 0.0000 0.0000 0 0
Age Age of household head 6561 51.2681 14.4550 15 97
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 6450 1.1043 2.7310 0 15
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 6635 1.2879 1.2362 0 7
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 6635 2.0644 1.6053 0 16
Source: Authors' own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table E.3: Variable summary statistics and descriptions (parcels belonging to female  
                  household heads, 2007 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Total # of observations
total number of parcels belonging to female headed households in 2007 
1,353
Total # of households total number of female headed households in 2007 339
New SWC investment
Dummy for new SWC investment on parcel: =0 if no SWC investment; 
1=if there is SWC investment
753 0.1142 0.3183 0 1
SWC maintenance
Dummy for SWC maintenance on parcel: =0 if no SWC maintenance; 
1=if there is SWC maintenance
1342 0.2779 0.4482 0 1
Parcel certification status
Dummy for parcel certification status: = 0 if parcel is not certified; 
1=parcel is certified.
1353 0.7901 0.4074 0 1
Kebele
Village location of parcel equals 1 if parcel is located in Amanuel; 
2=Debre Elias; 3=Kebi; 4=Wolkite; 5=Telma; 6=Sekla Debir; 7=Kete; 
8=Godguadit; 9=Amba Mariam; 10=Yamed; 11=Aaddis Mender; 
12=Chorisa; 13=Indod Ber; 14=Addis Gulit
1353 8.2639 3.7773 1 14
Parcel size Total parcel size belonging to household (hectares) 1343 0.1066 0.7117 0.0000 7.1302
Parcel quality 1=fertile; 2=medium-fertile; 3=infertile 1351 1.4759 0.6616 1 3
Parcel slope 1=flat; 2=medium; 3=steep 1351 1.2939 0.5553 1 3
Share of rented-out parcels
Proportion total parcel area in hectares that is rented-out by the 
household
1353 0.4455 0.4516 0 1
Sex Sex of household head: 0=male, 1=female 1353 1.0000 0.0000 1 1
Age Age of household head 1337 53.2610 14.1470 20 92
Years of schooling Years of schooling of household head 1336 0.4042 1.6964 0 14
Number of prime-age males Number of prime age (15-45 years old) males in the household 1353 1.2454 1.1875 0 5
Number of bulls/oxen Average number of bulls/oxen owned by the household 1353 0.9342 1.2257 0 6
Source: Authors' own estimation from the "Sustainble Land Use in the Ethiopian Highlands" survey.
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Table E.4: Determinants of new/additional SWC investment – linear probability model   
                  estimation with actual parcel certification status variable 
 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3)
Certification Status 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.058
(0.025) (0.030) (0.044)
Parcel size -0.009 0.003 -0.007
(0.015) (0.027) (0.015)
Medium parcel quality -0.062*** -0.075*** -0.046*
(0.014) (0.016) (0.026)
Infertile parcel quality -0.009 -0.030 0.069
(0.021) (0.024) (0.049)
Medium parcel slope -0.020 -0.011 -0.052*
(0.014) (0.016) (0.028)
Steep parcel slope -0.005 0.012 -0.096*
(0.027) (0.031) (0.050)
Age -0.001** -0.001* -0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Sex -0.061*** --- ---
(0.017)
Years of schooling 0.002 0.002 0.007
(0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.008 0.008 -0.019
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012)
Number of prime-age males -0.004 -0.009 0.036***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012)
Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes
N 3903 3184 719
Pseudo R Squared 0.0193 0.0145 0.0358
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Parcels from Male and 
Female Headed 
Households
Parcels from Male 
Headed 
Households
Parcels from 
Female Headed 
Households
Standard error in parentheses, and clustered at the househld level
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Table E.5: Determinants of SWC maintenance – linear probability model estimation with    
                  actual parcel certification status variable 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3)
Certification Status 0.148*** 0.168*** 0.078**
(0.018) (0.021) (0.038)
Parcel size -0.014 -0.029* 0.005
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016)
Medium parcel quality -0.011 -0.010 0.007
(0.011) (0.012) (0.026)
Infertile parcel quality -0.031* -0.024 -0.050
(0.016) (0.017) (0.043)
Medium parcel slope 0.121*** 0.122*** 0.106***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.029)
Steep parcel slope 0.104*** 0.110*** 0.052
(0.022) (0.024) (0.053)
Age -0.001*** -0.001* -0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Sex -0.067***
(0.013)
Years of schooling -0.003 -0.002 -0.009
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007)
Number of bulls/oxen 0.008** 0.007* 0.034***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
Number of prime-age males 0.004 -0.004 0.027**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.011)
Kebele FE Yes Yes Yes
N 7628 6326 1302
Pseudo R Squared 0.0317 0.0276 0.0460
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Standard error in parentheses, and clustered at the household level
Parcels from Male and 
Female Headed 
Households
Parcels from Male 
Headed 
Households
Parcels from 
Female Headed 
Households
